Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

hectare and 1.5 tonnes per hectare, respectively, slightly above regional averages of 4.1 tonnes per hectare and 1.4 tonnes per hectare. Cassava, maize and soybeans thus have possible production and export potential. Cambodia’s natural rubber yield at 940 kg per hectare is lower than the regional average of 1.3 tonnes per hectare, but higher than in Malaysia (693 kg per hectare) and Myanmar (616 kg per hectare). Nevertheless, despite the low yield, growth in rubber has been impressive in recent years given the rebound in world demand for natural rubber since the global economic recession. However, several hurdles and bottlenecks to expansion exist, some of which are more binding and protracted than others and require immediate interventions from the government (Table 1).

3. Extent and nature of foreign investment in agriculture in Cambodia

After its transition to a free market economic system in the early 1990s, Cambodia took steps to promote investment, both private domestic and foreign, through the privatization of state-owned resources and the promulgation of the Law on Investment in 1995, which provided tax and administrative incentives – and protection – to domestic and foreign investors. Investment started to flourish, gaining more momentum when Cambodia achieved genuine peace and stability in the late 1990s after the Khmer Rouge collapsed and rebel fighters were incorporated into the government defence forces.

Data from the Cambodia Investment Board (CIB) of CDC for the period from 2000 to June 2010, shows upward trends of investment. The critical turnaround in total investment occurred in 2005, which stemmed primarily from considerable engagement from China, Thailand and Republic of Korea, then rising substantially and continuing to expand into 2008. However, the pace of expansion slowed in 2009, as a result of the impacts of the global economic crisis on the Cambodian economy: total investment in that year fell sharply, to twice as low as that in 2008. Rostow (1960), among others cited in Todaro and Smith (2003: 115), indicates that countries which are able to save or generate investment of around 15 to 20 percent of GDP can grow at a much faster rate than those which save less, and that this growth will then be self-sustaining. It is difficult to apply this to the Cambodian case, though, given the absence of data on actual implementation of approved investment projects in the country.

| TABLE 1 |
| Likely constraints to agricultural development in Cambodia |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal/domestic challenges</th>
<th>External constraints/factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• High informal export cost</td>
<td>• Many major consuming countries protect their markets (e.g. Japan, Korea Rep., some ASEAN countries)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Lack of irrigation infrastructure and low level of technology in farming and processing</td>
<td>• Few countries offer preferential market access for Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High input cost and low quality and capacity of milling/processing</td>
<td>• Exports rely largely on demand and milling facilities in Thailand and Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Inadequate storage and grain silos</td>
<td>• Importing countries often require a Special Purpose Ship Safety Certificate, which Cambodia lacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of low-interest credit</td>
<td>• Narrow export markets i.e. Thailand and Viet Nam, mostly for informal exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of awareness of new and efficient planting techniques and lack of motivation to diversify production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient (or absence of) trademarks and geographical indications</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High transportation costs due to infrastructure problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of marketing skills and market information system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• No brand names</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deforestation due to the expansion of certain crops, like soybeans</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Source: UNDP, 2007
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

Private domestic engagement and foreign engagement were about equal between 2000 and 2010: the average share of FDI in total investment in the period was about 58 percent. FDI showed an upward trend but slowed in 2009 after the global economic crisis hit. Among foreign investors, China stood out, followed by the Republic of Korea, United States, Thailand, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, in that order. Traditional investors, like China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, have been injecting more funds into the Cambodian economy since 2000, which reflects their growing trust and confidence in the country’s investment environment. Additionally, countries such as Viet Nam, Japan and United States have shown rising interest in the past couple of years. This is a promising sign for overall output growth in the medium and long term, despite the shocks of 2008 and 2009.

3.1 Approved Investment by sector

In terms of distribution by sector, tourism and industry have absorbed a great deal of investment during the past decade, followed by services. Tourism was champion, with a share in total investment averaging 35 percent between 2000 and June 2010, followed by industry (32 percent) and services (25 percent). Investment in agriculture was sluggish during the same period (Figure 2). In terms of accumulation of approved investment, tourism took the lead with 58 percent, followed by services (19 percent) and industry (17 percent); agriculture contributed the smallest share: around 6 percent. High capital inflows into tourism are attributable to the government’s 1997 Open Sky Policy, the achievement of peace and political stability in 1998, and the gradual improvement of national infrastructures, particularly road connectivity and bridges.

Sluggish growth in agricultural investment between 2000 and 2010 can be explained by the fact that investment in agriculture is a long-term process with weak likelihood of return, and by the widespread nature of ill-defined property rights which prevent enterprises from using land and property as collateral to access finance (World Bank 2006: 74).

### TABLE 2
Investment approved by CIB, 2000–2010 (Fixed assets in million US$)

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<td>415</td>
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<td>6,866</td>
<td>2,101</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>14,474</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Note: data for 2010 = January to June. Source: CDC, 2010
3.2 FDI in agriculture by nationality

Table 3 shows a significant contribution of FDI to agriculture in Cambodia between 2000 and 2010, with an average share of fixed assets of 78.4 percent, along with a slow but stable growth of private domestic investment, which averaged 21.6 percent in the same period. The significant rise in both private domestic and foreign investment has been more evident in recent years. This can be attributed to steep rises in global demand for natural rubber, particularly from China, India, Japan and the United States, as a result of a hike in the price of synthetic rubber after the petroleum price spike in late 2007 and 2008; for bio-fuel refined from common crops like palm oil and corn; and for food, such as rice, from food-importing countries in the region and the world.

Although the monetary value of foreign projects looks small compared with total FDI in the three major sectors of tourism, industry and services, the total size of secured land in agriculture may be substantial and thereby have negative implications for the environment and food security.

Looking at data for the period 2000 to 2010, illustrated in Table 3, China stands out as the second-largest investor in agriculture with a share of fixed assets of 17.6 percent, following Thailand, with the largest share of 21.7 percent. There is also evidence of rising interest in agriculture in Cambodia from such countries as Viet Nam (14.8 percent), Republic of Korea (6.5 percent), Singapore (4.8 percent), India (4.4 percent), United States (3.6 percent) and Japan (1.8 percent). All of these countries are mainly involved in crops and forestry, as discussed in the following section. Although this dramatic surge in foreign engagement in agriculture could be favourable at the macro level, negative trends could arise at the micro level if there is an absence of sound and prudent investment coordination mechanisms, environmental impact assessments and regular on-site investigations that are pro-poor, environmentally aware and consider food security as a priority issue.

3.3 Subsectoral breakdown of investment in agriculture

The CDC does not have a template giving a sectoral breakdown of agriculture data; categorization must be done instead, using different data sources. This study breaks agriculture down into crops, livestock, fisheries, forestry, fruit, food processing and others. This

![FIGURE 2](image2.png)

**FIGURE 2**
Share of approved investment by sector, 2000–June 2010 (Million US$)

![FIGURE 3](image3.png)

**FIGURE 3**
Share of approved investment by sector, 2000–June 2010
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

is the first attempt, and the results may differ in future work given the constraints to subsector classification. For instance, rubber and acacia plantations, which might fit into either the crops subsector or the forestry subsector, is in crops for the purposes of this study.

As mentioned in Section 3.2, Thailand ranks first in agricultural investment in Cambodia, followed by China, Viet Nam and Republic of Korea, in that order. Breaking agriculture down into five subsectors, we find that foreign investors engage mainly in crops, forestry and other sectors. In crops, fixed asset investment is dominated by Thailand, Viet Nam and China. Thai investors tend to have a strong interest in sugar cane, which is estimated to have created approximately 13,500 jobs, and less so in rubber, palm oil and cassava. The majority of the firms come in the form of pure Thai ownership or partnership with Cambodians. In contrast, Vietnamese investors appear to have been focusing on rubber plantation in recent years, which is estimated to have generated around 11,000 jobs, and less so on cashew nuts, palm oil, cassava and sugar cane, in that order. The ownership structure of Vietnamese investors is similar to that of Thai investors. China is geared towards rubber and cashew nuts, and less so towards palm oil, sugar cane and cassava. Most Chinese investments have pure Chinese ownership.

Apart from these dominant players, Japan, Republic of Korea and Singapore have also made a marked contribution to crops. A Japanese investor has partnered with Thai (50 percent), Cambodian (20 percent) and Chinese (15 percent) investors in a sugar cane plantation in the Koh Kong province in southwest Cambodia, on the border with Thailand. This partnership received approval from the CIB in November 2007. Korean investors tend to be drawn to rubber, cassava and cashew nuts, in projects which take the

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**TABLE 3**

Agriculture investment approved by CIB, 2000–2010 (fixed Assets in million US$)

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</thead>
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<td>82.6</td>
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Source: CDC, 2010
form of pure Korean ownership or partnership with Cambodians. Singapore has two projects, each of which is in both rubber and corn, with pure Singaporean ownership; the CIB approved both of these in July 2009. In addition, there is involvement from France, Malaysia, Israel and the United States. France engaged in rice plantation and milling in November 2008 as a joint venture. Malaysia started a joint venture with Cambodia (12.5 percent), to grow palm oil, rubber and cashew nuts in July 2004. Israel, as a joint venture firm, started cassava plantation in March 2007, and the United States (100 percent USA fixed asset), became involved in cashew and cassava plantation in February 2000.

Chinese and Thai investors are dominant in the forestry sector. Chinese investors focus on the production of pistachio and acacia trees, by investing their own fixed assets in the form of ELCs. In the case of Thai investment, it is not clear what tree groups are involved. There is also involvement from neighbouring Viet Nam, as well as from Denmark and Canada. Vietnamese investment comes in the form of a joint venture with Cambodia (30 percent), in acacia plantation, which was approved by the CIB in March 2010. Canada engages in teak plantation in partnership with China (40 percent), under the company name GG World Group Development; this venture obtained approval from the CIB in December 2005. Denmark is also involved in teak plantation and uses 100 percent own fixed assets; this project was approved by the CIB in April 2010. In addition to foreign engagement in crops and forestry, there are a number of other foreign investments in other subsectors, namely, agro-industry in general, animal meal, corn-drying, crepe rubber processing, palm oil refinery and development, herbal tea production, hollyhock plantation and

---

**TABLE 4**

Approved agriculture subsector investment accumulated over 2000–June 2010 (Fixed Assets in million US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Fisheries</th>
<th>Forestry</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<td>32.1</td>
<td>303.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.2</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>82.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>266.9</td>
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<td>194.8</td>
<td>182.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CDC, 2010

---

processing and integrated sugar cane plantation and sugar refining. Investors from China and the United States are involved in general agro-industry, whereas the Republic of Korea invests in corn plantation and drying, hollyhock plantation and processing and animal meal. Malaysia had a project in palm oil development and refinery approved by the CIB in June 2004 as a joint venture with Cambodia (40 percent), and Taiwan invested its own fixed assets in a herbal tea factory in March 2010. The United States has one project in hollyhock plantation and processing, and India has one in integrated sugar plantation and sugar, ethanol and power generation, with a licensed company named Kamadhenu Venture5 growing sugar cane and producing ethanol in the Kratie province.

3.4 FDI in food processing

In the past decade there has been no significant involvement by foreign investors in food processing, whose share of fixed assets in total sector fixed assets is 28.7 percent. Cambodia thus takes the lead in the subsector, but in partnership with foreign investors like Viet Nam, Singapore and Thailand. Australia set up a soya milk manufacturing plant with own assets in 2003 and has joined with Cambodia (which holds 51 percent), in beer manufacturing. Canada started a project in beer manufacturing in 2010 with 100 percent fixed assets, and Singapore has partnered with Cambodian (10 percent), to produce pure drinking water. Thailand partners Cambodia (40 percent), in producing instant noodles and instant food; Viet Nam does so (Cambodia taking 30 percent), in producing beer, soft drinks and drinking water. China invested 100 percent of own capital in sea food processing in 2004. On the whole, only countries in the region appear to have an interest in food processing, except for Australia and Canada.

Overall, at approximately 6 percent, the share of approved fixed investment in agriculture has been minimal but stable during the past decade. Low appropriability of return on investment coupled with ill-defined property rights could hinder private and foreign investment in the subsector.

3.5. Engagement of foreign investors in ELCs

Given the absence of data on land/plantation size of foreign investments from the CDC and some

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved fixed assets in food processing, 2000–June 2010 (Million US$)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
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<td>71.3</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Viet Nam</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share in FDI</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CDC, 2010

5 MAFF has a different name for this: www.elc.maff.gov.kh/comprofiles/krtcarmad.html
of the discrepancies between CDC data and the MAFF website, this study probed data recorded by the MAFF further in order to understand the scale of FDI in agriculture, particularly in the form of ELCs, which could shed some light on the potential effects of FDI on the socioeconomic situation, the environment and food security in the country. Public investment through the leasing of state private land in the form of ELCs to private domestic and foreign investors has been in evidence since 1995, prior even to the promulgation of the Land Law in 2001. According to the Sub-decree on Economic Land Concessions, dated 27 December 2005, ELC refers to a mechanism to grant state private land through a specific contract to a concessionaire for use in agricultural and industrial agricultural exploitation, namely, the cultivation of food crops or industrial crops; raising animals and aquaculture; construction of plants, factories or facilities for processing domestic agriculture raw materials; or a combination of some or all of the above mentioned activities.

The principal aims of such initiatives are to develop intensive agricultural and industrial agricultural activities; to generate employment and diversify livelihood opportunities in rural areas; and to generate government revenue (US$1–10 per hectare per year based on four land categories). Table 8 indicates that private domestic as well as foreign investment in ELCs was not as considerable from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s as it has been from the early 2000s to the present. Cambodia’s newfound peace and stability, along with a better investment environment and rising global demand for industrial crops like rubber and cassava, could be driving factors.

It should be noted, however, that the scale of concessions between 1995 and 2003 was massive. In 1999, 2000 and 2001, concessions were granted for 20 000 hectares, 315 028 hectares and 100 852 hectares, respectively. That such large-scale investment models were permitted before the adoption of the Land Law in 2001 and the Sub-decree on Economic Land Concessions in 2005, meant they were implemented in the absence of sound regulations and governance mechanisms, putting resources and local stakeholders at risk.

By the end of 2009, the MAFF had granted 86 ELC projects (excluding 12 which were cancelled); all but nine have profiles on MAFF’s website. Article 59 of the Land Law in 2001 states that land concession areas shall not be more than 10 000 hectares. In response, the MAFF has been negotiating with companies that have a land area larger than 10 000 hectares, and are slow in implementing their business plans. Overall, 12 projects have been revoked, two of which have a land area above 10 000 hectares. The three mega projects mentioned earlier remain underway.

However, it is vital to note that, in order to secure larger tracts of state private land, some companies use two different names to obtain ELCs. For instance, Koh Kong Plantation Limited and Koh Kong Sugar Company Limited in Koh Kong province have secured land areas of 9 400 hectares and 9 700 hectares, respectively. This creates a total land size of close to 20 000 hectares. Even more importantly, the Council of Ministers can grant exemptions to the required reduction of concessions covering over 10 000 hectares, under conditions set out in Article 39 of the Sub-decree on Economic Land Concessions. As of late 2009, the total land size of reported ELC projects was 1 024 639 hectares. Ngo and Chan (2010: 6) indicate that approximately 500 000 hectares of ELC projects have been granted by and are under the administration of the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) but are not included in MAFF data. This pushes the total size of ELC projects up to around 1.5 million hectares, close to the size of the area under paddy rice of 2.7 million hectares in 2009 (MAFF 2010: 16). As Table 7 shows, ELC projects are mainly under private domestic ownership, according to data from the MAFF website. Foreign investors have acquired an ELC land size of 355 914 hectares, which is around 35 percent of the total and equates to 13 percent of the total paddy rice area in Cambodia in 2009. China is the dominant player among foreign investors, with 17 projects covering a total land size of 186 935 hectares.
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

CAMBODIA

Viet Nam has seven projects with a focus on rubber plantation in Kratie, Ratanakkiri, Mondolkiri, Kompong Thom and Preah Vihear provinces, and Thailand has five projects concentrating on sugar cane in Oddar Meanchey and Koh Kong provinces. The United States has four projects growing teak trees in Kratie and Kompong Speu provinces, and the Republic of Korea has five projects investing mainly in rubber and cassava plantation in Kompong Thom, Ratanakkiri, Kratie and Kompong Speu provinces. India has interests in sugar cane, whereas Malaysia has interests in palm oil plantation.

As illustrated earlier, foreign investors tend to have a strong interest in such crops as rubber, cassava, sugar cane, teak, acacia and pistachio, which are specialities of Cambodia and well suited to the soil conditions in the country. By number of projects, their engagement is seen mainly in Cambodia’s strategic crop provinces, such as Kratie (13 projects), Mondolkiri (5), Kompong Speu (5), Ratanakkiri (4), Stung Treng (4), Oddar Meanchey (4) and Kompong Thom (3).

Given the absence of data on actual implementation of foreign investment projects, it is difficult to generalize about the job creation and income generation benefits to Cambodia. If all the projects are fully realized, generation of income and jobs could be substantial. However, large-scale investment in agriculture in ELCs entails at least a degree of clearance of the forest, upon which many rural households depend as a major source of income. Concentration of projects in provinces like Mondolkiri and Ratanakkiri, where the majority of the population is made up of ethnic minorities and where most people depend on non-timber forest products as their major source of income, could endanger ethnic groups’ livelihoods. Negative effects

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**TABLE 6**
Approved and cancelled ELCs, 1995–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Permitted and ongoing projects</th>
<th>Permitted but later cancelled projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size (ha)</td>
<td>Min. size (ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11 000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>60 200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>33 400</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>341 898</td>
<td>1 070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>128 275</td>
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<td>67 043</td>
<td>3 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>168 256</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29 001</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>40 936</td>
<td>6 523</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>136 130</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 024 639</td>
<td>807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Projects with no reported date and land size 9

Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from MAFF website, www.elc.maff.gov.kh/profiles.html, October, 2010

(18 percent), including one mega project of 60 200 hectares secured in 1998 in Koh Kong province. It has a strong interest in rubber, acacia and pistachio plantation.
### TABLE 7
Distribution of ELCs by nationality, 1995–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Mean size (ha)</th>
<th>Min. size (ha)</th>
<th>Max. size (ha)</th>
<th>No. of projects</th>
<th>No. of projects &gt;10,000 ha</th>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>668,725</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>18,576</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>315,028</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>10,996</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>60,200</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>7,955</td>
<td>7,955</td>
<td>7,955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<td>4,900</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6,523</td>
<td>9,700</td>
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<td>9,820</td>
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<td>1,024,639</td>
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<td>13,307</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>315,028</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>28,500</td>
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<td>7,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>10,490</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * excluding number of unreported projects. Source: Authors’ calculation based on data from the MAFF website, www.elc.maff.gov.kh/profiles.html (retrieved in October 2010)

Effects of investment and ELCs in particular should be netted using the above-mentioned indicators i.e. generated income and employment, loss of communities’ major sources of income from forest products, the competing use of water and land between rice and other crops under foreign investment projects, and companies’ contribution to developing local infrastructure such as roads and irrigation facilities. Section 6 offers a preliminary impact assessment of FDI on agriculture in Cambodia.

### 3.6 Barriers to FDI in agriculture

A survey of firms, to examine motivations for and barriers to investment in agriculture in Cambodia, was conducted in November 2010. A semi-structured questionnaire was used to capture information on the firms’ contribution to infrastructural development and perceptions of mechanisms to mitigate investment barriers. CDC data for the period 2000 to June 2010 indicates that total of 59 firms were involved in...
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

In response to the above obstacles, firms recommended that the government consider adopting computerized investment or business licence application procedures and other related administrative procedures in order to reduce paperwork, time and cost and make it easier for firms to deal with problems during application. Firms also recommended setting up a feedback department in each responsible ministry, to help investors address problems arising during application or operations.

No inclusive business model or contract arrangement between firms and farmers has been introduced. The real practice is that firms buy corn from farmers at the market rate without entering into any future contract. Farmers either get their produce to the factory gate or sell it to brokers, who later sell it to factories or firms. Using brokers is more common, particularly when brokers are the farmers’ creditors. Overall, despite a certain number of barriers, the two investors questioned appeared to be supportive of the business environment in Cambodia. They remarked, however, that Cambodia, as a developing country, has a great deal to do to improve its investment environment, and that there are steps that should be taken immediately.

4. Cambodia’s investment policies and regulations by subsector

The Cambodian Government has set comprehensive strategies to promote investment in agriculture. Being an agrarian country, Cambodia has a huge potential in this sector, as there is plenty of land available. However, the sector has not been sufficiently developed, partly due to limited capital investment in irrigation networks, technology, energy and fertilizers. The global economic crisis in late 2008 hit Cambodia’s major sectors: clothing, tourism and construction. Although MAFF figures show a rather stable trend in agricultural production, investment in the sector declined because of low capital investment and low appropriability of returns from agricultural investment projects. Since Cambodia’s economic growth is narrowly based, promoting agriculture plays a crucial role in strengthening
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

Cambodia

The country’s economy. It is therefore prioritized in the government’s Rectangular Strategy as a key pillar in achieving growth, employment, equity and efficiency. Under this strategy, agricultural policies are playing an increasingly important role.

The Rectangular Strategy emphasizes that to improve agricultural sector productivity, diversification and intensification, land management, fisheries and forestry reforms must go hand in hand with the development of rural infrastructure, energy, credit, markets and technology. To further promote agricultural investment and improve productivity, land reform is particularly crucial. The government is determined to implement the Land Law, the Law on Expropriation, the Law on Pre-emption and Land Development, the Law on Construction and Urbanization and the country’s National Construction Standards. However, the implementation of the Land and Expropriation Laws has sparked some controversies, as certain land or farm owners are not entitled to compensation, because according to the 2001 Land Law, some roads and rights of way are treated as state public property. They are not even entitled to improvements made during their occupation of such property. The reconstruction of National Highway No. 1 is a good example. To support the sector, the government has also waived taxes on imports of agriculture-related materials, and suspended taxes on agricultural land. Despite this support, Cambodian farmers still face production difficulties because their crops depend on rainfall and are vulnerable to natural disaster.

In accordance with Cambodia’s investment law, promulgated in 1994 and amended in 2004, and Sub-decree No. 111 on the implementation of the amendment of investments dated 27 September 2005, the CIB of the CDC is responsible for overseeing the development of investment (domestic and foreign) activities. The CIB’s registration mechanism is used for investment projects costing in excess of US$2 000 000, located in two provinces/municipalities, and special economic zones, while the sub-committee on investment is responsible for granting permits for projects costing up to US$2 000 000.

4.1 Fisheries

Fish is the second staple food source after rice in Cambodia. It plays a crucial role in people’s livelihoods and is one of the main sources of income and food security in the country. There are two levels of fisheries management in Cambodia, namely, central and local governments. At the central level, the Department of Fisheries of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries is in charge of policy formulation and the conduct of research and inspection, while at the local level, the sector is under the control of the Provincial-Urban Fishery Authorities, which have the powers to ensure compliance with the law in the areas under their jurisdiction.

Several laws govern the sector, including the Fisheries Management and Administration Law (1987), Proclamation on Competent Authorities in issuing permission to fish in open water, aquaculture, fish processing and special permissions (1989), and the Sub-law on Transportation of Fishery Products (1988). It should be noted that Cambodia’s master plan for fisheries 2001-2011 was developed in 2001, while the Fisheries Law promulgated in 2006 was to better manage the sector. Despite the introduction of necessary regulations, illegal fishing and habitat destruction along the Mekong River and in the Tonle Sap Lake continue more or less unabated, and conflicts over fishing rights between communities and politically and economically more powerful commercial fishing lot owners are common (FAO 2011: 6, 10). Law enforcement is observed to be ad hoc or case-by-case. For instance, the recent tough action taken by the prime minister on 1 July 2011 ordering the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to remove fishery chiefs in five provinces around the Tonle Sap Lake, on suspicion of fishery infringements by irregularly selling fishing lots, is part of an effort towards fishery reform (Yang 2011).[10]


On the investment regulation of the sector, no specific rule is set out to promote investment in this subsector. However, this subsector’s investment incentives i.e. exemption of taxes and duties, are set forth in Cambodia investment law. Investments include fish hatcheries of more than 2 hectares and shrimp farming and other aquaculture production greater than 10 hectares. The sector’s investment procedures also fall under the procedure highlighted generally above. In order to develop the subsector, the government has distributed marine and freshwater fishing lots to the people for both consumption and commercial purposes, with the aim of facilitating fishing operations, sustaining catch sources and preserving natural resources. Further, given the increasing demand for fish from the rising population, the government has encouraged people to shift their focus from natural catches to aquaculture. To better manage the resource, the government is establishing an effective price mechanism by ensuring proper demarcation of fishing lots and making the process of fishing lot bidding more transparent. This will help increase state revenue from fisheries. Tough measures are being taken to prevent and crack down on illegal fishing activities and the encroachment of flooded forests. Fish farmers and communities are given technical assistance, credit and market facilitation to improve their capacity and increase their revenue. To increase competitiveness and market access, the government has encouraged large-scale fishery investments by improving infrastructure.

4.2 Forestry

Generally, the Forestry Administration (under MAFF) is in charge of the general governance of forests and forest resources in Cambodia, in accordance with the National Forestry Sector Policy and the Forestry Law (2002). The sector comes under two levels of management i.e. central and local government. Prior to 2000, forest harvesting was rampant, rapid and widespread. The government’s cancellation of 40 percent of all forest concessions in the early 2000s – equivalent to almost half of the original area under concession – as well as the its moratorium on logging in concession areas and log transportation in January 2002, has significantly reduced rampant logging (World Bank 2004a:19, 76). Another measure was introduced to clamp down on illegal natural forest products export through the introduction of a subdecree on forest and non-timber forest products allowed for export and import, dated 20 November 2006. This new rule allows the export of all kinds of processed and non-processed timber products derived from man-made forests, which offers room for private/foreign investors to engage in the form of economic land concession (ELC), which is under the governance of the MAFF (see discussion on ELC in section 4.5). It should be noted that there is no specific rule to promote investment in the forest sector. In addition, the government has put efforts into forestry reform by establishing forestry policies, including the law on Concessions, subdecrees on Economic Land Concessions and Forestry Concession Management, Forestry Community formation and other regulations related to environment preservation, such as the law on Environmental Protection and Natural Resource Management and the subdecree on Environmental Impact Assessment. These aim to ensure the livelihoods of local communities improve, as a large number of people in rural communities depend on forests. With help from the international community, people are educated on how to make proper use of and also protect the forests. In this way, sustainable development can be achieved and biodiversity protection guaranteed. Once forests are well protected, local communities are the ones who benefit both economically and non-economically from community forestry, as they have secured access to land and legal rights.

For the detailed function and structure of Forest Administration see: [http://www.forestry.gov.kh/AboutFA/MandateEng.html](http://www.forestry.gov.kh/AboutFA/MandateEng.html)

Non-economic benefits include spiritual/customary values (for ethnic minorities) and training, social capital and networking.
on forest use\textsuperscript{13}. Across the country, the forestry communities have reported significant reduction in illegal activities within forest areas under their management. Protecting forests has a direct impact on wildlife and biodiversity, which in turn is conducive to sustainable development and poverty reduction. Therefore, the government has shifted more focus onto raising environmental awareness by educating people and students on the conservation, protection and sustainable management of natural resources. In addition, the serious punishment meted out to those who are involved in illegal logging has been in the media headlines; the offenders have been jailed. In spite of such enforcement, illegal logging has been reported subsequently and the law enforcement personnel themselves are alleged to be behind these acts, indicating the limitations of law enforcement in the sector.

4.3 Livestock

Livestock farming i.e. pigs, cattle and poultry, needs to grow as demand for food increases, and the government is now focusing on better food quality and safety. To attain this, the department of Production and Animal Health of MAFF, which also has branches in the provinces, has set out the tasks related to the policies on animal health and production subsector, improving services for animal health and production and credit support for livestock farmers. It is also responsible for enacting laws and regulations on the quality of animal products, controlling the import and export of livestock at border gates and inspecting sanitary and phytosanitary standards at slaughterhouses. With support from USAID and FAO, draft law on animal health and production which covers aspects of animal and public health issues was initiated in early 2009. Cambodia is the transit point for cattle from Thailand to Viet Nam, and itself exports and imports cattle and pigs from the two neighbouring countries; therefore, it is vital to have such a law. Large-scale cattle and pig trading companies appear to be highly influential in the long-distance movement of livestock both within Cambodia and between neighbouring countries. They are well protected through high level connections to relevant ministries, through which they are able to influence decision-making among not only livestock traders, but also the police, military police and veterinary officials (FAO, ADB, OIE SEAFMD 2009:21-22).

No specific rule is observed in promoting investment in the industry; however, as set out in Cambodian Investment law, investors qualify for custom duty exemption if they produce more than 1 000 head of livestock; manage a dairy herd larger than 100 head; or produce more than 10 000 poultry and eggs. Despite the absence of a specific investment promotion policy, the overall investment process is in line with the general investment procedure stated above. Issues arising in the sector are often brought up at the government private sector forum, which is a trouble-shooting mechanism, by the Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Agro-industries. For instance, the issue of rampant pig smuggling – which harms domestic producers – was addressed through instruction no.001 dated 13 August 2007 on the prohibition of meat and live pig imports.

4.4 Water resources and technology

Water resource management is crucial to agricultural development. To date, Cambodia’s irrigation system is still not sufficiently developed; the vast majority of farming is rainfed, making it highly vulnerable to variable climatic conditions. The government has formed water-user communities across the country by expanding reservoir capacity to meet demand. In addition, the MAFF and the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MoWRAM) have, as required by the NSDP, prepared a Strategy for Agriculture and Water through the newly established Technical Working Group on Agriculture and Water. The government, in order to scale-up productivity in agriculture for own consumption and for sale, has intervened further, such as by providing high-quality seeds yielding high-quality produce;

\textsuperscript{13} Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Community-based Natural Resources Management: Lessons Learned from Cambodia, Technical Advisory Services, December 2010.
facilitating the adoption of better technology by farmers; reducing harvest and post-harvest losses; and promoting innovative agricultural practices, including integrated crop management. Reducing the price of electricity will also help lower the cost of production.

4.5 ELCs and commercial production

As Cambodia’s potential to export agricultural products to the world market grows, the government is placing higher priority on commercial agricultural production, especially rice and other agribusiness crops such as rubber and cassava. Unlike subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture can expand the revenues of rural people and thus lift them out of poverty. It will also provide new opportunities for children in rural areas to go to school, which will in turn better rural people’s livelihoods. To this end, government interventions relate to market information; new product opportunities to fit customer requirements; value-added processing facilities; quality assurance and food safety; profitable business promotion; and infrastructural development.

The Cambodian Government proposed the agriculture sector intervention in 2003 by targeting structural reforms – with support from ADB through its Agriculture Sector Programme Loan – under which the government is in charge of disseminating wider information related to agricultural marketing and technology, liberalising fertilizer pricing and marketing, formulating rural credit policy, divesting the rubber subsector, establishing local rural development committees and improving property rights. Further, the government has continued to improve access to productive land under secure title for the rural poor and commercial development in urban areas with support from several aid agencies such as AusAID on mine clearance and agricultural extension services, and the World Bank on land titling.

As seen above, ELCs are a mechanism for providing state private land\(^\text{14}\) to concessionaires for industrial agricultural exploitation, including tree plantation, animal raising, aquaculture and the building of factories for agricultural raw material processing. Alongside the granting of large tracts of unused and/or unauthorized lands as ELCs to both foreign and Cambodian investors, rural infrastructures such as roads, bridges, markets and hospitals are being developed by both government and investors. Income from jobs created by these companies has to some extent allowed local communities to improve their living conditions.

The subdecree on Economic Land Concessions was introduced on 27 December 2005 in order to tap the opportunity of developing intensive agricultural and agri-industrial activities, increasing employment in rural areas, and generating state or provincial revenues. Article 29 of the subdecree states that the MAFF, as chair of the technical secretariat and an inter-ministerial body, is authorized – and responsible for – granting economic land concessions with total land area greater than 1,000 hectares, and the provincial/municipal governor is authorized and responsible for granting economic land concessions with total area less than 1,000 hectares. However, the MAFF always seeks approval from the Office of the Council of Ministers before granting approval to a company.

By law, feasibility studies and environmental and social impact assessments are required prior to contract approval. Interview with one ELC company indicates that to obtain quick ELC investment approval a company has to engage local consultants – who are closely connected to officials at the MAFF – to conduct feasibility study and environmental impact assessment. The process could be protracted if a company were to engage only international consultants. Despite the carrying out of feasibility studies and project border demarcation prior to approval, overlapping claims between villagers and ELC companies prevail. Provincial governors and the commune council often act as mediators once conflicts arise; however, villagers are often disappointed with the solutions offered by the company, a sentiment echoed by local authorities (see section V. for further analysis).

\(^{14}\) By subdecree, the ELC can also be used as a legal instrument to convert state public land into state private land (Articles 14 and 15, Land Law 2001).
The National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009–2013 sets forth other policy measures to promote agriculture, including a focus on land reform and clearance of land mines. These measures include strengthening land management, distribution and use; securing land ownership; curbing illegal landholding; and preventing concentration of unused land in few hands. Moreover, small farmers have been provided with social land concessions (SLC)\textsuperscript{15} in order to foster their production and ability to diversify. Clearance of land mines and unexploded ordnance is a top priority for the government to help enable better access for farmers and investors to larger land and more remote areas.

4.6 Rice

Cambodia has tried to grasp new opportunities in the rice subsector, following food price increases in 2007 and 2008. Rice is not only a main source of food for the Cambodian people but also a potential source of income for the country’s economy. As such, the government has encouraged investment in rice, by waiving tariffs on seeds, fertilizers and pesticides to promote paddy rice production. In addition, Prime Minister Hun Sen called for further investment by both local and foreign investors in rice mills\textsuperscript{16}. The promotion of rice processing, especially milling and packaging is aimed at upgrading rice quality, reducing cost of production, increasing value-added and marketing for export. Paddy rice production is expected to reach around 7 million tonnes in 2010/11, with domestic consumption of around 3 million tonnes in the same period. This increased production is a result mainly of investment in irrigation, expansion and intensification of cultivated land, the use of better farming techniques and improved seeds.

Recognizing the important role of paddy rice in enhancing growth and reducing poverty, the government came up with the policy on “Paddy Rice Production and Promotion of Milled Rice Export” in mid-2010, aiming to achieve a paddy rice production surplus of 4 million tonnes and milled rice export of at least 1 million tonnes by 2015 by continuing to invest in irrigation facilities; encouraging private sector investment in paddy rice processing and export; and improving procedures for export and transport facilitation. However, the rice subsector is challenged by weak governance and institutional support. Ear (2009), examining dynamic governance and the growth of Cambodia’s rice industry, finds that the sector’s export is markedly imperfect as two entities, the state-owned Green Trade Company (GTC) and the National Cambodian Rice Millers Association, headed by the director of GTC, are allowed to export milled rice above 100 tonnes without an export licence. Another dominant exporter, Angkor Kasekam Roongroeung, acquired an export licence through its governmental channels.

4.7 Rubber

In rebuilding the rubber subsector, the government started by investing in production for domestic consumption. Later, Cambodian rubber began to penetrate foreign markets, especially those in Viet Nam and China. The government then introduced important institutional and policy reforms for market-based agricultural growth with the assistance of external funding agencies, especially from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The government began to withdraw from direct intervention in the production and marketing of agricultural and agro-based products, though state-owned rubber estates continued to constitute about 80 percent of the total rubber-exploited area of the country until 2004, when the world price of rubber increased (ADB 2003).

Continued state ownership was impeding the growth of the whole subsector by restricting the development of smallholder and family-scale rubber production and constraining smallholder processing and marketing (ADB 2003). Quality was also an issue, leading to Cambodian rubber being 15–20 percent lower in price on the

\textsuperscript{15} Criteria for SLC have no time restriction with a maximum 1.250 m\textsuperscript{2} for residential use and 2 hectares for agricultural use, and it can be transformed into private property.

\textsuperscript{16} Radio Free Asia, March 22, 2011.
The past years have witnessed a growing interest in investment in land and agriculture in particular, in Cambodia. Concerns over potential risks of such investment have been echoed by various interest groups. A study by German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) in 2009 identifies both opportunities and risks from foreign investment in land in Cambodia, which are highlighted below.

**Socioeconomic aspects:** at the macro level, there has been evidence of job creation in the production of biofuel providing average monthly wages of US$100; improvement in local roads, but also degradation of community roads by heavily loaded trucks of the investment projects; generation of foreign exchange earnings through export of wood and wood products, rubber, cotton, essential oils, fish and live animal; and a contribution to government budget through land concession rental payment of between US$0–10 per hectare/year. At the microlevel certain risks arise. For instance, there is evidence of negative effects on indigenous people's access to land; loss of community opportunity to collect non-timber forest products; absence or lack of transfer of technical skills from foreign firms to farmers, such as breeding, use of seeds, improving soil conditions or using fertilizers. Opportunities do also emerge, which range from double income for unskilled construction and agricultural labourers to the development of schools and healthcare centres.

**Food security:** the status of community food security could be affected through the loss of community access to non-timber forest products. Hansen et al. (2006) indicate that non-timber forest products contribute about 42 percent of poor household income and 30 percent of medium household income in rural communities in Cambodia. However, this study found that foreign investment in land is unlikely to have a negative effect on rural community food security in the short term.

**Environment:** foreign investment in land creates both environmental gain and risk. A host country could gain from the import of new technology and environmentally friendly agricultural production methods, and reduction of soil erosion through agricultural production on formerly abandoned land. However, benefits also bring risks in their wake. Environmental concerns over large-scale foreign investment include climate change and soil erosion, water security and quality, biodiversity and local ecology.

Given the concerns highlighted above, this study with a specific focus on foreign investment in agriculture, but not in land in a broad sense, is intended to shed more light on likely impacts of foreign investment in agriculture on local community livelihoods, the environment, food security, and land and water use. Taking stock of CDC data from 2000 to June 2010, the study found that foreign investors in agriculture engage mainly in crops and forestry in the form of ELCs, whereas in food processing they engage mainly in the production of drinking water, soya milk and instant noodles. This section focuses on crops (sugar cane, rubber, corn) and forestry in order to examine the likely impacts of such foreign investments.

This assessment is based on results from focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted by the study...
6. Projects

6.1 Crops

The case studies on crops covered one sugar cane project, two rubber projects and one corn project. The projects were not selected randomly using factors such as land size, geographical location, crop type or company nationality, but through considerations of their importance and a study of their budget limitations.

**Sugarcane plantation in Koh Kong Province**

**Koh Kong Plantation Ltd and Koh Kong Sugar Company Ltd**

According to the CEA (Cambodia Economic Association) (2010), two ELC companies under the same representative’s name—that of Ly Yong Phat—have been granted a licence for sugar cane

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**TABLE 8**

Summary of fieldwork by the CDRI and CEA in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Subsector</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Koh Kong Plantation Ltd (Thailand, Japan, China, Cambodia)</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>Botomsakor district, Koh Kong province</td>
<td>Sugar cane plantation</td>
<td>CEA June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koh Kong Sugar Company Ltd (Thai)</td>
<td>9,700</td>
<td>Chi-Khor Leu commune, Sre Ambel district, Koh Kong province</td>
<td>Sugar cane processing</td>
<td>CEA June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Socfin KCD (Belgium-Cambodia)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Bousra commune, Mondolkiri province</td>
<td>Rubber plantation</td>
<td>CEA May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAK LAK (Viet Nam)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Busra commune, Mondolkiri province</td>
<td>Rubber plantation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Tong Ming Group Engineering (China)</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>Kbal Damrei commune, Kratie province</td>
<td>Forestry (acacia)</td>
<td>CDRI April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tan Bien-Kompong Thom Rubber Development (Viet Nam)</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>Kraya commune, Kompong Thom province</td>
<td>Rubber plantation</td>
<td>CDRI December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>HLH Agriculture (Singapore)</td>
<td>90 rai (4500 Amleang)</td>
<td>Oral district and Amleang commune, Kampong Speu province</td>
<td>Corn plantation and drying</td>
<td>CDRI November 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ngo & Chan 2010: Nos. 1, 2; Hem & Tong 2010: Nos. 3, 4
plantation from the Cambodian Government. The land covers about 20,000 hectares, of which 9,400 hectares is under Koh Kong Plantation Ltd in Botomsakor district and 9,700 hectares under Koh Kong Sugar Company Ltd in Sre Ambel district. The sugar cane goes through the processing factory of Koh Kong Sugar Company Ltd, which has a capacity of 6,000 tonnes a day, and is packed for export to European Union markets. CEA carried out its survey in Trapaing Kandal and Chi-Khor Leu villages, interviewing 143 households in order to assess impacts on employment, livelihood transformation and land transactions.

**Socioeconomic impacts:** A number of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled jobs have been created for the local people and for those living in the surrounding areas and other provinces. These jobs include preparing land, planting, applying fertilizer, controlling pests, weeding, harvesting, collecting and transporting, which are dependent on the season. The planting and harvesting period represents the high season for employment, stretching from November to May. During this high season in 2009, approximately 3,400 workers were employed, around 30 percent of whom were from Koh Kong. Only around 1,300 daily workers were employed between June and October 2009. These labourers receive a daily wage of around US$2.50. In addition, accommodation and transportation are provided to migrant workers from such provinces as Banteay Meanchey, Kampot and Kompong Thom. The two companies also employed a total of 511 Cambodian and Thai office staff, earning an average of US$6 per day, but it should be noted that a slim proportion of the local people employed were working as office staff.

Prior to the arrival of the company, the local people earned a living by farming wet season rice and cash crops and raising cattle. After the company arrived, some of the land once used for cash crops was annexed by the sugar cane plantation. This has triggered serious disputes between the local people and the company, as a source of revenue for the former has been taken away. Further, local people’s cattle can no longer roam freely on farm and forest land that has become part of the company’s investment zone.

If the company’s guards see the community’s livestock on the company’s plantation, they will catch, detain and sometimes shoot the animals. It should be noticed that the company, after being awarded its ELC licence in 2006, started clearing the land without giving prior notice to the local community. This provoked strong protests by the local people: 449 households filed a petition letter on the loss of their farmland and other property. Even though the company has offered compensation to the affected households, there have been many complaints that this is insufficient and unfair: villagers who have relatives working for the company tend to get better compensation, with overall compensation ranging from US$25 to US$350. One critical reason villagers cannot make a strong argument for their land is that most of them do not possess a land title for the land they have been cultivating.

The central challenges behind the disputes include the absence of clear guidelines or procedures to resolve the disputes, uneven compensatory choices offered by the company to affected households, replacement of common dispute settlement mechanism by non-transparent and unfair case-by-case, household-by-household solutions, and limited or no assistance from the local authorities. A community representative claimed that local authorities are not helpful, and thus the community has little support in finding a way to deal with the company.

**Environmental impacts:** The sugar cane plantation and processing factory reportedly generate two types of pollution. First, water pollution seriously affects the daily life of the local community, as disposed chemical substances contaminate the water upstream, which then passes downstream to the villagers. This water is vital to the villagers, so this pollution harms both humans and animals. Second, factory emissions lead to air pollution, which makes it hard for the people living nearby to breathe.

**Infrastructural impacts:** The CEA report did not capture information on the development of local infrastructure by the investing company. However, it is likely that roads have been built in
order to transport materials and workers in and out.

**Rubber Plantation in Mondolkiri and Kompong Thom Provinces**

**Socfin KCD and DAK LAK (Mondolkiri)**
The CEA (Ngo and Chan, 2010) conducted a survey in May 2010 on rubber plantation in Mondolkiri in two communes—Bousra and Krang in Peach Chinda district. Eight ELC companies are licensed for rubber plantation, each with a land area of 3 000–5 000 hectares. Most of them have cleared land and planted rubber trees. All of the ELCs are reported to be active, except for Sarmala Company. CEA examined the potential effects mainly of Socfin KCD and DAK LAK.

**Socioeconomic impacts:** at the start of its operations in 2008, Socfin KCD employed around 10 000 people—around 2 000 between May and August and around 8 000 people for the rest of the year. About 20–25 percent of the total workforce is made up of local people; 60 percent female. The company will employ at least 1 500 workers when the plantation is fully planted. Unskilled workers can earn around US$5 a day; their jobs include weeding and applying fertilizers; they work 10 to 15 days per month. Skilled workers can earn a bit more per day – around US$6.50–8. All the skilled employees are migrant workers, particularly from Kompong Cham province, with work experience in the rubber industry. They are satisfied with their jobs even though they have to live far away from their families.

Overlapping land claims between villagers and companies are prevalent, as villagers traditionally move their farmland from one place to another every few years and do not have certificates of land ownership. All villagers in the Bousra commune have been affected by Socfin KCD and DAK LAK investment projects. Villagers were shocked when Socfin KCD cleared their lands without giving them any notice. Disputes erupted which resulted in villagers burning the company’s tractors. The Land Conflict Resolution Committee, headed by the provincial deputy governor and comprising members from district and commune authorities, was set up to tackle the problem. Around 172 affected households were on the list endorsed by the government. However, it was claimed by a local NGO (CLEC: Community Legal Education Centre) that 362 households in Bousra were initially affected in 2008. Ultimately, the company came up with compensation schemes, such as cash payment of around US$200–250 per hectare, land exchange and land exchange and development. Among the options, villagers tended to opt for cash payment, as the land offered in exchange was too far from the village and not fertile enough for cultivation. Some initially selected the third option, but later switched to cash payment given the delays in the process. Overall, cash payment was the best option.

On the DAK LAK project, around 40–50 percent of the concession belongs to villagers, with whom the company negotiated the deal in advance. Half of the villagers’ section of the concession is near the village, which is convenient for raising cattle. The company has also provided loans to villagers with a grace repayment period of 10 years to allow them to plant rubber on the land allocated to them, and has agreed to buy latex from villagers at 80 percent of the international market price. The company even allows landless farmers to cultivate crops between rubber trees on its concession land before rubber trees are mature enough for tapping. Villagers were satisfied with the company’s offer.

Before the companies arrived, people in Bousra made a living by farming lowland and highland rice and cash crops, collecting forest by-products, raising livestock, fishing, hunting, gold mining and small businesses. However, the ELCs have affected highland cultivation badly, and some have also lost their land to the companies. This has brought hardship, as they can no longer generate an income from collecting non-timber forest products, which used to generate US$10–15 per week. They now have to go further from home to hunt and to find forest by-products in order to survive. Moreover, some have lost an income source from livestock rearing given the loss of grassland to ELCs.

**Environmental impacts:** the study captured no critical aspect of the local environment. It might
be assumed, however, that the investment has caused a natural imbalance, given the drastic and large-scale influx of rubber trees. Rubber trees store carbon, but they require a larger volume of water, which could lead to water use that competes with that of local ethnic communities. It could also result in loss of natural habitat, as forest land has been turned into private estates.

**Infrastructural impacts:** the companies have rehabilitated roads and contributed school buildings. For instance, DAK LAK donated a school building to the community in Koh Nhek district. However, there have been complaints about the destruction of community-funded roads since the arrival of the companies.

**Tan Bien-Kompong Thom (Kompong Thom)**

The Cambodian Development Resource Institute conducted fieldwork in Kraya commune in December 2010, consulting a commune councillor on the overall impacts of ELCs on the commune and holding a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in Thmor Samleang village in order to examine the effects of the investment project. It should be noted that the number of private investments, both foreign and domestic, in the form of ELCs in Kraya commune has been rising. There have been several accounts of disputes between Vietnamese investments i.e. Tan Bien Investment and Phuek Fa Investment (Phuek Fa was formerly known as Mean Rithy Investment, owned by a Cambodian investor), and the local communities.

The major occupations of the people in Kraya commune are growing paddy rice and cassava and collecting forest by-products. Villagers claim that an income solely from growing paddy rice is not enough: farmers generate extra revenue by collecting wood resin and vines or selling labour on rice fields or plantations. Some catch porcupines, as they are in high demand for medicinal purposes. Some use their income from forest by-products to buy fertilizer in order to increase their paddy yield (the average yield per hectare is between 2 and 4 tonnes), as soil quality is poor. Given the rising demand for cassava in recent years, about half of the total population of the commune has decided to clear state forest land to grow this crop. Aware of the hardships facing the villagers, the commune councils have turned a blind eye to their clearance of state forest land. On average, a tonne of cassava fetches around KHR300,000 (about US$73). Some clear state forest land to grow cashew nuts or jack fruit.

**Socioeconomic impacts:** at the onset of Tan Bien’s business operations there was evidence of significant job creation as the company employed a large number of people in the commune (no data confirmed by the commune council). Tasks included mainly weeding, digging, spraying pesticide and watering, at an average daily income of around KHR12,000–13,000 (approximately US$3.0–3.5). However, the majority of employed villagers left their jobs, complaining of unbearable hardship. Problems ranged from insufficient skills to grow rubber saplings and apply pesticide, to fraud in wage disbursements. In response, the company gathered a workforce from neighbouring communes and other provinces, mainly Kompong Cham, as farmers from there are more familiar with producing rubber saplings and maintaining rubber trees. Another impact has been the loss of traditional sources of income, particularly resin and vine collection, as firms have bulldozed the commune’s forest. In addition, several households have lost their cassava plantations to ELCs, as these had been acquired through illegal clearance of state forest land. Note that this clearance originally occurred with the tacit acceptance of the commune council, as noted above. As such, the project has been a double blow for households: loss of income sources but no employment and skills acquisition opportunities. In compensation for the loss of the land, the company provided households with US$200 per hectare for cleared land with crops and US$100 per hectare for newly cleared land without crops/vegetation. However, for the most part, one striking characteristic of dispute settlements between the company and villagers is that the company representative agreed to follow requests made by the commune facilitator but in practice the company broke this promise. For instance, the company agreed to keep streams in place, both small and big, for animals to drink from, and for
other agricultural purposes, but later filled them in and made no serious effort to keep its promise. The commune council has little power over the company, which is obliged to get permission from provincial level to implement the project. Meanwhile, if villagers let their livestock roam onto the plantation, the animals are detained and can be retrieved only after paying a fine of KHR100 000 (approximately US$25).

**Environmental impacts:** there is no evidence of competing water use between the company and Thmor Samleang villagers. Villagers’ crops of paddy rice, cassava and other crops are rainfed, and the company has excavated its own reservoir for watering rubber tree saplings. In addition, there are no complaints from villagers as to the overuse of pesticides that could degrade soil quality and pollute groundwater, or the costs of harvesting the forest around the village and particularly the commune. However, this could be due to the limited knowledge of villagers regarding the environmental impacts of the development.

**Infrastructural impacts:** the company has built roads connecting its land to the commune centre. Although it seems these roads have been built for the sake of the company’s business operations alone, Thmor Samleang, which is near the company’s land, benefits from their construction. There is no other evidence of the company’s contribution to local infrastructural development, such as hospitals, schools, irrigation and the like.

**Business model:** no formal and genuine business model has been applied, but the company has cleared forests and expropriated households plantations; in return it has employed villagers on the rubber plantation on an irregular basis only.

**Corn plantation in Kampong Speu Province**

**HLH Agriculture**

The HLH Group Limited, which is 100 percent Singapore-owned and was listed on 21 June 2000 on the SGX Mainboard, operates in agriculture, property and investments, construction and agriresearch and development. In Cambodia, the company received investment approval in 2007 and started maize plantation in 2009 on 9 800 hectares in Oral district and 4 500 hectares in Amleang district, Kompong Speu province, 48 km from Phnom Penh. The HLH Group produces animal feed on a 70-year concession with a capital investment of about US$45 million. It has one processing factory with production capacity of around 600 tonnes per day, and four plantation farms, each covering between 450 and 2 000 hectares. The company has imported high-tech machinery from Singapore. All farms are overseen by farm supervisors from the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore, China and Myanmar, who use different management styles. All the assistant supervisors are Cambodians, who are supposed to take over the management jobs in the future, once they have gained enough skills and experience. Thirty of the company’s circa 450 full-time staff are office staff, with only two from Singapore. On the plantations, there are about 200 workers in low season and around 1 000 in high season; the majority are Cambodian.

**Socioeconomic impacts:** when the project began in 2007, a significant number of jobs were created, providing an average daily income of between KHR10 000 and 12 000 (around US$2.5–3.0), with villagers having to spend around KHR1 000 (around US$0.33) on transport to and from the plantation. Recently, the number of workers employed has declined considerably, as the company has replaced them with imported machines, for example for sowing and harvesting. This has limited villagers’ opportunity to access this new income source. The company claims that it has not been able to apply a business model because farmers cannot afford to buy seeds and machines and lack appropriate technology for cultivating maize. Meanwhile, the project has severely affected local people’s main and traditional sources of income, namely, rice growing and charcoal production: HLH Agriculture has claimed around 40 percent of villagers’ paddy rice fields and also cleared forest land. Another large private investment (Kompong Speu Sugar), belonging to Cambodian tycoon Ly Yong Phat (of the Koh Kong sugar cane...
plantations detailed above), has affected around 90 percent of villagers' paddy fields.

Resolving the disputes has been difficult as villagers do not have certificates to prove they own the land. The company claims that there have been no big problems with the local community as it has worked in a consultative manner, inviting the local people, authorities and other relevant bodies to come together to find a solution to any issues arising. In terms of compensation, the company promised new plots of land but, as these are very far from the village, only some people have agreed to this. In terms of cash compensation, according to villagers, the company promised to provide each family US$1 000–2 000 per hectare, but this money has not yet materialized. Villagers can grow paddy rice only in the rainy season, given the lack of irrigation. Therefore, the majority of villagers also produce charcoal by going to the forest and chopping down small trees. Each household has on average two to four kilns; a small kiln can process about 5 m³ wood in 15 days and generate circa KHR350 000 (approximately US$85), while a big one processing around 10 m³ wood and taking roughly 20–25 days can make about KHR700 000 (circa US$170). However, right now, villagers can no longer produce charcoal because the forest near the village has been cleared and the company does not allow people to enter its demarcated land. Villagers can get wood now only by going further into the forest, which most of them do not want to do. They feel pessimistic about their future livelihoods since the arrival of the company, and some have left their company plantation jobs. Meanwhile, the company claims the forest was already cleared when it arrived.

Environmental impacts: as more land has been cleared, forest coverage has declined. This could have adverse impacts on the ecological system and the biodiversity of the area. People in the village are very worried about this environmental degradation.

Infrastructural impacts: according to group discussions, so far the two companies mentioned (HLH Agriculture and Kompong Speu Sugar) have built no significant physical infrastructure. A few roads and bridges have been built for company use only. Most of the roads are government built.

6.2 Forestry in Kratie Province

Tong Ming Group Engineering and Eight Other ELCs

There are eight ELCs in the Kbal Damrei commune according to an interview with the second deputy chief of the commune in April 2011. Distribution of the project by nationality is shown in Table 9. It is important to note that this account of the preliminary impact assessment has been compiled from the investigation of one investment project owned by Tong Ming Group Engineering in early 2010, and does not reflect the full-scale or commune-wide impact of the total number of investment projects listed in the table below.

Socioeconomic impacts: communication between villagers, companies and authorities is weak: in some cases, villagers were shocked to see the companies turn up to clear land close to their backyards. There are disputes between the local community and the companies over both land-grabbing and restrictions on farmers entering the forest. Villagers can no longer go to collect vines, wood resin, rattan and bamboo or to hunt, which has cut off a main source of income. The forest plantation is protected by armed guards, and if villagers are found entering it, they are arrested and fined and their belongings seized. Meanwhile, villagers are no longer in favour of working at the company owned by Tong Ming Group Engineering, given its strict working conditions (e.g. monthly salary is reduced if workers take a day off and workers are not allowed to go home if overtime work is necessary), and its land-grabbing activities. Workers are mainly from Prey Veng and Svay Rieng provinces.

Environmental impacts: the CDRI team observed that the companies in the commune were using heavy machines to clear the forest, often violating the regulation that requires companies to keep intact 200 m of forest on each side of a large
stream (one that is 20–30 m wide) and 100 m of forest on each side of a smaller stream to ensure the sustainable use of water and protection of the environment. The real practice is that companies leave around 10 m of forest on each side of the stream. Villagers also mentioned the frequent transportation of timber at night to Viet Nam.

**Infrastructural impacts:** there is evidence of road construction, but no school buildings or pagodas have been built. New roads have been built mainly for the company's use and not for the public, who are not allowed to intrude on the company's property.

### 6.3 Overall assessment

Overall, based on the authors' preliminary examination, the costs of FDI projects seem to outweigh the benefits to an extent that is hard to estimate. Foreign direct investment projects have both positive and adverse effects. On the positive side, some projects have created significant employment for local communities and for communities in nearby provinces. However, others have not. Land conflict is quite common across ELC projects, given the lack of a sound system of land tenure and limited consultation with local communities prior to the granting of ELCs. In addition, some ELC projects involved in clearing the forest eliminate major sources of community income, such as collection of non-timber forest products and hunting. The filling in of streams was also evident in some projects, which could lead to water shortages.

Notably, Cambodia has not experienced a food deficit during the past decade. Paddy rice production and the total area under cultivation have grown quite favourably, with average growth rates of 9.4 percent and 2.7 percent, respectively, between 2004 and 2009. In 2009, the total rice cultivated area reached just over 2.7 million hectares, generating total production of 7.6 million tonnes and a surplus of 3.5 million tonnes (Table 10). Therefore, at first glance, and from a short- to medium-term perspective, Cambodia does not seem to have grave concerns related to food security. It is more important to note that the drastic rise in the size and total number of ELC projects does not seem to threaten national

### TABLE 9
Profiles of ELCs in Kbal Damrey Commune, Sambour District, Kratie Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Year of approval</th>
<th>Duration of contract</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
<th>Purpose of investment</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Great Island Agricultural Development Co., Ltd</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>9 583</td>
<td>Teak plantation and processing factory</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Global Agricultural Development Co., Ltd</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>9 800</td>
<td>Tectona/teak plantation and processing factory</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Asia World Agricultural Development Co., Ltd</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>Teak plantation and processing factory</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Great Asset Agricultural Development Co., Ltd</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>8 985</td>
<td>Pistacia Chinensis Bunge and other tree plantation</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Great Wonder Agricultural Development</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>8 231</td>
<td>Pistacia Chinensis Bunge and other tree plantation</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tong Ming Group Engineering</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>7 465</td>
<td>Rubber, acacia, jatropha plantation and processing factory</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Agri-industrial Crops Development</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>Rubber and acacia plantation</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Carmadeno Venture Limited</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>70 years</td>
<td>7 635</td>
<td>Sugar cane plantation</td>
<td>Indian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cambodia food security in the medium term because the current stable surge in paddy rice cultivated areas will continue to produce surplus for domestic consumption in the short and medium term. In addition, in the short and medium term, ELC expansion does not appear to compete for water use over paddy cultivation. However, in the longer term competing use for water and land could be detrimental to national food security if size of ELC projects keeps growing at the current pace.

However, it is important to note that rising world demand for food (rice) and industrial crops like rubber, cassava and sugar cane for the production of biofuel energy could place Cambodia in a perilous situation if its trade and investment policies do not take food security seriously into account. In the long term, land use conflicts between villagers and ELCs producing rice and industrial crops for export, fierce competition for water currently used for paddy rice production, and loss of traditional sources of income for local communities could contribute to a decline in household food consumption and thereby a reduction in nutrition.

### 7. Conclusions and recommendations

Agriculture has been a constant contributor to the national economy, employing a significant proportion of the rural workforce and generating substantial foreign exchange earnings. In its fourth legislature, the Cambodian Government has focused even more strongly on promoting the sector, by relaxing taxes related to agricultural products and developing rural infrastructures such as roads and irrigation. New measures have been taken to help people in local communities, including removing big fishing lots that once were under private ownership. The government, with the support of development partners, has provided technical assistance to rural people in rice farming, fisheries (aquaculture) and livestock production. It has also built up the irrigation system so the farmers can become less dependent on rain, particularly in rice production, and more resilient to climate change.

The government has also undertaken forestry reform in order to facilitate investment in forestry and crops through the establishment of legislation on concessions, forestry community formation and environmental protection. The subdecree on Economic Land Concessions, adopted in 2005, helps in the granting of land concessions to foreign and local investors to exploit unused and/or infertile land. Laws relating to sanitary and phytosanitary issues and animal health have been enacted, to control livestock production, prevent animal losses and contain animal diseases. Recently, the government, through the

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**TABLE 10**

**Evolution of paddy rice production area and ELC land size, 2004–2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rice cultivated area (ha)</td>
<td>2 374 175</td>
<td>2 443 530</td>
<td>2 541 433</td>
<td>2 585 905</td>
<td>2 615 741</td>
<td>2 719 080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice area expansion (%)</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy rice production (tonnes)</td>
<td>4 170 284</td>
<td>5 986 179</td>
<td>6 264 123</td>
<td>6 727 127</td>
<td>7 175 473</td>
<td>7 585 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of paddy rice production (%)</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paddy rice surplus (tonnes)</td>
<td>650 184</td>
<td>2 061 830</td>
<td>2 240 438</td>
<td>2 577 562</td>
<td>3 164 114</td>
<td>3 507 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milled rice surplus (tonnes)</td>
<td>416 118</td>
<td>1 319 571</td>
<td>1 433 880</td>
<td>1 649 640</td>
<td>2 025 033</td>
<td>2 244 598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulated ELCs (ha) (total)</td>
<td>583 273</td>
<td>650 316</td>
<td>818 572</td>
<td>847 573</td>
<td>888 509</td>
<td>1 024 639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELC expansion (%)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accumulated ELCs ha (FDI)</td>
<td>73 100</td>
<td>97 480</td>
<td>188 499</td>
<td>217 500</td>
<td>258 436</td>
<td>355 914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MAFF, 2010
MAFF, prohibited the import of livestock from neighbouring countries, to prevent swine flu. This measure not only reduces the risk of animal disease pandemics but also helps local producers compete with imported products.

On the trade side, a market mechanism has been set up to channel agricultural products to local and international markets, as the sector is one of the main drivers of economic growth in Cambodia. To help the sector become more competitive, there have been improvements to soft infrastructure, related to rules and regulations, red tape and costs of doing business. Attracting investment in the energy sector is also deemed important, as the price of electricity in Cambodia is still high compared with in other countries in the region.

The share of total agricultural investment to total investment is small, at around 6 percent between 2000 and June 2010, although interest rose during this period from investors from countries such as Thailand, China, Viet Nam, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Canada, America, India, France, United Kingdom, United States and Denmark. Investors engage mainly in crops, namely, rubber, cassava, corn, sugar cane and cashew nuts, and forestry, such as teak and acacia. The dramatic rise in interest in recent years has sparked concern from various stakeholders as to the potential effects of foreign ELC projects on community livelihoods, local environment quality and national food security.

Preliminary examination using data from both the CDC and the MAFF shows both positive and adverse effects from FDI projects. Some projects have created significant employment for local communities; others, however, have not. In addition, land conflict has been common, resulting from a weak land tenure system and limited consultation with local communities prior to the granting of ELC projects. Moreover, some projects involved in forest clearance have eliminated traditional community income generation through collection of non-timber forest products, such as vines, wood resin, bamboo and rattan, and hunting. The filling in of streams by some projects could lead to water shortages. Overall, then, it seems the costs of FDI projects tend to outweigh the benefits.

With a growing population and land becoming more limited, food security is becoming a concern in Cambodia. According to an examination of CDC investment data (2000–2009) and MAFF/ELC investment data, and preliminary fieldwork on a number of FDI projects, the authors find that, in the short and medium term, Cambodia will not suffer from food insecurity, despite the existence of a traditionally widespread informal paddy rice export to Thailand and Viet Nam. Nevertheless, in the long term, conflicts over land use, water shortages and loss of other sources of income, all contributed to by a dramatic expansion in investment in ELCs in recent years, could lead to a decline in household food consumption and thereby a reduction in nutrition. Particularly at risk are subsistence farming households and those that cannot earn enough from growing rice, such as in Kraya commune in Kompong Thom province.

7.1 Policy recommendations

In order to ensure that opportunities for foreign investment in agriculture in Cambodia are sustainable and beneficial to all stakeholders involved, the government and concerned stakeholders should consider taking the steps outlined below.

7.2 Central and local government

- Environmental impact assessment should be conducted with wide participation from concerned stakeholders, particularly from communities residing close to project sites, prior to granting ELC approval. As the impact assessment becomes more reliable and transparent, the number and scope of land conflicts will be reduced.
- In order to avoid land disputes and overlapping claims, the MAFF and related institutions should demarcate ELC borders in consultation with communities adjacent to each project.
- The government should monitor ELC operations more closely to prevent sub-standard forest clearance activities, such as filling in of upstream water sources and excessive logging activities.
Authorities at both central and provincial levels should hold frequent consultations with communities and companies so as to be able to pre-empt problems.

The MAFF should update progress on the operations of various ELCs on its website – and through other public media – on a regular basis, to ensure more transparency and generate more credibility.

The government should take food security into account seriously in the provision of future ELCs in order to avoid problems of competing land use between industrial crop production for export and paddy rice production for domestic consumption.

Also on food security, the government needs to review overall policy on investment in agriculture, particularly in relation to ELCs, given their drastic expansion, and to ensure agricultural trade policy is not geared solely towards foreign exchange earnings.

The government must tackle the large-scale informal export of paddy rice and other crops with neighbouring countries.

To reduce land conflicts and ensure benefits are derived from large-scale agricultural investment, whether private domestic or foreign, the government must take swift and prudent action to provide land titles to all rural and remote communities, at little or no cost, to be implemented on a sporadic basis by prioritizing those affected by projects.

Future rules and regulations should put increased stress on the protection of rural communities through implementing social impact assessment prior to project approval, and they should be in line with regulations on investor protection.

It is vital to eliminate unofficial fees and set up a computerized investment and business licensing application process, and related administrative procedures to improve the investment climate; this should be done through a step-by-step or ministry-by-ministry approach.

Dispute settlement mechanisms should be reviewed in order to build confidence among private sector firms.

Relevant ministries should set up a department for feedback in order to be able to provide clear guidance and assistance to investors when they need it.

### 7.3 Private companies

Existing and future ELC holders should be more transparent and accountable in their operations to nearby communities and the public by contributing more to the development and maintenance of local infrastructures.

Companies should maintain good, frequent and direct communication with communities through various community social gatherings and the like.

Resolution of conflicts, such as land disputes, should be based on a win-win approach, according to the model used on the DAK LAK rubber plantation project in Mondolkiri.

Companies, ELCs and processing plants in particular should be more responsible for the quality of the environment and the ecological system of the project area.

Chemical substances used in factories should comply with environmental regulations so as not to harm people and animals and contaminate water in the surrounding area.

### 7.4 Affected communities

Communities should maintain good, frequent and direct communication with companies through various community social gatherings and the like.

Communities should be more involved with education programmes provided by the authorities and NGOs regarding their rights to property and how to resolve land conflicts.

Communities should report any irregular operations of the ELC companies to the commune or provincial authority immediately, for example the filling in of streams or excessive logging.
7.5 NGOs/Civil society

- Local NGOs should actively engage in raising community awareness regarding civil rights and how to exercise those rights.
- Community NGOs should closely monitor potential conflicts between local communities and ELC companies and compile accounts to inform the public.
- Civil society groups should advocate for better recognition of community rights by ELC companies and local authorities.

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Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture


1. Introduction

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section presents an analysis of FDI flows bringing out key issues and impacts on the Ghanaian economy. In the second section, an assessment is made of two business models used by private investors in Ghana drawing on case studies from: i) the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC) to illustrate the nature and issues in a model involving collaboration between a private company and local farmers through a nucleus estate and out-grower scheme for the production of organic mangoes; and ii) the Solar Harvest Ltd (formerly Biofuel Africa Ltd) which provides an example of a production model centred on large-scale plantations.

2. Analysis and impacts of private investment flows to Ghanaian agriculture

Several studies have provided some excellent reviews of trends in FDI inflows to the Ghanaian economy from 1970 to 2003. However, in the period since 2003 which has witnessed increased attention by private firms to invest in large tracts of land for agricultural related activities and a huge turnaround for the Ghanaian economy, very little reliable information is available.

In Ghana, the period of 2003-2008 witnessed a significant increase in FDI inflows compared to the previous decade, with FDI growing from the level of US$167 million in 2003 to US$2.1 billion in 2008 within a span of about 5 years (Figure 1). With this trend, Ghana has outperformed several competitive West African FDI destinations including Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, the two leading economies of the West Africa CFA zone. This remains true despite the onset of the 2007/8 global economic downturn which negatively affected global FDI trends.

Furthermore, in a survey conducted for Ghana in 2008 (see Aryeetey et al. 2009), 35 percent of the Multinational Enterprises companies covered indicated that macroeconomic and political stability were the most important factors influencing their decision to locate in Ghana. Other reasons given were market size, potential for growth and extent of natural and physical resources in the country, etc.

Tables 1, 2 and 3 provide a summary of the FDI related projects registered by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) in Ghana.

### TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values and number of FDI projects registered with GIPC in Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC)
### TABLE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>110,739,277</td>
<td>7,935,771</td>
<td>5,531,725</td>
<td>2,282,900</td>
<td>6,100,832</td>
<td>30,262,277</td>
<td>55,612,844</td>
<td>30,12,928</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building/Construction</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2,221,887,925</td>
<td>1,807,617</td>
<td>7,829,047</td>
<td>57,136,311</td>
<td>47,582,520</td>
<td>27,901,785</td>
<td>20,756,451</td>
<td>3,985,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Trade</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>21,836,218</td>
<td>1,071,150</td>
<td>266,417</td>
<td>3,277,917</td>
<td>9,283,240</td>
<td>2,018,955</td>
<td>5,828,539</td>
<td>90,000</td>
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<td>Liaison</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10,535,285</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>361,200</td>
<td>9,524,085</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>7,211,482,509</td>
<td>17,802,282</td>
<td>23,512,748</td>
<td>33,053,721</td>
<td>2,170,553,339</td>
<td>4,754,832,226</td>
<td>191,305,841</td>
<td>20,422,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>52,821,869</td>
<td>3,891,502</td>
<td>25,846,797</td>
<td>3,274,357</td>
<td>8,970,833</td>
<td>7,245,554</td>
<td>2,657,043</td>
<td>935,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,575</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,213,029,696</strong></td>
<td><strong>88,644,646</strong></td>
<td><strong>153,733,732</strong></td>
<td><strong>167,159,704</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,317,467,010</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,930,040,696</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,446,828,888</strong></td>
<td><strong>109,155,019</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GIPC
## TABLE 3
FDI agricultural projects as registered in the first six months of 2009 with GIPC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of company</th>
<th>Year business start</th>
<th>Nature investment (c: creation; e: extension)</th>
<th>Location Region</th>
<th>Ownership (f: 100% foreign; jv: joint venture)</th>
<th>Sector (plantation, fisheries, forestry, livestock)</th>
<th>Activity/Target products</th>
<th>Target markets (l: local; e: export)</th>
<th>Activity/target products</th>
<th>Source markets (l: local; e: export)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahimsach Ghana Limited</td>
<td>27/04/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Opp. Kadaaja</td>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Fish farming</td>
<td>Fisheries production of fingerlings, tilapia, production of catfish, production of table size fish</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bionic Palm Limited</td>
<td>12/05/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Brong Ahafo</td>
<td>Eastern Region</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F Fisheries</td>
<td>To produce &amp; process cashew nuts &amp; agricultural products of high quality for export</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana Sumatra</td>
<td>16/06/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Kumasi</td>
<td>Ashanti Region</td>
<td>Fish farming</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F Fisheries</td>
<td>To produce &amp; market oil palm seed to meet the demand of the Ghanaian oil palm in Ghana</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inga Farms Limited</td>
<td>18/06/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Ashanti Region</td>
<td>Ashanti Region</td>
<td>Plantation</td>
<td>JV</td>
<td>JV Fisheries</td>
<td>Large-scale commercial farm and plantation.</td>
<td>Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maleka Farms Limited</td>
<td>23/02/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Tema</td>
<td>Ghana Region</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>JV</td>
<td>JV Fisheries</td>
<td>Tuna fishing</td>
<td>Local/export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triton Aquaculture Limited</td>
<td>15/06/2009</td>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>Tema</td>
<td>Greater Accra Region</td>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F Fisheries</td>
<td>Aquaculture farming</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) over the period 2003–2009, by economic activity. From Table 1, the cumulative value of investments registered for the period amounted to US$11.2 billion which was used to finance 1,575 projects. The greatest share of the investments went to the following subsectors: manufacturing, building and construction, general trade and services. Agriculture accounted for only about 5 percent although this does not account for projects in the food and beverages, fishing, and others related to agriculture.

From Table 3, joint-venture projects appear the most dominant modes of investment types into the Ghana economy with the values of these activities amounting to US$144 million, while the 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises were valued at US$71.5 million.

2.1 Sources of FDI to Ghanaian agriculture

FDI in Ghana comes from several countries in almost all parts of the world. Drawing from FDI data available for 1994-2008 from GIPC, FDI inflows to Ghana amounted to about US$13.5 billion, of which US$322.7 million (2.4 percent) went into agriculture (Table 4). Of this total amount, France invested about US$57 million followed by India (US$47.3 million), Switzerland (US$46.4 million), United States (US$43.3 million), Denmark (US$23.6 million), Belgium (US$19.8 million), Republic of Korea (US$14.6 million), Netherlands (US$9.2 million), China (US$5.1 million), United Kingdom (US$4.1 million) and Germany (US$4.1 million). The largest African investor country in Ghana is Nigeria and although it invested only US$3 million in agriculture, Nigeria’s invested US$795 million in general trade category – the highest for that category. Nigeria also invested significant amounts of US$10 million in building and construction category and a similar amount in the Ghanaian manufacturing sector. Investments from Asia accounted for 37 percent out of the 184 agriculture related projects registered over the 1994–2008 period. In 2008, for example, China topped the list of investors with the highest number of projects registered with the GIPC followed by India, Lebanon and Nigeria.

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3 All sectors considered.
### TABLE 4
Cumulative value of registered projects classified by country, economic activity, September, 1994–December, 2008, in US$ million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total value of projects</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Building/ construction</th>
<th>Export trade</th>
<th>General trade</th>
<th>Liaison</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Tourism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>4883.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4747.7</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2507.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2240.2</td>
<td>150.9</td>
<td>23.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>2077.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2077.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1120.8</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>795.2</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>546.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>538.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>237.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>157.22</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>156.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>118.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>110.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Island</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain/India</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,255</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>2,437</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7674</td>
<td>1255</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC)
The investments have been unevenly distributed among Ghana’s regions and economic subsectors. All forms of investments in the various sectors, even in the agricultural sector, have concentrated in the Greater Accra Region (GAR), which recorded 1,504 projects. The next major recipient region of investments is the Ashanti Region (AR) which recorded 86 projects followed by the Central Region (CR) with 45 projects and the Western Region with 41 projects. Some regions have had little (Upper East Region (1 project); Upper West Region (4 projects).

2.2 Institutional and regulatory framework for investments in Ghana

In terms of economic policy objectives, Ghana aims at achieving a middle-income status by 2015, and become a leading agro-industrial country, thereby substantially reducing its poverty and hunger levels. Sustainable economic growth is to be private-sector driven, and achieved a conducive investment environment, macroeconomic stability, and pro-market reforms. In line with this developmental strategy, Ghana has sought to promote the private sector as the engine of economic growth by creating an enabling environment for private investors, both domestic and foreign. To meet these goals, Ghana has taken several FDI related measures, discussed below.

While there is no specific legislation on domestic investment, provisions on foreign investment are laid down in the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act of 1994 and in various sector specific laws and regulations.

- Both domestic and foreign investors are required to register their investments in accordance with the companies’ code of 1963 or the partnership Act of 1962. Any enterprise with foreign participation must also register with the GIPC, indicating its activity, the amount of capital to be invested and where, the origin of the funds and plan for financing. Registration usually takes five working days. The registration fees are zero for wholly Ghanaian owned companies, US$100 for joint-ventures, and US$2,500 for foreign owned companies4. Registration must be renewed every two years for a fee of US$1,500. Additional fees apply for work permits for foreigners. In addition, foreign investors have to prove transfer of the required capital, and submit information on the proposed investment project, including equity structure, major activities, employment, and environmental impact.

- However, it is worth noting that the GIPC Act excludes foreign investors from participating in four economic sectors. These comprise the retail trade, operation of taxi and car services with fleets of less than ten vehicles; lotteries; and the operation of beauty and barber salons. Outside these areas, FDI is subject to a minimum capital of US$10,000 for foreign investors in joint-ventures, and US$50,000 for projects wholly owned by foreigners. Trading companies, whether partly or fully foreign-owned, require a minimum foreign equity of US$300,000 and must employ at least ten Ghanaians.

- Specific rules apply in the minerals, fishing, maritime transport, and postal services sectors, as well as to companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE). There is compulsory local participation in mineral and oil projects, whereby the government acquires 10 percent equity in ventures at no cost. Non-Ghanaians are not allowed to engage in small scale mining. As established by the 2002 Fisheries Act, ownership of fishing operations is restricted to Ghanaian citizens, but foreigners may own up to 50 percent of vessels engaged in tuna fishing. Only Ghanaian companies can engage in domestic maritime activities. Furthermore, the share held by any single external resident in a company listed on the GSE is limited to 10 percent, and the maximum

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4 Higher fees apply to foreign-owned trading companies (US$5,000) and establishments in the tourism subsector (between US$1,000 and US$10,000, depending on investment volume).
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

Level of foreign ownership for each firm is 75 percent. Foreign insurance subsectors were abolished with the entry into force of a new Insurance Act in 2006.

- There are other relevant areas of investment incentives available to foreigners and Ghanaians alike. Certain machinery imported for investment purposes are eligible for reduced import tariffs and VAT rates. Tax rebates are available for investments in specific regions. There are also medium- and long-term credit facilities made available to investors through designated financial institutions under the Ghana Investment Fund (GIF) scheme.

- The GIPC Act guarantees foreign investors “unconditional transferability” of dividends or net profits, and remittance of proceeds on sale or liquidation of their enterprises.

- Ghana has also ratified investment promotion and protection agreements with a number of countries. Ghana has signed and ratified double taxation agreements (DTAs) to rationalize tax obligations of investors, with the view of preventing double taxation. Double taxation agreements have been signed and ratified with a number of countries actively involved, such as France and the United Kingdom. They have been signed also with Germany and concluded with Belgium, Italy and countries of the Former Yugoslavia. These agreements are seen as complementing the investment legislation in force to help attract foreign investments. The Ghana Arbitration Centre, a private initiative established in 1996, provides a forum for the resolution of disputes with a view to bolstering investors’ confidence.

- Ghana is also a signatory to the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a convention which provides insurance against non-commercial risks. The country is also a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of investments Disputes (ICSID).

**The Ghana Free Zone schemes related FDI drive**

Ghana established a free zone board (Ghana Free Zone Board – (GFZB)) along with the country free zone schemes in September 1995, following the promulgation of the Ghana Free Zone Act, in order to accelerate the exploitation of the country’s general export potential. This Act has offered an extensive package of incentives including the following to companies operating in the zone:

- 100 percent exemption from payment of direct and indirect duties on all import for production and export from free zones;
- Exemption of free zones developers from income or profit tax for 10 years;
- Income tax after ten-year tax holidays not to exceed a maximum of 8 percent;
- Exemption from withholding taxes on dividends emanating from free zone investments;
- Relief from double taxation for foreign investors and employees;
- Freedom from a foreign investor to hold a 10 percent shares in any free zone enterprise; and
- Various guarantees in respect of repatriation of profits and against unreasonable nationalization of assets. In this connection, there are no conditions or restrictions on repatriation of dividends or net profit; payments for foreign loan servicing; payments of fees and charges for technology transfer agreements; and remittance of proceeds from sale of any interest in a free zone investment.

5 Agreements have been signed and ratified with : China, Denmark, Germany, Malaysia, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. Agreements have been signed, but are not yet ratified with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, France, Guinea, India, Mauritania, South Africa, United States, the Former Yugoslavia and Zambia.


7 Ghana has currently ratified double taxation agreement with France and Netherlands.
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

An investor who wishes to establish an enterprise in the Ghana free zones will, however, require various licenses and permits to enable him to operate. Detailed descriptions of these arrangements including the general requirement for foreign direct investor applying for the free zones can be found on the GFZB website.

The GIPC and the Free Zones have the same mandate to attract foreign investors, encourage, promote and facilitate investments in all sectors of the economy except mining and petroleum. But unlike the GIPC which comes under the office of the President and licenses companies with foreign investors, the GFZB falls under the Ghana Ministry of Trade and Industry (GMTI) with the added ability to license local companies who can meet the 70 per cent export requirement to which foreign investors are bound to adhere. As the results show, the GFZB has been effective and should be supported in the assisting and monitoring of the activities of the export processing zones (EPZs) whose establishment is being carried out across the country.

The free zones enclaves and enterprises can be located anywhere in the country upon the approval of the GFZB. In these locations, the EPZs provide buildings and services for manufacturing including the processing of local as well as imported raw and intermediate materials into finished products prepared primarily for exports. A certain proportion of these outputs may end up in domestic markets subject to meeting normal duty. The EPZ is thus a specialized industrial estate located physically and/or administratively outside the custom barrier, oriented primarily to meet export demands. The EPZ facilities have served as a showcase to attract investors and as a convenience for their being established. The Ghana Free Zones Board also requires a free zone enterprise to show evidence of possession or lease of real property or intent to acquire such property before issuing a free zone enterprise license. This is not without consequences for land prices, considering the difficulties of accessing land in the country, especially for the poor.

The Land Commission and FDI related land concerns

In Ghana, it remains fundamental to address the problem of land tenure insecurity to help meet the effective quest for attracting and providing a safer environment for foreign investors. In the opinion of many observers, land acquisition, ownership and management of land relations remain among the biggest challenges for Ghana to meet its development agenda. This has arisen from the fact that the Ghanaian land tenure system straddles two vastly different pillars of law and practice. It has been estimated that about 80 percent of the land in Ghana is held by customary authorities who provide land for residential or other economic activities. To access these land resources, investors must proceed with the terms of a customary regime which dates as far back as the days of the old Ghana Empire. Indeed, there is a long-standing complex customary regime governing the assignment of tribal lands generally referred to as “stool land” in the South, and “skin land” in the Northern part of the country. This regime stems from centuries of oral tradition and practice and varies by location, chiefdoms, and systems of lineal succession.

Alongside this customary system, there is a statutory regime of the Government of Ghana (GoG), codified in the constitution of 1992 and supported by an extensive body of law and regulations dealing with the ownership and use of land. Under this law, Article 266 of the constitution establishes that foreigners may not own land in Ghana. However, they may lease residential, commercial, industrial or agricultural land for renewable periods of up to 50 years. The dominance of this communal system, the imperfect fit between its regulations and those of the national government and the insufficiency of close coordination between these two autonomous land administration regimes have resulted in rampant

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8 See www.gipcghana.com and www.gfzb.com.gh

9 See Procedures for establishment of free zone development projects and enterprises. Source: Ghana free zone board. 2009.

land disputes, slowing and complicating the process of securing land for agribusiness purposes. Seeing multiple claims on the same piece of property are the rule rather than the exception. In July 2004 for example, there were about 66 000 land dispute cases before Ghana courts, resulting mainly from the inability of traditional or customary authorities to identify the extent of land boundaries among potential investors, thus suggesting the need for better understanding of the way landed property is registered, especially as it concerns foreign investors.

**Land acquisitions in Ghana by statutory means**

The constitution makes specific reference to “public lands, vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of Ghana”11 and stool lands, which “shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf of, and in trust for, the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and usage”12. Thus, in line with the Constitution, the management of the land related responsibilities appears shared between the Lands Commission and the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands as follows.

The Land Commission is primarily responsible for the management of public lands, coordination between state and customary authorities on the establishment of development policies, and development and execution of a comprehensive land title registration system throughout Ghana. The Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands is tasked for the establishment of a stool land account for each stool, to serve as a repository for all incomes generated by the land of that stool, to effect collections and disbursements of such incomes, and to assure that stool land dispositions are in conformity with national and regional planning authority programs. Income derived from stool lands is distributed, once 10 per cent of the total has been withheld to cover the office’s administrative expenses, according to the following schedule: 25 per cent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with its status; 20 percent to the traditional authority; and 55 per cent to the district assembly, within the area of authority of which the stool lands are situated. Under these provisions, the customary holders of lands are ultimately granted only 40.5 per cent of total proceeds from land rents, while the state, through its office of the Administrator of Stool Lands and the District Assemblies, receives 59.5 percent. These arrangements best explain the development of a parallel and undocumented system administered by customary authorities through which they are able to capture a far larger participation in the transaction values involved in the extension of leases to third parties.

**Land acquisitions in Ghana under the customary regime**

There are three types of customary land rights recognized in Ghana: i) *allodial* or freehold title, held by the community as a whole; ii) *usufruct*, held by individuals or groups of individuals who form part of the community; and iii) mixed types of tenancy, including leaseholds, that are allocated either to community members or to foreigners.

Unlike the straightforward provisions regarding land transactions and land tenure contained in the constitution of 1992 and laws involved in the establishment of a formal registry for land titles, the rules by which kings and paramount chiefs allocate the land they hold in trust are based on customary practice, handed down by oral tradition, and vary according to tribal group and location within the country. While this approach lends itself to certain variances in interpretation

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12 Id. (art 267 (1))

---

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Lease period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tree crops (citrus, cocoa, pineapple)</td>
<td>50 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staples (cassava, rice, cocoa, yam)</td>
<td>10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small ruminants</td>
<td>17 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: USAID Ghana, November 2009, P. 64
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

over time, and thus contains a high propensity for dispute, there appears to be a considerable richness in the range of situations these rules cover, and a general understanding among those who are subject to them.

The government has responded to this wide spectrum of situations by enacting in September 2008 the Lands Commission Act, thereby revising and consolidating into one piece of legislation the existing laws on the various public institutions that manage and administer land in the country. This Act intended to create a “one stop-shop” for land management while improving the delivery of services of a long list of implementing institutions including the following involved with property registration.

Despite the plethora of institutions currently acting to address the land related issues, Ghana has not yet succeeded in simplifying the process of acquiring land in a safe and transparent manner. Most land transactions, especially in the agribusiness, have involved leases of stool or skin lands of varying lengths, involving multiple agreements struck with multiple landlords of sometimes questionable reputation. The multiplicity of agreements derives also from the fact that most agricultural holdings in Ghana are of three acres or less and that the availability of land under the control of any particular paramount chief is limited. In the case of the Golden Exotics project, for example, which involves 875 acres of pineapples and 2 050 acres of bananas, the land acquisition process left the company with some “hundreds” of lease agreements, suggesting the need to continue support for programmes/projects such as the 2003 Ghana Land Administration Project (GLAP), the Ghana Land Bank (GLB) project which all aim at strengthening the country’s land administration while streamlining the current tiring steps involved in the land title registration process.

**Gauging the overall business climate in Ghana**

A number of recent studies have extensively discussed the business framework presented above and provided good insights about the way business has been carried out in the Ghana economy in general and its agriculture sector in particular. The following shows in tabulated form the summary data provided for Ghana relative to other countries. As can be noted, for 2010, Ghana is performing quite well on the global scale when it comes to registering properties, protecting investors and enforcing contracts in the country. Leaving aside these areas, the country has a long way to go in many other areas crucial in the FDI attractiveness as the global ranking provided below suggests. It is also worth mentioning that in this same year and for the first time, a sub-Saharan African country – Rwanda – was the world’s top reformer, based on the number and impact of reforms implemented between June 2008 and May 2009. There is no reason why West African countries with enormous resources such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal cannot perform effectively in a way to rank among the top 10 or 20 world reformers. For example, it now takes a Rwandan entrepreneur just two procedures and three days to start a business. The import and exports systems in this country is now seen as one of the most efficient in the world with the transfer of properties taking less time thanks to a reorganized registry and statutory time limits. In this country, investors have now more protection, insolvency reorganization has been streamlined, and a wide range of assets can be used as collateral to access credit.

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13 See Doing business in Ghana 2010 report. The doing business project of the World Bank provides objective measures of business regulations and their enforcement across 183 economies and selected cities at the subnational and regional level.

14 This table lists the overall “Ease of Doing Business” in Ghana (out of 183 economies) including the rankings by each topic. The detailed summary tables discussing the key indicators for each of the topic listed under review along with the benchmark information gauging Ghana against regional and high-income economy (OECD) averages are also available.

Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

3. Impacts of FDI in Ghana agriculture

Ghana has run a structural trade deficit of US$2.1 billion on average over the 2000–2008 periods underscoring the importance of the contribution the country can gain from export earnings mobilized from any other areas of the economy. Although traditionally Ghana has relied heavily on the exports earnings derived from a limited set of export products such as cocoa, minerals, timber to improve its trade balance, the country has made significant strides in the past ten years towards attracting FDI in support of the production and exports of non-traditional products – one of the economic areas where FDI have been most felt in recent years. Figure 3 and Table 7 show the exports earnings performance of non-traditional agricultural commodities such as fruits, vegetable, fish, sea foods and others.

TABLE 6
Ease of doing business in Ghana and selected competing FDI destinations - 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Côte d’ivoire</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doing business overall (183 economies surveyed)</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Starting a business</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with licenses</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employing workers</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registering property</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Getting credit</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting investors</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying taxes</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trading across borders</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing contracts</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closing a business</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.worldbank.org, doing business 2010 report
Note: Doing Business 2009 rankings have been recalculated to reflect changes to the methodology and the addition of two new countries.

Another key area where FDI has also made a significant impact on exports earnings in Ghana is the Ghana Free Zone Programme (GFZP). As can be noted (Table 8), exports earnings from the free zone companies increased 36 percent annually on average from 1998–2008 to reach US$1 305 million. The same programme has also helped the

FIGURE 3

Source: Ghana Export Promotion Council. The state of Ghana Economy, P126, ISSER, Ghana
TABLE 7

Volumes and values of major non-traditional agricultural export commodities, 2007 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Volume (tonnes)</th>
<th>Value ($ 000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roots/tubers/plantain</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yam</td>
<td>19 716</td>
<td>20 842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoyam</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantain</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cereals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize Seed &amp; maize</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1 097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>6 109</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fruits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pineapple</td>
<td>40 456</td>
<td>35 134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banana</td>
<td>52 069</td>
<td>69 773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangoes</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawpaw</td>
<td>1 194</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oranges</td>
<td>3 674</td>
<td>10 991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limes/Lemon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vegetables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Pepper</td>
<td>1 578</td>
<td>1 533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spinach</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubergine/Green Eggs</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onions/Shallots</td>
<td>6 636</td>
<td>1 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fish/Sea Foods</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuna</td>
<td>45 119</td>
<td>26 816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frozen Fish</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried/Smoked/Salted Fish</td>
<td>6 636</td>
<td>1 918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton Seed</td>
<td>5 337</td>
<td>3 711</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shea Nuts</td>
<td>57 166</td>
<td>55 489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coffee Robusta</td>
<td>1 464</td>
<td>2 023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kola Nuts</td>
<td>6 753</td>
<td>4 966</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cashew Nuts</td>
<td>23 616</td>
<td>81 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm Nuts &amp; Kernels</td>
<td>1 684</td>
<td>3 563</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Ghana Export Promotion Council, The State of Ghana Economy, P126, ISSER, Ghana
<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Companies Registered (number)</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Existing Companies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Capital (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1632</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumulative Investment Capital (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>1242</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (people)</td>
<td>3 483</td>
<td>3 968</td>
<td>5 523</td>
<td>6 895</td>
<td>7 745</td>
<td>9 459</td>
<td>14 071</td>
<td>23 928</td>
<td>28 334</td>
<td>25 820</td>
<td>28 875</td>
<td>28 559</td>
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<tr>
<td>- National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Expatriates</td>
<td>- 296</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>924</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Yearly figures</td>
<td>3 483</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>1 555</td>
<td>1 372</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1 714</td>
<td>4 612</td>
<td>9 857</td>
<td>4 406</td>
<td>(2 514)</td>
<td>3 055</td>
<td>(316)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Production (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>2 128</td>
<td>1 065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative (000 000 US$)</td>
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<td>160</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>1 074</td>
<td>1 423</td>
<td>2 026</td>
<td>2 532</td>
<td>4 660</td>
<td>5 725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>- 145</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1 206</td>
<td>1 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Exports (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>- 145</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1 374</td>
<td>2 001</td>
<td>2 511</td>
<td>3 034</td>
<td>4 240</td>
<td>5 545</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes/Duties on Local Sales (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Taxes/Duties (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries/Wages (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Salaries/Wages (000 000 US$)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ghana Free Zone Board (GFZB)
government to reduce, among others, its fiscal deficits in the range of US$7.8 million annually.

FDI impacts have also been felt across other subsectors of the Ghanaian economy especially in agriculture and food security. According to the GIPC, the expectation were for 263,798 jobs and 7,889 jobs to be created for Ghanaians and foreigners respectively, between January 2001 and December 2008. Although agriculture received a very small amount of investments relative to other sectors of the economy, it is the sector where most of the job creation was set to take place. Thus, agriculture alone was expected to create 184,296 jobs (Table 9) underscoring again the crucial role FDI can play in reducing poverty in rural areas given the relatively high labour-intensive nature of agricultural related activities therein.

The surge in FDI into Ghana in recent times has led to an increase in the levels of agricultural outputs, the quality of a wide range of readily available food as well as cash crop products and the purchasing power of certain classes of people, who are now in much better position to generate demand for the agricultural products produced in the country. All this is to suggest an improvement in the state of food insecurity in the country. This is evidenced by the fact that Ghana is one of the few countries in Africa slated to meet its MDG goal of eradicating poverty and hunger by 2015.

The next section presents an assessment of two business models used by private investors in Ghana drawing on case studies from: i) the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC) to illustrate the nature and issues in a model involving collaboration between a private company and local farmers through a nucleus estate and out-grower scheme for the production of organic mangoes; and ii) the Solar Harvest Ltd (formerly Biofuel Africa Ltd) which provides an example of a production model centred on large-scale plantations.

### 4. Agricultural investment business model and impacts – evidence from case studies

This section examines key issues and impacts from two forms of business models used by private investors in Ghana drawing on case studies from: i) the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC) to illustrate the nature and issues in a model involving collaboration between a private company and local farmers through a nucleus
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

4.1 The Integrated Tamale Fruit Company

Overview
The Integrated Tamale Fruit Company is a Ghanaian company with the head office in Gushie, 45 kilometres north of Tamale on the Bolgatanga trunk road in the Northern Region. Incorporated in 1999, the main activity of ITFC is the cultivation and trading of certified organic mango in fresh form. Activities are centred on a nursery for seedlings, a 155-hectare nucleus estate farm, an outgrower scheme and processing facilities that include a drying unit. The company’s main target is the export market (80–90 percent) and local market (10–20 percent). The main export destination countries are the United Kingdom, Netherlands and France.

The venture involves fully private companies’ capital from the Netherlands and from Ghana. The largest shareholder of ITFC, with 50 percent of shares, is Wienco Ghana Limited, a leading Ghanaian-Dutch fertilizer and agrochemicals manufacturer. Wienco (Ghana) Limited, in turn, was established in 1979. Among other things, it delivers organic inputs to ITFC. The second largest ITFC shareholder, with 30 percent shareholding, is Comma, a Dutch company. The remaining shareholders are Tamale Investments (a collection of local Tamale-area investors) at 5 percent, African Tiger Mutual Fund (a Ghanaian investment company) at 5 percent and Alhaji (the Nanton chief) at 10 percent.

The company enjoys strong local support in its operational area and a positive reputation throughout the country. Since the beginning, ITFC has worked with United Kingdom-based Soil Association and has obtained organic certification for its mangoes. The Soil Association is the United Kingdom’s leading certification body and campaign organization for organic food and farming. The Integrated Tamale Fruit Company is also GLOBALGAP (Global Good Agricultural Practices) certified; GLOBALGAP aims to develop widely accepted standards and procedures for the global certification of good agricultural practices.

The nursery
The nursery is located in the village of Dipale, in Savelugu/Nanton District. It has the capacity to produce 347,648 seedlings per year, which can withstand the harsh environmental conditions in sub-Saharan Africa. The nursery has three black nylon shade nets that protect the seedlings from 60 percent of the sun’s rays. There is a total of 16 blocks under the shade nets and each block contains 21,728 seedlings. The nursery uses drip irrigation to supply the plants with water that is sourced from the White Volta River (with the permission of the Water Resources Commission), as well as from the company’s private borehole.

Headed by a manager and an assistant, the nursery staff have been trained by international nursery specialists and pride themselves in their state-of-the-art techniques for grafting mangoes.

The nucleus farm
Like the nursery, the nucleus farm is also located in the village of Dipale, in Savelugu/Nanton District. The climate of the area is ideal for mango. The 155 hectares (about 383 acres) of land for the nucleus farm was acquired after protracted negotiations between chiefs and affected land users or owners. The land was officially handed over to ITFC in 2000. However, the author’s search for the land transfer documents at the Lands Commission in Tamale revealed that they could not be traced. Besides the 155 hectares used for mango, an additional

18 www.wienco.com
20 hectares of land is used for jathropa. The mango farm is divided into 16 equal blocks which are planted with four varieties, namely, Kent, Keitt, Amelie and Zille.

In order to meet organic standards, the farm uses a system of integrated pest management and organic disease control scheme. An internal control system has also been put in place to monitor all activities on the farm and ensure the best quality of organic mangoes and maintain their organic certification status. A micro-irrigation system is operated. This means that there is one sprinkler per plant. The system allows every plant to receive the required amount of water, which is pumped from the White Volta River with the permission of the Ghana Water Resources Commission. Water passes through a filtration system before reaching the sprinklers. The company has employed qualified personnel with requisite experience to manage the plantation, as well as sourcing farm workers from the surrounding communities. The staff strength of the nucleus farm is about 85, mostly labourers.

**The out-grower scheme**
The Integrated Tamale Fruit Company has been working with farmers in the communities surrounding the nucleus farm since 2000. The establishment and expansion of the outgrower scheme has received considerable development assistance. In the initial stages, PSOM, an NGO based in the Netherlands, assisted ITFC with partial financing in the form of a loan for the planting and irrigation of the 155-hectare nucleus farm and 50 hectares for outgrowers. Since the initial set up, ITFC has continued to expand its operations at a steady pace. It has also welcomed the addition of 400 outgrowers with the assistance of Dutch NGO Cordaid in 2004, and has begun to provide consultancy services to other development projects in the area that are dealing with agroforestry. In 2005, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored 100 additional outgrowers and the African Development Foundation sponsored 200 more. These sponsorships entailed payment for seedlings and cost of publication of educational materials. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture, through support from the World Bank, also assisted the outgrower scheme with a grant for partial funding of the seedlings and for an office complex. In total, the company currently has some 1 200 outgrowers who are organized in an Organic Mango Outgrowers Association (OMOA). All registered outgrowers become members of OMOA. The assistant general manager of ITFC indicated that “recently some 155 outgrowers’ names have been struck off the list of association membership because they have – on repeated occasions – allowed their farms to be destroyed by bush fires”. The 1 200 outgrowers are 60 percent of a 2007 target of 2 000 outgrowers achieved so far. Given the challenges faced by the company in increasing the number of outgrowers, the assistant general manager was unable to say when in the future the 2 000 outgrowers target will be fully achieved. Each outgrower cultivates an acre of mangoes, for a total of about 1 200 acres (486 hectares), with a carrying capacity of 100 mangoes per acre.

The aim of OMOA as provided in its constitution is: “to control and manage the affairs of … members with a view to improving the general earning capacity and well-being of the members”. The specific objectives of OMOA are to:

i. foster friendship and solidarity among members;

ii. maintain a lasting harmonious link between its members and ITFC;

i. ensure the most beneficial marketing system for the produce of its members which OMOA will negotiate and maintain competitive prices with ITFC;

ii. promote and protect the welfare and interest of its members;

iii. have full power to do all things necessary or expedient for the attainment of any or all of its objectives in keeping with the constitution of the company;

iv. follow organic standards as prescribed by the Soil Association; and

v. expand and develop the association to its utmost potential.

The association is governed by an Executive Committee (EC) comprising an elected chairman,
vice-chairman, secretary, assistant secretary and a treasurer. Other members of the EC are two representatives appointed by ITFC and one representative each from Diare East, Diare West, Pong-Tamale, Savelugu, Kumbungu, Karaga, Janga and Gushie zones. The functions of the EC as stipulated under the OMOA constitution are:

a. Keep an up-to-date account of the income and expenditure of the association and to submit the same for auditing after every financial year.
b. Present an annual report of the activities of the association at an annual general meeting.
c. Convene all meetings of the association as and when it is deemed necessary.
d. Secure and protect the well-being advancement of the interests of the members of the association.
e. Put in place a quality control monitoring system during the harvesting and packaging of the product.
f. Ensure strict compliance of GLOBALGAP rules and regulations by all members.
g. Ensure strict compliance of regulations of the Soil Association of the United Kingdom on organic standards.

Unfortunately, the constitution of OMOA neither provides for how a member can bring grievances to the attention of the association nor how the association can address its collective grievances with management of ITFC. This to a large extent could be a limiting factor for the voice of OMOA in the discharge of its functions.

According to the company, the outgrower option was motivated by recognition of the challenges and costs involved in acquiring land on this scale. In this area, land is held under customary tenure. Acquiring some 2,000 acres of land would have meant dealing with many individuals and family heads, and possibly multiple chiefs. The outgrower scheme was seen as a way to secure greater productive capacity without needing to acquire additional land. It should, however, be noted that another motivation for the outgrower scheme could have been the support received from development agencies and NGOs in building the capacity of outgrowers in organic mango production.

Outgrowers are provided with a long-term, no-interest loan in the form of inputs, to be used only for farming one acre of organic mango. It is the responsibility of the farmers to provide labour for their farms, including for digging, fencing, weeding and watering. The ITFC provides support on technical issues relating to farming organic mangoes, such as disease and pest control, pruning or shaping of the trees and water provision. Once the trees have reached maturity and they begin to bear fruit (three or four years after planting), ITFC provides the farmers with the technical assistance for harvesting and transports the fruits to the pack house for processing.

To render this arrangement operational, ITFC has a contractual agreement with the farmers. These are smallholder farmers who have agreed to put their customary lands to organic mango cultivation as outgrowers. The costs of the inputs are debited to individual accounts and will be paid back annually from the fifth year after planting. Each farmer must provide one bag of maize as registration fee and a sign of commitment, and pay 30 percent of his organic mango sales income towards the total debt repayment. The farmers are organized into groups and ITFC provides one assistant manager for every 400 farmers and one field assistant for every 40 farmers. The assistant managers and field assistants provide the farmers with the necessary technical support to farm organic mangoes. The total number of workers overseeing the outgrowers is about 70. During the rainy season, ITFC encourages the farmers to intercrop with groundnuts – not only as a cover crop to promote farm hygiene and for nitrogen fixing, but also as an intermediate income benefit to the farmer. It is also important to note that intercropping mango with groundnuts reduces the threat to food security posed by tree crop cultivation.

The nature of the contractual arrangement between ITFC and the individual outgrowers is as follows:

- A commitment fee of one bag of maize is required from the outgrower (value of
about US$15) to begin the process of working with ITFC.

- ITFC gives the outgrower farmer an interest free loan. This is not a cash loan – it comes in the form of farm inputs, such as fertilizer, water tanks for watering the farms, seedlings and technical assistance.

- ITFC assists farmers in obtaining licences and certifications, which are a requirement for the organic export markets. As discussed, one of the key certifying organizations is the Soil Association, based in the United Kingdom.

- The outgrower has a four-year grace period to begin repaying the value of the loaned inputs. This means the outgrower only starts repaying the loan in the fifth year (mangoes take approximately three to four years to mature and bear fruit).

- From the fifth year, the outgrower pays 30 percent of their sales to ITFC until the debt is repaid. The outgrower is expected to pay the Ghanaian cedi equivalent of the US dollar amount of the loan.

- Until the outgrower finishes repaying the loan, all mangoes must be sold through ITFC. After the outgrower finishes paying the loan, they are free to sell to ITFC or any other buyer they choose.

- In case of any conflict arising from the contract, both parties shall resolve such conflict through the traditional arbitration set up in the community. Should this fail, the OMOA will appoint a three-member committee of elders, to issue a written advice in fourteen days. This advice is binding; if this is still not accepted, both parties may go to court. However, the assistant general manager confirmed that there has not yet arisen any conflict between OMOA and management to require the use of any of the above mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The outgrower incurs a start-up cost of approximately US$2,236 (comprising farm inputs such as cutlasses, fertilizer, water tanks for watering the farms and seedlings). This initial cost outlay covers the gestation period of the investment until returns are made. The mango tree takes about three to four years to bear fruit. The annual operating cost of about US$944 is mainly in the form of technical assistance. These costs, which exclude labour costs, are financed by ITFC for the first five years. The mango sales start at around US$150 in the third year and rise to about US$3,000 by the tenth year (Table 10). Note that the cash flow plan is in US dollars to serve as a hedge against inflationary tendencies over time. The plan is based on the conservative assumption that only 50 percent of the expected yields are attained for the various years. This also assumes that 40 percent of the outgrowers’ produce

### Table 10

The ITFC outgrower cash flow plan in US$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year 0</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
<th>Year 7</th>
<th>Year 8</th>
<th>Year 9</th>
<th>Year 10</th>
<th>…</th>
<th>Year 20</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>944</td>
<td></td>
<td>944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct exports</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>1,190</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales to local processor</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales to local market</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>243</td>
<td></td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sales</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,036</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total debt</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>4,110</td>
<td>5,054</td>
<td>5,998</td>
<td>6,791</td>
<td>6,548</td>
<td>6,214</td>
<td>5,728</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>4,331</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,331</td>
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<tr>
<td>Servicing of debt</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash flow</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>(165)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from ITFC and Osei, 2008
are exported, 40 percent are sold to a local processor, and 20 percent are sold on the local market. The total loan of about US$6,956 (i.e. start-up cost plus operating costs for five years) owed to ITFC is expected to be paid off by each individual farmer at the end of the fourteenth year. After this period, individual farmers are expected to earn annual profits of approximately US$2,000 each. This revenue stream from the mango farm after debt repayment represents a substantial increase in income over that gained from subsistence farming. The average farm income in the Tamale area is about US$300 per year for most smallholder farmers who are not outgrowers. This suggests that, after year 14, the outgrowers’ expected income of US$2,000 per annum would most likely put them in a better position than other farmers or labourers. But this reward is acquired in full only after 14 years in the scheme – a considerably long wait, with all the associated risks of production and general economic uncertainties.

The assistant general manager disclosed that outgrowers generally meet their debt obligations to ITFC and that some outgrowers are even willing to pay more than 30 percent of their mango sales to ITFC with the view to redeeming their indebtedness earlier than scheduled. This is hardly surprising, since only 50 percent of expected yield was used in the estimation of cash flows. However, the contractual arrangement of 30 percent of sales as annual repayment of loan was said to be strictly enforced.

A 66-year old outgrower made the following comments, which reflect the general mood expressed by the outgrowers interviewed for this study:

“IFTC came into the community to help us in the cultivation of mangoes. Their aim is to improve and better our yields as well as provide a ready market for our produce. The company’s operations are very beneficial to us. Teachers’ bungalows have been built and health education is provided. We work in groups and use pipes to water the mango seedlings. We have also been promised electricity although we have yet to receive that.”

However, concerns were also expressed by outgrowers in terms of delays in payments for the mangoes sold to the company. One farmer said that “produce sold to the company can take three to four weeks before payment is effected and this does not help with emergency situations where cash is needed by farmers”.

The main risk that threatens the sustainability of the outgrower scheme is produce diversion to other market sources (side selling), especially given complaints of delay in payments. There is, in other words, the possibility that an exporter could come and offer ready cash for the outgrowers’ mangoes. This could potentially threaten ITFC’s export volumes and, accordingly, its command over the market. The diversion of produce to other buyers after the loan repayment of an outgrower can also affect the sustainability of the business model. The company believes this will be a real challenge, because they pay the farmers 20 percent when they collect the fruit from them, and it is only after ITFC has sold the produce that they pay the remaining 80 percent.

Another threat to sustainability is low production capacity among outgrower farmers. The study found that ITFC had to buy mangoes from Burkina Faso to augment local supplies. Even though the agreement between ITFC and the outgrower allows ITFC to deduct 30 percent of the proceeds from sales, outgrowers have to produce mangoes before these can be sold and the debt repaid. Therefore, low productivity would negatively affect the repayment of the loans. For example, a 39-year old male outgrower complained that production has suffered because the company has not yet honoured all its responsibilities under the OMOA contract, and another 43-year old female outgrower lamented that: our group has not been provided with water under the terms of the contract and as a result the growth of our mango trees is negatively affected. These concerns are indicative of low outgrower production locally as a result of ITFC not honouring all its contractual obligations to outgrowers, and hence the inability of some outgrowers to pay off their indebtedness, at least on schedule.
The ITFC has built a pack house facility in Gushie, approximately 9 km from the nucleus farm. Like the nucleus farm and the outgrower scheme, the facility is also GLOBALGAP and Soil Association certified. With a staff strength of 175, the facility is the first of its kind in the Northern Region of Ghana, equipped with a refrigeration unit, a dump bath, a brush washer, a hot water bath, a brush dryer, a sorting table and a sizing machine. Solidaridad, a Dutch organization dedicated to a fair economy for all, in conjunction with AgroFair Assistance and Development for CTM Bolzano of Italy, provided funding for the packaging equipment.

The facility has the capacity to pack 5 tonnes of produce per hour or two 40-feet containers per day. The facility employs approximately 90 workers during the peak of the packaging season. These workers are mostly recruited from the local communities and Tamale. The water used in the facility is pumped from an underground borehole. The company has expanded the facility to include a drying unit whereby nonexportable fruit can be processed and also sold for bulk export.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities

In addition to the support that ITFC has given the outgrowers, the company has also teamed up with Mondiaal Platvorm Venlo (MPV) Solidaridad to start the Children to School Project (CTSP). The project’s objectives are to improve the infrastructure of primary schools in the project area. The CTSP has since become an NGO, with donor support from ITFC and from Roemond of Holland (funding), from Nordox Norway (teachers’ quarters and kitchens) and from Mang-go Project of Holland (text books). Mang-go project also participates in an exchange programme in which university students spend time in the project area volunteering their services. A food programme is in place to ensure that all the students get one nutritionally balanced meal per day at school. The meals consist mainly of local dishes, and one chocolate drink. Clean drinking water is also provided to each school.

As an incentive for teachers to move to the rural areas to teach, housing facilities have been built for them. At the same time, the school environment was renovated to create friendlier educational surroundings for the students.

The ITFC also has a programme to support its staff in fighting the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In addition, the company has a biodiversity programme that provides participating communities in the project area with education on the protection and propagation of indigenous tree species and responsible medicinal herb harvesting. The company is a

| TABLE 11 |
| Key features of IFTC’s business model |

- **Ownership:** ITFC is a partnership between local and foreign companies. While ITFC nucleus farm documents could not be traced at the Regional Lands Commission, the nucleus farm is in the hands of the company. The outgrowers operate on their own lands, which are held under customary tenure.

- **Voice:** The establishment of Organic Mango Outgrowers Association (OMOA) has given collective voice to the outgrowers. It is unclear what formal procedures are available for an outgrower to bring grievances to the company’s attention.

- **Risk:** Both the company and the outgrowers bear the risks associated with weather and the lack of sustainable water supply, with complaints from OMOA about high water charges. ITFC bears the risk of loss of market share in case of side selling. Prices are largely determined by the company, which implies that outgrowers suffer the risk of lower prices.

- **Reward:** Based on the cash flow pattern of the outgrower as shown in Table 2, the outgrowers scheme of ITFC provides major financial rewards to outgrowers, especially when compared with annual incomes of other smallholder farmers in the area (US$2,000 as against US$300). But this reward is acquired in full only after 14 years on the scheme, which is a long-term timeframe and subject to economic uncertainties. Yet outgrowers were generally of the view that they are better off even when they are still indebted to ITFC than when they were ordinary farmers or labourers. Most of the OMOA members interviewed also indicated that they periodically receive training on how to improve their farming practices. ITFC has a total of 330 employees, comprising 70 outgrower staff, 175 for the pack house and 85 for the nucleus farm.
strong advocate of bush fire prevention and trains its staff and the outgrowers in methods of protecting their lands.

4.2 The Solar Harvest Limited Company

Overview
Solar Harvest Ltd, originally Biofuel Africa Ltd. (Ghana), is a private company with Norwegian capital, which was incorporated in Ghana in 2007. In 2009, the Ghana operation went into liquidation following the global economic downturn (Tsikata and Yaro, 2011) and was directly acquired by two of the original founders of the Norwegian company. It was at that stage that the company was renamed Solar Harvest Ltd.

The company has acquired large tracts of land in the Northern Region for the cultivation of jatropha. The acquisitions include 4 844.20 acres of land at Kpachaa, 13 156 acres at Jimle and 8 803.10 acres at Kpalikori, all in the Yendi District of the Northern Region, for a total of 26 803.2 acres (10 847 hectares). The Regional Lands Officer described the transaction as:

a lease agreement drawn and executed between the lessor – the chief of Tijo (Tijo-Na) – and the lessee Biofuel Africa Ltd. The lease is for 25 years with option to renew for another 25 years. The rent is 2 Ghanaian Cedi [US$1.20] per acre of land and a two-year rent advance is to be paid after execution of a statutory declaration. Rent review is every seven years and any upward review of rent shall not exceed 2 percent of current rent.

Thus, Solar Harvest Ltd has leased the land for a term of 25 years, renewable for additional 25 years. Documentation from the Regional Lands Commission in Tamale, which was reviewed by this study, suggests that at least part of the lease agreements have not been formalized due to disputes between competing customary authorities on the one hand, and between customary authorities and community members on the other (see below). The duration of the leases is consistent with the restrictions placed on land access by foreigners under Ghana’s 1992 Constitution. According to article 266 of the Constitution, foreigners cannot acquire interests in, or rights over, land for a term of more than 50 years.

The company’s jatropha cultivation started in the last three years and there is yet to be a harvest. While jatropha remains central to the business plan for these plantations, since 2010, following the global economic downturn, the company has been increasingly diversifying into food crop cultivation, with an emphasis on maize production. It is understood that 400 hectares of land are under jatropha cultivation and 220 hectares of land has been used to cultivate maize at Kpachaa, and a further 25 hectares of land have been acquired in the Dipale area for vegetable cultivation (Tsikata and Yaro, 2011). The target markets for the produce is both local and international but it is unclear how processing is going to take place since there is no evidence of processing plants being built and the plans of management in this direction have not been disclosed. The jatropha plantation at Kpachaa was recently ravaged by bush fire, adding to the uncertainty over when there will be a harvest and the future of Solar Harvest Ltd operations.

Bush fires are common in the area during the dry season and are mostly caused by locals burning bushes in search of game. Referring to the burned plantation, the negotiator for the Solar land acquisition and assistant manager of the company deeply regretted the lack of funds which prevented the company from creating a fire belt around the plantation. However, although the burning of the jatropha plantation could have been caused through the spread of a common bush fire and therefore accidental, it is hard to rule out sabotage given the recent lack of cordial relations between the community members and Solar Harvest Ltd.

In addition to the plantations, the company has also developed plans to expand and upgrade irrigation facilities for the cultivation of food crops on land belonging to local farmers. These plans are embodied in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that the company signed in September 2011 with Ghana’s Millennium
Development Authority (MiDA). The Authority is the national entity responsible for implementing activities funded by the US Millennium Challenge Corporation and included in the Millennium Challenge Compact between the United States and the Government of Ghana. Under the MoU, Solar Harvest Ltd will become a partner on the Bontanga and Golinga irrigation sites in the Tolon-Kumbungu District of the Northern Region. These farmers are smallholders in control and use of their own customary land rights but in need of assistance to improve their production capacities. Solar Harvest Ltd will assist farmers with inputs like seeds, fertilizers, tractors and harvester services, on a credit basis, on some 1 321 acres (535 hectares) of existing irrigated land and water ponds for the cultivation of cotton, sugarcane, vegetables, fish and pasture for local and export markets. Should this proposal materialize, it would entail the company adding to its plantation portfolio activities that involve collaborating with local farmers through a contract farming arrangement. Under the same MoU, in addition to the land already under irrigation, 1 161 acres (470 hectares) of irrigable land are currently planned for expansion works to be led by Solar Harvest Ltd. An additional land area of 12 844 acres (5 200 hectares) is planned for future expansion in the hope that water would be pumped from the White Volta river. The company will manage irrigation infrastructure, provide the above support services to farmers and buy the produce of farmers and in turn sell to both local and external markets.

With the first phase of the above developments involving Solar Harvest Ltd and MiDA, the company is to invest approximately US$2 000 000 and this will be scaled up to more than US$30 000 000 when fully developed. According to company sources, these investments are expected to bring about an increase in cereal production from some 18 000 metric tonnes per annum to 110 000 metric tonnes per annum at full potential and thereby increase cereal production 8-12 times the yields of traditional rain-dependent farming practices.

These measures, if successful, will improve on the state of food insecurity in Northern Ghana. However, the focus in this study is on the jatropha operations of the company.

**Land acquisition, stakeholders’ roles and responses**

Having taken place within the institutional context discussed on pp 199-200 of this chapter, the company’s land acquisition remains contentious. Tsikata and Yaro (2011) explain the land acquisition process following the investor’s placement of an advertisement in the media for land to cultivate jatropha as follows. First, visits were made by the investor’s negotiator to the local chiefs to ask for the land. However, as the sub-chiefs only act as caretakers of the land on behalf of the divisional chief, Tijo-Na, these requests were then referred to the Tijo-Na. The company’s negotiator and assistant manager, who also happens to be the grandson of Tijo-Na, organized a *durbar* (community meeting) of stakeholders, including chiefs, land users, NGOs, the District Assembly and other interested ordinary citizens at the Tamale Cultural Centre. At this *durbar* the benefits of Solar Harvest’s operations were explained to participants. Two public hearings involving stakeholders were also organized in Yendi where the paramount chief and overlord of the Dagbon traditional area the Ya-Na resides, and Tijo where the divisional chief overseeing the communities – where the lands to be acquired – are located. The Tijo-Na is answerable to the Ya-Na and therefore also required the latter’s permission to release the lands. The regent of Dagbon granted that permission in the absence of a substantive Ya-Na (the Ya-Na was murdered in a communal conflict in 2001). At the public hearings the environmental and social implications of the undertaking were explained by consultants to the stakeholders.

The Tijo-Na then hired the services of the lawyer of the regent of Dagbon to prepare contractual documents after the land was surveyed. An initial payment of 13 800 Ghanaian Cedi was paid by the investor, 40 percent of which went to the regent of Dagbon and the remainder (between 500 to 1 000 Ghanaian Cedi) was shared among sub-chiefs and divisional

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chiefs, irrespective of whose land was part of the transaction (Tsikata and Yaro, 2011).

During this study, however, responses from local community members pointed to the lack of a consultative process that preceded the acquisition of the land from the local chiefs in 2008, and the displacement of a number of families from their source of livelihood, the land. Examples of these responses from three community chiefs are given in box 1.

The above local accounts suggest that land acquisition by Solar Harvest Ltd lacked wide stakeholder consultation. This has generated tension in the communities, and a potential for conflict. In the case of Jimle, for example, community members have returned to occupy and use company lands that are currently uncultivated and this corroborates the assessment by Tsikata and Yaro (2011) that only 400 hectares of the total of 10,847 hectares acquired by the company are currently used for jatropha cultivation. There arises, therefore, the question of security of tenure as community members and the company both now contest ownership and use rights over the land. CICOL (2008) also noted tenure insecurity in the case of the Solar Harvest Ltd land acquisition. The likely consequence of this is rising tensions and ultimately conflict in the area. Perhaps the reverence for the chiefs in the area, and particularly for the Tijo-Na, is what has prevented the tensions escalating into conflict between community members and the company. The inability of the company to keep to its promise of job creation has further strained relations between the company and the locals. Under these circumstances, the lack of compensation to farmers who lost their land has negatively affected their livelihoods. This analysis points to the need for Solar Harvest Ltd to improve on implementing the principles of responsible agricultural investment, especially in respect of land acquisition. The current guidelines being developed by the Lands Commission are therefore critical.

For example, a 45-year-old widow of Kpachaa told her story as follows:

“They [Solar Harvest] came to grow jatropha for fuel and as result I have lost my three acres of farmland which I depended on for a living. There was no proper acquisition of my farmland. It was just taken away from me under the instructions of the chief. In the beginning, the company employed me as a casual worker, but I have now been laid off and am suffering because I cannot get alternative land to farm and I was not given compensation. Even eating is a problem now but I am powerless to fight the company.”

The above highlights the implications of Solar Harvest Ltd’s operations for secondary land rights holders such as women. The situation worsens when the environmental resource base – on which they rely for alternative sources of income, e.g. fruits from trees – is cleared for large-scale plantation farming.

While it is estimated that hundreds of farmers lost their farm lands to the company, available evidence collected during the study suggest that loss of land (of around 400 acres) for both resident farmers in Kpachaa and for farmers who reside in a different community and commute to Kpachaa to farm (“nonresident farmers”). From the evidence gathered, it was determined that the average size of farmers’ land lost was 9.5 acres and 4.1 acres for non-resident farmers and resident farmers respectively. The non-resident farmers were mostly from Tamale, while resident farmers lived in the communities where the land was acquired by Solar Harvest Ltd. The difference in land size can be explained by the fact that most non-resident farmers from towns have commercial motives and better resources to acquire and cultivate larger sizes of land than resident farmers in the villages, who lack these resources and cultivate smallholdings on a subsistence basis. So the non-resident farmers lost more land because they had more to lose.

It is also important to note that no women were determined to have lost land. This conforms to the customary practice in Dagbon traditional area, and northern Ghana as a whole, that land inheritance is patrilineal, but women generally have access to use of land and in some cases, widows can lay ownership claims to land as the example of the 45-year-old widow of Kpachaa above illustrates.
“Biofuel [Africa Ltd] approached me for land through one of my elders. The amount of land asked for was huge. Later, I was taken to a hotel in Tamale called Picorna Hotel. At the hotel were other chiefs and some educated people. We were made to thumb print some documents to show that we had agreed to the deal for further action by the Tijo-Na. Those whose lands were taken were neither consulted nor paid compensation and naturally this led to disputes. I can count up to ten families that have left this village because their lands were taken by Biofuel. We, the sub-chiefs, were asked to speak to these people and calm them down, drawing their attention to promises of jobs, schools, water, corn mills and other forms of development to be provided. I was encouraged because as a white man making promises their delivery was assured. However, as I speak, only two small dams have been provided and a corn mill. The corn mill is even a Biofuel business because we pay for its services.”

[Interview with the chief of Kpachaa]

“The Tijo-Na gave out the land to Biofuel. As caretaker chief under his jurisdiction, I was only told about his action at a gathering in which we were informed that a development project was to take place on our land and we should embrace it for our own good. Jobs, dams, schools and other benefits were promised us. Of these, a small dam has been provided in Jimle but I am told those who had jobs have lost them. The loss of jobs and land on which one once farmed has brought misery to us in Jimle. I am unaware of any compensation that was paid to any farmer who lost his land, though monies were shared among the chiefs. Ironically, when some farmers who lost their land to Biofuel returned to these lands to cultivate them because they were not used by the company, the manager reported the matter to Tijo-Na and imposed four conditions on such farmers to select one for compliance. The first condition was for such farmers to discontinue the use of the land and be employed by the company; second was to continue to use such land but be enveloped by company farmlands such that they cannot expand their farms; the third condition was to be given some money as compensation and when the land is vacated; and finally, resettlement on alternative land elsewhere that is not acquired by Biofuel. People are cultivating their lands without complying with these conditions and there are regrets for having the company here but we lack the power to do anything about it since the Tijo-Na is regarded as our father and he brought the company to us.”

[Interview with the chief of Jimle]

“It was one morning that we woke up to find earth-moving vehicles on our lands. When the operators of the vehicles were contacted, the community members were told by a white man that it was Tijo-Na who gave them permission to work the land. A large amount of our land was taken and this led to disputes between our people and Biofuel. Subsequently, when the Tijo-Na was contacted he confirmed that as true and apologized to me as the sub-chief of Jashee for not notifying me earlier, and further explained that it was a development project which promised benefits of schools, electricity, roads, corn mills and water and jobs for communities that embraced its activities. Of all these, however, only a small dam has been constructed and ten (10) members from this community were initially employed. The Tijo-Na is revered and therefore no collective action can be taken to argue the injustice done to local farmers whose lands were taken.”

[Interview with the chief of Jashee]
The Assemblyman of Jimle, a locally elected position for community development purposes, spoke of Solar Harvest Ltd operations as follows:

“There was lack of consultation in the process of acquiring the land for Biofuel. The Tijo-Na controlled the process and suppressed all forms of opposition. I was personally warned by the Tijo-Na for opposing the lack of consultation. Yes, I was warned by him to desist or face the consequences.”

The position of a chief in the Ghanaian society has been described by Brobbey (2008) in the following words:

“The people of this country cherish chieftaincy as an institution of such significance that it is inconceivable to think of a situation where the subjects of a chief will refuse his order. Ghanaians have such great respect, in some cases bordering on reverence, for chiefs that what the chief tells his people is in many cases instinctively obeyed.”

The above observation underpins article 270 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which guarantees chieftaincy and traditional institutions which were in existence before the promulgation of the Constitution. This heightens the need for a regulatory framework for land acquisitions that will respect and protect the land rights of community members and provide also for economic, social and environmental outcomes that are equitably distributed to all stakeholders.

In the focus group discussions with community members at Kpachaa, Jimle, Jashee and Cheegu communities, the findings of the consultation process of the land acquisition were consistently described in phrases such as: ‘the chiefs brought the company without consultation with land users’. On payment of compensation to farmers who lost their lands the typical response was: ‘there was no compensation to farmers for the loss of their land’. Regarding promises made by the company to the communities it was mostly observed that, initially, jobs were created especially for casual labour for land clearance and general land husbandry activities. A former company employee, who recorded the names of the recruited workers, produced a notebook in which 64 employees of the company comprising 37 men and 27 women were documented as casual labourers. They earned 75 Ghanaian Cedi each (about US$50) per month as of 2010. By February 2012, when these focus group discussions were conducted, it was estimated that the only remaining company employees were three watchmen, the managing director and his assistant; totalling five. The relations between the company and locals were no longer cordial and a typical opinion expressed was that: ‘Biofuel Ltd should leave our lands and allow us to do our farming as its presence has made us worse off’.

**Socio-economic outcomes**

The company’s operations have been negatively affected by the global economic downturn. This has led to difficulty in accessing international sources of finance and to heightened environmental concerns of jatropha cultivation. While at some point the company employed around 400 workers, as of February 2012 the company’s workforce has been reduced to five people, namely the managing director, the assistant manager and three watchmen. At the peak of operations when some 400 workers were employed, these were mainly casual labourers from local communities and Tamale on comparable wages (75 Ghanaian Cedi each per month) to other staff of similar grades in the localities. The company’s manager explained that he had to invest about one million US dollars of his own resources to assist in operations and to diversify into food crop production. This raises real questions as to where the resources necessary to scale up the investment will be coming from, especially given limited local sources of finance for jatropha cultivation (see Technoserve, 2007). According to the assistant manager, the manager of Solar Harvest Ltd is currently in Norway, trying to mobilize an amount of US$500 000 for the company to revitalise its activities. Given the scale of the financial difficulties faced by the company and the fact that such a large-scale agricultural investment business has huge inherent risks, one...
wonders if the business plans of Solar Harvest Ltd were carefully evaluated before the start of operations.

As part of its biofuel operations, Solar Harvest Ltd plans to produce jatropha through plantations – there is currently no outgrower scheme. While jatropha cultivation on a plantation basis has food security risks, the fact that currently only a small amount of the land acquired by Solar Harvest Ltd has been put to cultivation and some community members are returning to unused land for farming, the risk to food security is minimal in the short term. However, in the long term, when more land is put to jatropha cultivation, this may negatively affect food security in the area.

The company has developed a CSR (corporate social responsibility) programme. This includes providing two small dams and a corn mill to the Kpachaa community; and a small dam each at Jimle and Jashee. At the time of this study in February 2012, however, the corn mill at Kpachaa was out of order and community members had to travel several kilometres to the nearest towns to access the service of a corn mill. It was also indicated that the services of the corn mill are paid for by community members and it is therefore seen as a business of Solar Harvest Ltd. The four dams were inspected by the author of this study and seen to serve as important sources of drinking water and other domestic purposes including the watering of animals. It was impossible to access contractual documentation to assess the extent to which these benefits are part of clear and enforceable commitments for the company, or to assess these benefits in the broader context of the economic deal embodied in the contract (for example, comparing these benefits to benefits promised to customary authorities or other groups).

The company liaises with the community through a central committee made up of two members selected by each community to represent it and this serves as a link with the management of the company. The son of Tijo-Na is the chairman of the central committee. However, this committee appears to behave more like a mouthpiece of the company. This is illustrated by the committee’s reaction to efforts by Action Aid International to draw the company’s attention to challenges that the project poses to the local community. In the attempts of Action Aid to expose the negative consequences of the company’s operations, the committee came to the defence of Solar Harvest Ltd, in spite of existing evidence of the suffering of many community members whose lands were taken away. Given the fact that the company’s assistant manager is a grandson of the Tijo-Na (the customary chief), that the chairman of the central committee is a son of the Tijo-Na, and that the Tijo-Na was instrumental in having the company established in his traditional area, the behaviour of the central committee is hardly surprising.

Of course, the above analysis does not imply any bad faith on the part of the company. Had it not been for the effects of the global economic crisis, the outlook might have been very different. Until it was deeply affected by that crisis, the company had created a reasonably good number of jobs and provided some important social amenities in the communities. Had it sustained the job creation and improved on its CSR demonstrated to date, its relations with the communities might have continued to be cordial. The MoU between Solar Harvest and MiDA also appears to be pro-smallholder farmers and the diversification into food crop production are measures that, if well planned and managed, could restore the good image of the company in local communities. The capital required by the company is, however, a key determinant of how successful these measures would be.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

The current wave of agricultural investment in Ghana is taking place in a context where legal and institutional frameworks at local and national levels are very weak. In this context, there is a real risk that deals concluded with customary authorities benefit only a minority. This could have negative implications for the livelihoods of most smallholder farmers who are the poorest of the poor. The nature of the impact of an agricultural investment seems to depend on the framing of
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

The business model, as well as on factors affecting commercial viability. If the manner in which the business entity is structured in wealth creation takes into account the needs of communities and provides room for partnerships and equitable sharing of benefits and risks, the impacts on people's livelihoods are likely to be positive. Thus, a business model's degree of inclusiveness will be high or low depending on how much control over ownership, voice, risk and reward is exercised by a single entity.

Attracting more FDI to the economy, especially to agriculture, is seen in Ghana as a key strategy to achieve the MDGs, while addressing the structural impediments the country is bound to face to become economically independent. Building on some of its natural competitive advantages, Ghana has also taken several FDI related reform measures to enhance its agribusiness climate. This effort has paid off, making Ghana the second fastest growing country behind Burkina Faso in terms of inflows and the third largest FDI stock-builder in West Africa. The benefits of these outcomes are unevenly distributed with little investments going to agriculture in terms of cash (1 percent) and projects (5 percent), compared to other subsectors such as manufacturing, building and construction, general trade and services. FDI originates from the country's long-standing partners such as France, United Kingdom and United States, but also from new and distant investors from Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Singapore and the Republic of Korea). All these partners are expressing renewed interests in available land acquisition or leasing opportunities to farm energy crops and fish while maintaining investments in traditional farming of cash and food crops. The disparity in FDI distribution remains true at the regional level where the Greater Accra region appears the largest FDI beneficiary.

Land tenure insecurity is hampering the remarkable effort being made to drive more FDI into the agriculture sector and food industry. Despite the plethora of institutions currently acting to address the land related issues in the country, Ghana has not yet succeeded in simplifying the process of acquiring or leasing land in a safe and transparent manner and this task needs to be confronted. Contrary to the perceived belief that land is abundantly and readily available for venture in any profitable economic activity in Ghana, the amount of land remaining by region is shrinking like washed leather, underscoring the sensitivity of land issues today across Ghana, especially for smallholders.

### TABLE 12
**Key features of the Solar Harvest Ltd business model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>The company is owned by Norwegian nationals. It has leased land for 25 years on the basis of a lease renewable for another 25-year term. As part of a separate, more recent development, the company will upgrade and expand irrigation facilities on land belonging to local farmers under a MoU with MiDA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Decision-making lies in the hands of the management of Solar Harvest Ltd. The chain of command appears to be top-down. The land acquisition process was characterized by lack of consultation with local people – the deal was struck directly with customary authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>The company bears business risks, and so do the workers – the workforce has shrunk from 400 to 5 as a result of the global economic downturn. Community members who lost land now face livelihood challenges and even risk destitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reward</td>
<td>Jobs have been created – 400 at peak, currently 5 and earning some 75 Ghanaian Cedi (less than US$50) per month as watchmen. The salaries of the manager and his assistant were not disclosed. Two small dams and a corn mill have been provided by the company at Kpachaa and one small dam each for the communities of Jimle and Jashee. The corn mill facility was not in working order at the time of the research in February 2012. The company's expectation of rewards from jatropha production has also suffered due to financial constraints, and the company has revised its business model towards greater diversification. The bulk of the rental sum for the first lease period of 25 years appeared to have been taken by the chiefs; community members who lost their land use rights got little if anything in compensation, as indicated by community members interviewed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
whose livelihoods are highly dependent on rural incomes. Consequently, there are no large tracts of land available now for sale or lease without the encumbrance of some sort of claim or ownership attached, which would suggest an urgent need to address the problem of land tenure insecurity that is prevalent in the country. Providing support to the mapping of the most favoured foreign investment areas and maintaining online land banks is worthwhile if one wants to see more FDI inflowing to Ghana’s agriculture.

The impacts of FDI have been favourably felt in many areas across the Ghanaian economy in general, including its food sector where the case of the palm sector and the free zone scheme were extensively discussed to illustrate the economic, social and environmental contribution of FDI therein, as they relate to various income generation opportunities and risks created to help provide a livelihood for people. Foreign direct investment inflows to Ghana have helped ease various structural imbalances including the state of food insecurity, while raising the risks of seeing more and smaller land users dispossessed of the land they work to make ends meet, and also of seeing the country exposed to more climate change effects. Though encouraging, the results obtained are well below expectations in many other areas including the persistent agricultural yield gaps that the on-going sluggish rates of technology transfer have failed to address in key supply chains.

Joint-venturing appears as the most preferred mode of entry (78 percent of the agribusiness projects registered with GIPC) investors used to penetrate the Ghana agribusiness sector. The findings suggest that the palm oil sector is one of the most profitable agribusiness activities where good public policy coupled with a sustained financial support to the industry would make a big difference in the fight against poverty and food insecurity in the country. The review of the GOPDC business model suggests that there is room for interested foreign investors to invest responsibly in the agricultural sector while reducing the risks for all involved including the smallholders who are most likely to be dispossessed of their land. The review suggests the need to go beyond agribusiness models established so far (out-growers and contract farming schemes) to include more inventive agribusiness arrangements, viz. farmer ownership models whereby smallholders would be given a chance to use their lands for equity swap arrangements while also keeping a greater value of the processed commodities derived from what they produce along global food value chains.

Within the context of the data limitations faced, the results of the business model case studies suggest that the business model developed by the ITFC presents a high degree of inclusiveness. The company management undertakes operational decisions, but given its outgrower scheme, control over much of the land is in the hands of outgrowers. The existence of an outgrowers’ association enables farmers to exercise a voice vis-à-vis the management of the company. Community perceptions of the initiative are overwhelmingly positive, and the study documented amenities and services provided by the company. The food security risks posed by ITFC are minimal given that outgrowers are encouraged to intercrop with groundnuts, and the company has not undertaken large-scale land acquisition for its operations. However, the study also highlighted concerns that aspects of the contractual arrangements appear to favour ITFC, especially in terms of price fixing and marketing of produce.

Both outgrowers and company face and share risks unique to their roles and the terms of their contractual relations. While outgrowers’ risks are largely production related (for example, the vagaries of the weather), management bears the bulk of financial and marketing risks. In the case of benefits, employment as well as CSR activities – particularly in the areas of health and education – have resulted in cordial relations between the ITFC and the local communities. The outgrowers expect an annual income of US$2,000 after 14 years, when debts are fully repaid. This promises better incomes for outgrowers than alternative livelihood sources in the area. There are, however, risks that this expectation might not be realized.
given the lengthy time frame involved. Yet, outgrowers regard themselves as better off even now, compared to other farmers or labourers.

It should be noted that the ITFC has received extensive development aid support, particularly with regard to its outgrower scheme. This raises issues about the extent to which the experience can be replicated and scaled, since the need for development aid support might have been a possible motivation for ITFC to embark on the outgrower scheme, in addition to the costs of large-scale land acquisition.

The case of Solar Harvest Ltd is the story of a private company that acquired land on a large scale in several communities, for the cultivation of jatropha. While the ITFC has been around since 1999, Solar Harvest is a more recent project, launched in 2008 as part of the global increased interest in land investments in the global South. Its business model concentrates the control of land and other key assets of the company in the hands of management. The process of land acquisition resulted in tension in the communities and still remains contentious, due to the imbalance in the power of stakeholders in the negotiation process, and the lack of compensation for those who lost land to the company. The company’s promises of jobs and other CSR activities were seriously affected by the global economic downturn. This has left the company in a state of financial crisis and thus nearly all of its 400 jobs at peak of operations have been lost. These developments have led to significant deterioration in relations between Solar Harvest Ltd and local communities. This is a serious risk to the investor. The burning of the jatropha plantation at Kpachaa may well have been accidental – but the possibility of an act of sabotage cannot be ruled out. The experience is a dire warning to the many companies developing similar projects in many parts of Africa. Of course, outcomes and community relations might have been different had it not been for the global economic downturn. But the model itself (acquisition of large areas of land, dependence on lending) made the investment vulnerable to these outcomes.

The two case studies analysed in this chapter are very different in nature – not only in focus areas of crop cultivation, but also as business models. While the ITFC focuses on organic mango cultivation through an outgrower scheme, has been in operation for a long time, and has received extensive development aid support; Solar Harvest Ltd focuses on jatropha as feedstock for biofuel and is a fairly new company, which has yet to make a harvest and has already been hit by a financial crisis. The ITFC can be seen as an example of best practice in agricultural investment. Solar Harvest Ltd, on the other hand, offers useful insights for the future of agricultural investments that require large-scale land acquisition in areas prone to tenure insecurity.

Agriculture is the engine of growth for the Ghanaian economy. The country currently aims to become a middle-income country by 2015, under the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy II (FASDEP II) and the Medium Term Agriculture Improvement Plan (2009-2015). Evidence from this study suggests that achieving this would require measures that promote serious private agricultural investments. However, given the high risk of food insecurity of some agricultural investments, the way forward lies in a balance between a value chain approach to agricultural development and food security concerns.

This approach would require developing country-level operational tools to implement the principles of responsible agricultural investments (RAI) developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank. To achieve this requires political will and commitment to strengthening the legal and institutional capacities and frameworks for effective land governance and agricultural development from local to national level. In the case of Ghana, the following specific recommendations are made:

1. The Lands Commission, in consultation with traditional authorities and other stakeholders, should urgently speed up the process of finalizing the draft guidelines for large-scale land acquisitions for agricultural and other purposes, for these to serve as a tool for
operationalizing the principles for responsible agricultural investment (RAI);

2. The capacity of traditional authorities and local communities needs to be strengthened to enable them undertake productive negotiations with investors through the development of local land governance structures such as the Customary Lands Secretariats;

3. The Civil Society Coalition on Land (CICOL), the District Assemblies and Customary Land Secretariats can play an important role by undertaking periodic public education and sensitization of communities on their land rights and how these can be protected;

4. The Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) need to collaborate more in enforcing compliance with standards and conditions and periodically monitoring compliance by investors;

5. The Constitutional provision that government should not interfere with the chieftaincy institution must be reviewed to enable some level of intervention, especially where the land rights of communities are usurped by a chief for personal gain;

6. The Lands Commission should disclose and publicize the contracts involving land acquisitions for the public to evaluate how transparent, accountable and equitable these transactions are to both present and future generations, and

7. Government ought to balance efforts to promote agricultural investments with the need to promote national food security.

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Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture


Large-scale agricultural investments and inclusive business models

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses trends, drivers, legal frameworks and case studies of agricultural investments in Mali. The purpose is to generate evidence on a range of different models for structuring agricultural investments, with a focus on models that hold promise for the inclusion of local farmers and communities.

The chapter analyses the context in which agricultural investments are taking place, particularly with regard to Mali’s policy framework regulating land use and tenure and to the economic position of local producers; it analyses recent trends in agricultural investment and land acquisition in Mali; it discusses the design and implementation of different business models, focusing on case studies of two investment projects; and it develops conclusions and possible ways forward. The two case studies involve a discussion of two recent agricultural investments: a bio diesel project run by Mali Biocarburant SA in the Koulikoro Region, which provides an example of agricultural investment that does not involve land acquisitions and has made the inclusion of smallscale producers a central pillar of its business model; and a sugar cane plantation and processing facility run by the Markala Sugar Company (SOSUMAR) in the country’s Office du Niger area, which is located in Ségou Region. This second case study provides an example of ‘public – private – community’ partnership.

The chapter draws on a review of the literature and of documentary evidence, including some contracts for agricultural investments, on interviews with key informants, and on fieldwork based on qualitative semistructured interviews. Interviews with informants based in Bamako helped frame the analysis and collect data on the two case studies. Informants included researchers, officials of public and semipublic agencies and private sector officers. Fieldwork focused on the two case studies. Field research was conducted in May 2011 in Koulikoro Region and in the Office du Niger area. During the field visits, collective and individual interviews were conducted with the various stakeholders, including investors, local producers, government administration, technical services and funding agencies. The remainder of the chapter is structured in three parts. The next section analyses the national context within which agricultural investments are taking place, which is characterized by widespread poverty, the existence of considerable agricultural development potential, weak public funding capacity in the sector, the urgent need for private investment – all within a confused land tenure situation. Section 3 reviews current trends in agricultural investment, discussing key players and their drivers, features as well as potential and actual impacts. Finally, Section 4 presents findings of the two case studies. The conclusion summarises key findings and suggests possible ways forward.

2. The national context

Gaining a proper grasp of the context of private investment in the agricultural sector in Mali requires a discussion of three critical issues. Firstly, the country has considerable agricultural development potential but, due to its extreme poverty and the decrease in Official Development Assistance (ODA), it faces difficulties in funding the agricultural sector. This explains the desire of...
public authorities to attract private investment. Secondly, complex and pluralistic land tenure systems and the limited ability of national legislation to ensure effective regulation of the tenure dimension of private agricultural investment raise important challenges for the government’s ability to manage investment in agriculture and for the protection of local rights that may be affected by investment projects. Thirdly, legislation has been adopted to promote investment and regulate its social and environmental impacts, but the effectiveness of this legislation in establishing safeguards for local people and the environment has been questioned. The next few sections discuss these three aspects in greater depth.

2.1 A country with major agricultural potential but facing financing difficulties

Mali is a landlocked country in the heart of West Africa, with a surface area of around 1 240 000 km². Its population was 14 517 176 in 2009. Mali shares around 7 200 km of borders with Algeria to the North, Niger to the East, Burkina Faso to the SouthEast, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea to the South, Mauritania and Senegal to the West. Much of the country is relatively flat, with rolling plains and low plateaux.

With its very low but steadily rising Human Development Index, Mali is amongst the poorest countries in the world. Although the poverty rate fell over the period 2001-2006, it is still very high, with a national average of 47.4 percent in 2006. Geographical variations are substantial: the poverty rate is 20.1 percent in urban areas and 73 percent in rural areas (CSRP 2007-2011). The country was ranked 175th out of 187 on the HDI in 2011 (UNDP, 2011). This pattern of poverty, combined with certain cultural and historical features, has made Mali the source of major migration, particularly towards West, North and Central Africa, as well as Europe and America.

The structure of the Malian economy is characterized by a predominance of the primary and tertiary sectors, which accounted respectively for 36 percent and 35.6 percent of gross domestic product in 2009 and 2010. This pattern was expected to remain stable in 2011, with the primary and tertiary sectors losing a little ground to the secondary sector. In 2010, growth in real GDP was held to the same level as 2009 (4.5 percent) but below initial forecasts. Mali presents considerable agricultural, forestry and pastoral potential. Rural land is estimated to amount to 46.6 million hectares, including 12.2 million hectares of arable land, 30 million hectares of grazing land, 3.3 million hectares of wildlife reserves and 1.1 million hectares of forest reserves (Ministry of Agriculture, 2008). The country has vast areas suitable for development and irrigation (2.2 million hectares), substantial water resources (2 600 km of rivers), considerable biological diversity, substantial forest and wildlife resources and large numbers of diverse, adapted livestock (7.1 million cattle, 19 million sheep/goats, 0.6 million camels, 25 million poultry) (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006 and 2008).

Nevertheless, agricultural resources are unequally spread over the national territory, twothirds of which is desert. In addition, funding is crucial to the expansion of the agricultural sector but this is becoming increasingly problematic.

The modernization of agriculture is one of the three main objectives of the Rural Development Master Plan (SDDR), together with environmental protection and improved natural resource management. The Master Plan was adopted in 1992 and updated in 2000. The provisions of the Plan are reflected in various other official documents. They were taken up by the second President of the third Republic of Mali just after his election in 2002 and developed particularly within the Economic and Social Development Programme, which he outlined during the presidential election campaign in 2007 (Toumani

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2 Provisional results, 4th General Census of Population and Housing.

3 www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fr/countries/west-africa/mali/

4 www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fr/countries/west-africa/mali/
Toure, 2009). So, agricultural modernization is seen as a policy priority at the highest level of government.

The desire to modernize agriculture also lies at the heart of the Framework Law on Agriculture (LOA), which was adopted in 2006. In article 3, the LOA states that ‘agricultural development policy shall be based on voluntaristic promotion of the modernization of family farming and agribusiness, to foster the emergence of a structured, competitive agroindustrial sector integrated within the sub-regional economy’. However, agricultural modernization involves a financial cost that the country cannot meet from its own resources. The Strategic Framework for Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCRP) 2007-2011 estimates the cost of taking action in the agricultural sector at FCFA 153 648 000 000 (CSCRP 2007-2011, Annex III). At an approximate exchange rate of 1 US$ = 500 FCFA, this is equivalent to US$307 296 000.

A brief look at public investment in the Office du Niger area, which is today favoured by investors because of its enormous hydroagricultural potential, can give an idea of the resources required to pursue this agricultural modernization agenda, in particular as regards irrigation schemes. The Office du Niger is one of the oldest irrigation schemes in West Africa. Set up in 1932 in the inner Niger delta, it was to become, according to the original plans, the main supplier of colonial France’s textile industries, the rice bowl for West Africa and a place of technical and social innovation. The objectives were ambitious, with over a million hectares to be irrigated over a 50-year period. The major structures were designed and built to meet those objectives. Using existing backwaters and a dense network of irrigation and drainage canals, the scheme now covers more than 87 692 hectares. Irrigated lands are used to produce rice, vegetables and sugarcane (Dave, 2010).

Until recently, all the schemes in the ON area were funded by the public authorities. Between 1934 and 2009, the government developed a total area of 63 713 hectares, including 4 653 hectares supported as of 2000 through the Special Investment Budget (African Development Bank, 2010). To these must be added interventions supported by donors. Donor agencies initially funded only the rehabilitation of older schemes, but then went on to fund the creation of new ones. The main donors have been the Netherlands (20 595 hectares rehabilitated and 5 829 hectares constructed), the French Development Agency (5 540 hectares rehabilitated and 1 700 hectares constructed, together with another donor), the European Development Fund (3 650 hectares rehabilitated), the International Development Bank (700 hectares rehabilitated and 520 constructed), USAID (1 971 hectares new schemes, usually with the Office du Niger or other donors), German Development Cooperation (3 100 hectares rehabilitated and 800 hectares new).

Table 1 provides data on the substantial volume of funding expected to be required for new schemes in the Office du Niger area. It shows that the irrigation of 79 865 hectares planned for the period 2010-2020 requires an amount of FCFA 266 756 291 750 (US$533 512 584), i.e. an average of FCFA 3 340 000 (US$6 680) per hectare, excluding costs relating to feasibility and related studies. According to data from SEDIZON (2010), funding for planned extensions and studies to be conducted by a Libyan investor, Malibya, over the same period would amount to FCFA 85 750 million (US$171 500 000). These figures illustrate the challenges faced by a country like Mali in financing its plans to expand irrigation infrastructure as a basis for agricultural modernization at this scale.

It is for these reasons that the Malian Government has worked to promote private investment in agriculture. Given limited capital availability within Mali, foreign investment is expected to play a particularly important role. Private investment is seen as a source not only of capital, but also technology, knowhow, infrastructure development and market access, and potentially as a catalyst for economic development in rural areas. On the other hand, family farming is considered in public discourses as old-fashioned and incapable of ensuring food security.

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The call for private investment was accompanied by a ‘charm offensive’ to attract investors, which included revising the investment code and setting up a National Investment Promotion Agency, a Presidential Investment Council and an international cooperation office within the Ministry of Agriculture, backed by an intensive advertising campaign.

The call for private investment did not fall on deaf ears. Stimulated by the international food crisis and the increased interest in biofuels, private investors rushed to get hold of Malian agricultural land, particularly in the Office du Niger area. Some of these deals were very large. By way of illustration, 100,000 hectares were allocated in a deal with Malibya, an enterprise of Libyan origin, and a similar land area was allocated to Huicoma, a Malian company. These land allocations alone exceed the total area of the irrigation development schemes established in the ON area since colonial times.

However, this scramble for land took place against a background of relative confusion, given the limitations characterising the legal, regulatory and institutional framework. It is to this topic that the next section turns.

### 2.2 A hybrid land tenure system

There are two main land tenure systems in Mali: customary systems deriving from ancestral traditions and local practice, on the one hand, and the formal system of written law established by the state, on the other.

#### Customary systems and local practice

Customary patterns of land access are still the most widespread in rural areas. Throughout history, major empires and kingdoms have flourished on the territory of Mali, shaping lifestyles, beliefs and patterns of access to land and natural resources. This historical legacy explains the great similarities that exist in the traditional organization of social and land relations, although land tenure regimes are still widely different as a result of specific historical, geographical and socio-cultural factors.

Relationships between individuals and social groups are organized according to principles like kinship; gerontocracy and the corollary principle of seniority, based on respect for the elders; the pre-eminence of indigenous communities, particularly as regards the exercise of local political power and access to land; and a gender hierarchy in which men take precedence over women.

These principles guide the organization and operation of village institutions and indeed the entire social and tenure structure in rural areas. However, generally speaking, their implementation varies depending on the agroecological zone concerned, the nature of production systems and especially social and historic factors.

Access to land in rural areas follows two essential patterns: intra-lineage access and interlineage access. The predominant method of access to land, common to all geographical zones, is intralineage access. This takes two main forms: inheritance and allocation of a portion of...
the lineage holdings to one family or individual belonging to the lineage. As land ownership is passed on within families, it is possible through inheritance not only to gain access to land but also to become its manager according to customary rules (GERSDA, 2007). Management was originally based not on ownership rights understood in the sense of individual private property rights, but on a set of rights (access, usage, offtake, exclusion, disposal, etc.) held collectively by the members of the lineage or family and allocated in various ways to the members of those groups.

Intralineage access patterns depend on the size of lineage landholdings and tenure issues in the area. In many families, there is an increasing trend towards splitting up lineage holdings following the enlargement and dismantling of family farms. As a result of various different factors, large families are breaking up and giving rise in various places to the emergence of nuclear families as customary holders of the land they work.

Interlineage access is organised around arrangements that transfer rights, permanently or temporarily outside the landholding lineage. These arrangements include gifts, loans, rental and, more rarely, sharecropping and sale. The latter three arrangements have developed recently as a result of the growing monetization of land relations. They tend to involve relationships between indigenous people and recent migrants, rather than between lineages within the same community. The various arrangements can be combined; the predominance of one or the other depends on local land relations and the economic stakes in the area concerned.

While customary rights are formally recognized and protected by legislation, the procedures to establish and register them have still not been determined. This is because the necessary implementing decrees have not yet been adopted. This circumstance makes Mali’s land legislation incomplete in important respects. Customary land holders that wish to formalise their rights can only do so through the procedure provided for rural concessions. This procedure is costly

Tenure systems under written law
Formal (written) law establishes various methods of access to land. The provisions of general legislation must be distinguished from the norms regulating particular areas such as irrigation schemes.

The Land and Property Code (Code Domaniale et Foncier, CDF) is the piece of legislation that provides the foundation of national law governing tenure. As a general rule, Malian legislation follows the principle of state ownership of land. The state plays a leading role in land relations, and directly holds land as part of its public or private land estate. The latter category consists of land that has been explicitly registered as belonging to the state, but also land classified as ‘vacant and unclaimed’ and land held by virtue of customary rights (article 28 of the CDF). The CDF does protect these customary rights, requiring that their compulsory acquisition requires public purpose and payment of compensation (article 43). But ownership on these lands is vested with the state. So it is the state that has the legal authority to decide on and negotiate transactions affecting these lands.

Article 35 of the CDF states that the private land estate can be transferred in a number of ways, namely such as rural concessions, allocation, longterm lease, leasehold with the promise of sale or title deeds. In the case of rural concessions, for example, the public authority grants the concessionholder the right of temporary use of a piece of land to develop it on the terms set out in the concession deed and attached specifications. In a longterm lease, the lessor grants the lessee a longterm use right that can be mortgaged, against payment of an annual fee. Title deeds are regulated by article 169 of the CDF, which states that titles are permanent and cannot be challenged. A title deed is seen by the Malian courts as the sole starting point of all property rights at the time of registration.

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and cumbersome, and arguably not suited to recording customary rights.

In virtually every region of the country, there are schemes set up by the state or NGOs where tenure systems varied depending on the legal status of the scheme in question. Plots are typically allocated in these schemes on the basis of permits or usage agreements. This chapter focuses on the case of the Office du Niger, where various tenure systems coexist.

From its creation until the present day, the Office du Niger has undergone various changes which have resulted in a wide range of tenure arrangements. Pursuant to Decree No. 94-004 of 1994, the Office du Niger (ON) is a public industrial and commercial establishment (EPIC) responsible for managing land irrigated or irrigable through the Markala dam. Decree No. 96188/PRM of 1996 confirms the ON's control over not only the land which has been developed and equipped, but also the land located in undeveloped areas, i.e. irrigated land and land that is capable of irrigation by means of the Markala dam. Article 3 of the 1996 decree specifies that the remit of the ON management can extend to nonirrigable land if the government deems it appropriate. However, according to article 4, this land must, like land already developed and the surrounding protected areas, be registered in the name of the Malian state, which will bear the cost of clearing customary rights exercised over that land and all expenses connected with registration. Undeveloped land in the ON area, as in the other rural regions of the country, is in practice held by local communities and managed according to customary rules. Any intervention by the State in those areas would require prior negotiation with the customary holders.

The 1996 decree sets out the following mechanisms for accessing land: the Annual Usage Contract (Contrat Annuel d’Exploitation - CAE), the Farming Permit (Permis d’Exploitation Agricole - PEA) and the housing lease in irrigated areas; and the ordinary lease and emphytheutic lease in areas not yet irrigated. The last two methods are used for large-scale investments, and are briefly discussed in Box 1.

In practice, recent large-scale land acquisitions in Mali and in the Office du Niger have involved use of contractual arrangements not explicitly mentioned in the legislation discussed so far.

The first such contractual arrangement is the investment agreement, or convention of establishment. This is a relatively recent practice in private investment in the agricultural sector, although a few rare examples can be found from the 1990s. These agreements reflect the investors’ wish to obtain legal safeguards from the government concerning aspects capable of affecting the success of their investment. This mechanism has been used by large foreign or

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**BOX 1**

Access to undeveloped Office du Niger land

- Ordinary lease: granted on undeveloped land for a maximum period of 30 years, renewable by express agreement between the parties. The lessees must develop irrigation infrastructure. Non-payment of rent and failure to maintain the hydraulic network will result in cancellation of the lease. No structure erected in connection with a lease can be destroyed if the contract is terminated.

- Emphytheutic lease: granted on undeveloped land for a period of 50 years, renewable by express agreement between the parties. On expiry of the long-term lease, the lessee leaves the infrastructure constructed by the project in place as it stands, without compensation from the Office du Niger. The lessee undertakes to develop the land within three years from the date of signature of the lease. This period may be renewed once, either tacitly or by express agreement between the parties. The leases are typically subject to conditionalities determined by the Office du Niger. The lessee bears the cost of developing the land and establishing the hydraulic network and all other facilities enabling the land to be used.
national investors like Illovo, a firm based in South Africa, the China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation, Malibya, the Société des Moulins Modernes and a few others.

But despite all the political, strategic and legal interest of investment agreements, the transfer of land rights is actually implemented through a lease contract. In this respect, the investment agreement can be seen as some sort of letter of intent which cannot be implemented until the studies required by it have been carried out and its provisions have been operationalized, whether totally or partially, through a lease contract. In some cases, while the investment agreement covers a very large land area (e.g. 100 000 hectares for Malibya and 20 000 hectares for the Malian company GDCM), the lease contract may only cover a smaller area for which the feasibility and impact assessment studies have been conducted and the development plans submitted (e.g. an initial 25 000 hectares for Malibya and 7 400 hectares for GDCM).

The lease contract is signed by the Managing Director of the Office du Niger and by the investor. It specifies the nature of the lease (ordinary or emphyteutic), as well as its duration and the exact location of the land. The contract sets out the timeline for the development of the land (usually three years), the agreed land use and the terms and conditions, including the terms of access to water and payment of the water fee, conditions of land use, and terms for cancellation of the agreement, withdrawal of the plot and settlement of disputes. Once signed, the contract is registered at the land registry in Ségou.

**Constraints on tenure security for rural producers**

As a broad generalization, the national law regime regulating land tenure is ineffective. State law is modelled on the French legal tradition, rather than customary tenure systems. National and customary laws are governed by different and partly contrasting principles. In rural areas, two different systems of authority, the government and customary regimes, claim legitimacy. By placing customarily held land within the private land estate of the state, the CDF has undermined the security of tenure of the majority national investors like Illovo, a firm based in South Africa, the China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation, Malibya, the Société des Moulins Modernes and a few others.

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of rural people, who have little decisionmaking or management power on their own land. The lack of the implementing decree required to regulate the procedure for recording customary rights makes it more difficult for rural people to have access to formal documentation for their land. Customary and statutory systems also coexist in irrigation schemes that are governed by special regimes under national law, such as the Office du Niger. Here, while irrigated land is accessed through the arrangements articulated in the 1996 management decree, undeveloped areas are effectively managed through customary systems. The different principles that inspire customary and statutory law create latent tensions that can easily explode as large-scale investments enter the local arena.

Although the CDF establishes various measures intended to ensure the transparency of the procedure through which investors may access land under national law, these measures are, in practice, sometimes breached or sidestepped. The effect is to weaken the procedures, undermine the land rights of rural communities and affect the credibility and reliability of deeds issued under national law. In addition, official procedures are based on mechanisms that are unfamiliar and inaccessible for the majority of rural people, and have costs which exclude these people from land ownership (Djiré, 2007).

The effectiveness of national law and of government procedures is restricted by multiple factors, including barriers to rural communities’ access to justice, incomplete and inappropriate legislation, and heavy bureaucracy.

2.3. Measures to promote investment and regulate its social and environmental impacts

A new investment code to promote private investment

In order to promote private investment, Mali has, like the other countries in the region, enacted a law determining conditions and procedures for both foreign and national private investment. First adopted in 1991 (Law No. 91-048 of 1991 and Decree No. 95-423/PRM laying down its implementing provisions) and subsequently considerably revised (especially in 2005), the Investment Code was drawn up under the aegis of international financial institutions well before the current wave...
of largescale land acquisitions. It does not therefore take account of some of their specific aspects, despite its successive revisions.

The Investment Code defines investment broadly as the contribution of ‘fixed assets and initial working capital in connection with a development project’. Despite the dryness of this definition, it does have the advantage of excluding exclusively commercial transactions (sale/purchase) from the scope of the Code. The latter operations are governed by the Commercial Code, together with the OHADA Treaty, which concerns the harmonization of business law in Africa. Also excluded from the application of the Investment Code are mining exploration and exploitation and petroleum exploration and exploitation which, although covered by investment agreements, are governed by the Mining Code and Petroleum Code, respectively, and their implementing provisions.

The Code sets out the mechanisms and provisions designed to promote investments, through legal and institutional arrangements which are attractive. It grants many benefits to investors, without discrimination, such as tax and financial advantages, or flexible hiring and firing terms. Industrial developments are encouraged through an increase in the duration of the exemption from the tax on industrial and commercial profits and from the business tax. Apart from equal treatment between national and foreign investors, the Investment Code offers several other safeguards, including the right to repatriate profits and salaries and recourse to international arbitration to settle disputes with the Malian Government. Finally, the Code guarantees protection of established rights, including through general stabilization clauses.

The Code sets no minimum investment threshold. The essential criterion for project eligibility is that the rate of added value must be 35 percent or more.

To ensure efficient enforcement of the Code’s provisions, the state has reorganized the departments dealing with investment. At the government level, an Investment Ministry has been established, under the supervision of which the Investment Promotion Agency is tasked with increasing direct investment, particularly foreign direct investment. A onestop shop was set up in 2008 to deal with all administrative procedures relating to enterprise creation in respect of new investments, and to shorten the time taken to complete the formalities.

These advantages explain to a large extent why major national and foreign investors prefer to sign an investment agreement with the government before approaching the Office du Niger for a land lease. Indeed, the investment agreement triggers the application of the Investment Code. In addition, prior approval from the highest level of government authority, which is usually involved with the signing of investment agreements, can help to facilitate the allocation procedure.

**Addressing social and environmental issues**

Largescale investments typically raise important social and environmental issues. Parallel to the development of legislation to promote investment, the Malian Government has enacted legislation to manage social and environmental risks. While progress has been relatively slow with regard to social risks, environmental legislation has made important advances over the past two decades. The Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992 enshrines the right to a healthy environment as a human right. Similarly, it considers environmental protection as the common duty of citizens and the state. Indeed, article 15 of the Constitution provides that ‘Everyone is entitled to a healthy environment. The protection and defence of the environment and the promotion of quality of life are the duty of everyone and the State’.

Reflecting these constitutional provisions but also under international pressure from environmentalists and ecologists, relevant regulations have gradually been put in place to ensure proper protection of the natural and human environment.

In 2001, basic legislation was enacted to combat pollution and nuisance (Law No. 01-020

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6 The 1991 Code repealed the first one adopted back in 1986 (Law No. 86-39/AN-RM of 8 March 1986) and is currently under review.
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of 2001 on pollution and nuisance). According to article 3 of that law, any activity liable to harm the natural and human environment is subject to prior authorization from the Environment Minister based on an environmental impact study. Article 5 of the same law requires an environmental audit of any industrial, agricultural, mining, craft, business or transport activity, work or development that could be the source of environmental pollution, nuisance or degradation.

First adopted in 2003 to implement these provisions, the decree concerning the environmental impact assessment (Decree No. 03-594/P-RM of 2003) also deals with the social impacts of projects, although its title does not mention that element. The desire to ensure greater consideration of the impact of projects on people living in the area led the authorities to adopt a new decree (No. 08-346/P-RM of 2008). This decree places greater emphasis on the social impact of projects, and establishes the rules and procedures governing the environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA). Further minor amendments were made in 2009.

In principle, projects subject to an ESIA cannot begin implementation without an environmental permit issued by the Minister for the Environment. The permit would require the mitigation and compensation measures recommended by the ESIA. As part of the ESIA, the project developer must inform the local people, particularly those liable to be affected by the project. Also, a public consultation must be organized by the government representative or mayor in the project area to enable local people to voice their concerns. The ESIA must be accompanied by an environmental and social management and monitoring plan (ESMP). These provisions apply to all projects, including agricultural development projects, liable to have negative environmental and social impacts. In practice, the decrees regulating the management of the social and environmental impacts of investments face major problems in implementation, as will be discussed later.

It is in this context of inadequate legal safeguards for local interests, whether in law or in practice, that the recent wave of land acquisitions in Mali has taken place.

3. Trends in private agricultural investment and large-scale land acquisitions

3.1 A long tradition of land acquisition by urban elites

The current trend towards private agricultural investment began in peri-urban areas. It is not a new phenomenon, dating back to the colonial era and ever increasing urbanization. Many government officials and traders used their professional positions or their social relations (friendship, marriage ties, etc.) to acquire plots of land in villages not far from towns. This land became the subject of rural concessions and then, in some cases, title deeds (Djiré, 2007). The trend was encouraged at independence by the authorities of the first Republic, who advocated ‘returning to the land’ and, as a result, set about dividing land into lots and establishing rural concessions for the benefit of city dwellers, especially in the areas around Bamako.

Rampant urbanization since independence encouraged city dwellers to continue acquiring land in periurban areas. Claims that these activities aimed to set up modern farms served to provide them with social legitimacy. In reality, however, although some city dwellers did establish livestock farms (poultry or dairy cattle), most were interested in speculative land acquisitions; the land acquired would be divided up and sold in the form of housing lots (Kéita, 2010; Djiré, 2007).

Despite the absence of official statistics on this phenomenon, there are a few case studies available to help gauge its scale. A study conducted in 2005 in the rural municipality of Sanankoroba, 30 km from Bamako (Djiré, 2007), showed that, while the number of title deeds in the municipality had increased exponentially in recent years, the cumulative 268 title deeds issued until then by the land administration were distributed as follows: government officials (40.29 percent); the state itself (35.44 percent); enterprises (19.40 percent); private organizations (1.88 percent); smallscale farmers (1.49 percent); artisans (0.75 percent); retired people (0.37
percent); and students, undoubtedly acting on behalf of their parents who already held other deeds (0.37 percent). Given that land titling is a condition for the acquisition of land ownership in Mali, these figures show that Malian farmers are being excluded from (official) land ownership. Ownership of valuable lands is increasingly concentrated in the hands of public servants and entrepreneurs living in town. And as the capital city expanded outwards, some landowners began to divide up their land and sell lots for residential use. Plots of a few hectares covered by a single title deed sometimes gave rise to hundreds of lots and respective deeds (Djiré, 2007).

Another study, conducted in the rural municipality of Baguineda-Camp, 35 km from Bamako, showed that the land under the management of the Baguineda Irrigation Scheme Agency (Office des Périmètres Irrigués de Baguineda - OPIB) was the subject of almost 40 longterm leases held in the name of public servants, traders, army officers and private sector executives. In the floodplains of the OPIB, 900 out of 2700 contracts allocating plots for rice production were held by non-resident city dwellers (Kéita, 2003). The average size of these plots between 3 and 5 hectares, with a few plots reaching 10 hectares.

To some extent, these acquisitions of periurban and irrigated lands by local elites foreshadowed current trends in land acquisitions – albeit at a slower pace and covering smaller areas. Like the largescale land acquisitions that have attracted so much media attention, these smaller land deals can undermine the tenure security of local dwellers in rural and particularly periurban areas. Farmer organizations in Mali have called for this phenomenon to be taken into account in debates about ‘land grabbing’.

### 3.2 A process that accelerated and diversified in the second half of the 2000s

Following the renewed interest in agriculture and the efforts of the Malian Government to attract investment, the trend described above has accelerated and expanded beyond periurban areas. The nature of the land acquirers has also changed, particularly with regard to the substantial involvment of foreign investors. The size of individual deals has increased exponentially, with some deals covering tens of thousands of hectares. The Office du Niger has become a favoured target for both national and foreign investors.

While the recent wave of land acquisitions affects the whole of Mali’s territory, the number and size of investments and acquisitions vary significantly from one area and region to another. In the absence of comprehensive information on developments across the national territory, the trends analysis focused on the Office du Niger (ON) area, where the most iconic cases can be found. The Office du Niger area hosts a major share of Mali’s irrigation potential, and is considered to have attracted particularly intense investor interest. In addition to private investment, the ON area has witnessed considerable public investment schemes. It is worth briefly recalling key features of both types of investment.

Public investment schemes supporting by development partners include:

- Land allocations to regional organizations for irrigation development, with plots to be made available to citizens of the member countries: CENSAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) and UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union);
- An experimental scheme centred on creating title deeds to be assigned to Malian individuals as part of a project funded by the International Finance Corporation (IFC);
- A scheme funded by the United States Government under the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), also based on the issuance of individual title deeds.

Schemes involving partnerships with regional institutions have had mixed success. The first such scheme involved the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD). This is a relatively new organization bringing together countries from Northern Africa and from the Sahel, and covering an area of 12 million km². CENSAD countries tend to suffer from food shortages and low incomes. At the 6th Conference of Leaders and Heads of
State of the Community of Sahara-Sahel States, held in Bamako in May 2004, the then President of Mali announced that 100,000 hectares of irrigable land would be made available to CENSAD in the Office du Niger area. The aim was ‘to help meet the target of food security for all member countries’.

After several meetings of a steering committee set up by the Malian Government, a project document was prepared and submitted to CENSAD, together with a draft agreement (Ministry of Agriculture, 2005). The document estimates the total cost of the programme at FCFA 312,600,000,000 (US$625,200,000), at an average cost of FCFA 3,126,000 (US$6,252) per hectare.

Various sources suggest that, when the report’s findings were presented to the following CENSAD Summit, some Heads of State saw the Malian proposal as a poisoned gift. For these reasons, the CENSAD scheme did not go ahead, though the project was taken up by a Libyan company (Box 4).

Another development scheme involving a regional integration organization has made more progress compared to the CENSAD experience. Following a similar logic to the failed CENSAD scheme but taking account of lessons learned through that experiment, the Malian Government offered an area of 11,288 hectares to the UEMOA under an agreement signed in April 2008, as part of a wider regional programme to develop Office du Niger land. The allocation covers two pieces of land located within the hydraulic scheme of the Sahel – Fala de Molodo canal: an area of 9,114 hectares in Kandiourou sector and an area of 2,174 hectares in Touraba sector.

The UEMOA project has three components:

- Infrastructure development (hydro-agricultural schemes and private developers’ installations): the UEMOA project aims at establishing farms of varying sizes for nationals of the member countries;
- Upgrading existing schemes, which involves intensification of rice production, crop diversification and support measures;
- Programme organization and management to ensure effective project implementation. Under this component, UEMOA acts as contracting authority in developing the plots that will subsequently be allocated to private operators from the member states. Under this arrangement, UEMOA will cover the cost of the feasibility studies, together with the construction costs of installing the main irrigation and drainage networks and the internal and external road systems; while UEMOA nationals will cover costs for the secondary and tertiary irrigation and drainage networks, together with levelling and preparing the plots, with pre-financing from UEMOA.

The scheme is designed to be open to three kinds of farmers: indigenous smallscale farmers, who will be allocated small plots with a unit size of between 4 and 5 hectares; private farmers with adequate technical and financial capacity to farm plots with a unit size of 10 or 20 hectares; and major private investors capable of setting up agri-businesses, who can be allocated blocks of between 30 and 60 hectares. Malian beneficiaries may receive title deeds but non-nationals will have to make do with longterm leases. With around FCFA 19 million funding from the European Union, the work started on 18 September 2010 and should in principle be completed by the end of 2012.

Issuance of private land titles to individual farmers is a key feature of the UEMOA scheme. This idea was first introduced in the Office du Niger area by another development scheme, the Koumouna project, which was supported by the World Bank.

The Koumouna project bears the name of the place where the scheme is implemented. First funded by the World Bank under the National Rural Investment Programme (Programme National d’Investissements Ruraux - PNIR) in the early 2000s, the project is designed to test the impact of granting title deeds to small- and mediumscale farmers. The project covers an area of approximately 830 hectares (reduced at the end of the project to 444 hectares), which were divided into 130 three-hectare lots and a small number of larger lots. It is based on the assumption that land titles and farmers’ participation in the investment will produce
The ON management, PNIR and World Bank set up a committee to review applications. The results bear witness to the failure of the initiative. First of all, the consultant’s report confirmed that development of the land offered to CENSAD would require extending the hydraulic infrastructure of the Office du Niger. It also noted the need to enlarge the intake canal and the second to the necessity of funding ancillary infrastructure, particularly roads and social facilities (education and health).

The report then tackled issues relating to seasonal water availability, which could seriously threaten the profitability of commercial farms. Building the Fomi dam was seen as the only way to increase availability during the low-water period and to facilitate dry-season cropping in the CENSAD project area.

Finally, the consultant looked at production systems and economic considerations, noting that the reasons for high yields (an average of 6 tonnes paddy/hectare, with peaks of more than 8 tonnes/hectare) and low production costs in the ON area include the modest size of farms (an average of around 3 hectares), local farming techniques and almost exclusive use of animal traction for soil preparation. He observed, however, that the planned farms on the land made available to CENSAD would be run in a radically different way, with a preference for large-scale mechanization, despite there being no convincing evidence of its effectiveness under the operating conditions of the Office du Niger area. The consultant drew attention to the 30-year lease granted by the ON in 1998 to the Chinese company COVEC to set up a 1000 hectare experimental farm using large-scale mechanization. The experiment failed and the company rented the land out to small-scale producers who, because of the shortage of irrigated land, agreed to pay a higher rent than the water charges that farmers using state land must pay.

The report also mentioned the cost implications of large-scale mechanization, which would make the scheme very expensive. Finally, in the conclusions and recommendations, the consultant suggested beginning work as a trial on 10,000 hectares within the schemes covered by the Development Master Plan. The findings would be used to inform feasibility studies on the remaining areas.

Source: Aw, 2005.

As CENSAD did not have the necessary expertise to analyse and react to the proposals from the Malian side, it sought assistance from the FAO to advance the project. A consultancy took place from 21 July – 12 August 2005. After visiting Rome, Tripoli, Bamako and the Office du Niger area, the consultant made some important observations and recommendations which cast doubt on the project’s viability. First of all, the consultant’s report confirmed that development of the land offered to CENSAD would require extending the hydraulic infrastructure of the Office du Niger. It also noted the need to enlarge the intake canal and the second to the necessity of funding ancillary infrastructure, particularly roads and social facilities (education and health).

greater security, motivation and a more rational approach to farming.

The ON management, PNIR and World Bank set up a committee to review applications. The results bear witness to the failure of the initiative. The committee was supposed to select candidates on the basis of criteria drawn up by the three organizations, but an initial session held in July 2005 only found one candidate who had met all the financial criteria. A new call for expressions of interest to make up the number was issued by the ON management in October 2006 and the stakeholders jointly drew up a new scoring grid. Of the 16 applications received, 11 were deemed admissible and 5 inadmissible (due to noncompliance with procedures, particularly failure to provide required documentation). Of the 11 admissible applications, 6 received low scores against indicators like solvency, track record and ability to pay a share of development costs. These six applications were therefore rejected pursuant to article 4(2) of Decision No. 05-0187/MA-5G of 2005, which regulates the operation of the Committee. Only five applicants have scores.
above minimum legal requirements and were thus approved. In effect, land allocations were made by default. Some of the beneficiaries have now begun farming.

Like the Koumouna experiment, a separate and more recent MCA-supported project is also built around the notion of introducing title deeds in the Office du Niger area. The project is the agricultural component of a substantial funding package granted by the United States to Mali, another component of which involves renovating Bamako airport. The objective of the agricultural component is to increase farmers’ income in the project area (Alatona) through extending the hydroagricultural schemes, improving security of tenure, increasing the area under cultivation, livelihood diversification, and agricultural intensification. To this end, the MCA project involves developing irrigation infrastructure in Alatona and allocated irrigated plots to farmers. The project has obtained 22,441 hectares, which will then be divided into a large number of title deeds (ranging between 1 and 80 hectares each). Plots would be allocated to people from the area, who enjoy priority, and to farmers from elsewhere. In the latter case, open calls for applications are used for allocating blocks of 5 and 10 hectares for young graduates and rural people, and blocks of 30, 60, 90 and 120 hectares for commercial farms. Of the 5,200 hectares to be developed in Alatona, 1,000 hectares have already been developed and plots distributed to 200 new farmers. The project also includes activities in the fields of education, health and organizational capacity-building.

Publicly funded projects like the Koumouna pilot, the UEMOA project and the MCA project are designed to promote farmer entrepreneurship in the Office du Niger area. In recent years, the Office du Niger area has attracted a substantial number of private investors motivated by other concerns. Over the period 2004-2009, 871,267 hectares were allocated to investment projects, with the pace accelerating after 2007. These allocations were made either by the Office du Niger or by the central state, in the main to large investors, on a permanent (50,419 hectares) or provisional basis (820,848 hectares). They cover an area almost 10 times the size of the irrigation schemes set up since the creation of the ON in colonial times.

While much attention has focused on land acquisitions by foreign investors, 90 percent of the known applications have been submitted by national developers, even though nationals represent less than 50 percent of the total area allocated (Papazian, 2011). Although there are some large land applications from national investors, most of national players seek land areas below 50 hectares. A staggering 38 percent of all applications covers areas between 1 and 5 hectares. On the other hand, no foreign investor has acquired less than 500 hectares (Papazian, 2011).

Land allocations to Malian applicants include: farmers (individuals or groups) already settled in the ON area; farmers (individuals or groups) without farming permits who wish to settle in the ON area; and large private investors. The first group consists of farmers that are already settled in the area that hold a farming permit (PEA) from the ON, and that wish individually or collectively to expand their farms and obtain greater security of tenure by means of a lease contract. These people are mostly farmer representatives who sit on ON joint management bodies, ON zone representatives or local political or association leaders who were the first to be informed of this new opportunity to access land. While many make individual applications, others prefer to set up associations with friends and family. Examples of the latter include the Nièta de Phédié Association, Modibo Kimbiri de Dogofri Association, and land allocations made to the Samabalagnon and Dunkafa-Ton cooperatives. The second group includes people wishing to settle in the ON area but who, having failed to gain access to serviced plots, are applying for undeveloped land. They generally work seasonally on fields belonging to nonresident farmers or work on land sub-let by farmers holding large areas. In general, they access plots through associations and cooperatives. Large private investors are developers that mostly do not live in the area and whose main activity is not farming. Some of them even live outside the country. Like foreign investors, they apply for very large land areas. Just 10 of them hold a combined total of 50 percent of all the areas allocated to
Mali. Significant players include the Tomota Group (100,000 hectares) and the companies Yatassaye (20,000 hectares), Société Africaine de Production Agricole (20,000 hectares), CAMEC (20,000 hectares), SOCOGEM (20,000 hectares), Ndiaye et frères (15,000 hectares), Société des Moulins Modernes (7,400 hectares) and BMB Export (10,000 hectares).

Foreign investors are just as diverse a group as national investors. Following a classification developed by Papazian (2011), they include private investments through sovereign wealth funds, such as the Libyan company Malibya; industrial groups (national and multinational) from the food processing and energy sectors, such as the Chinese investments Sukala and N.Sukala; and foreign investors involved with public-private partnerships with the Malian Government.

The latter category includes a large number of projects in which the Malian Government plays an active part through partnerships with the investor or the government of the investing country. This trend is illustrated by the case of PSM, which is one of the two case studies examined in this chapter and is discussed further below.

In line with Malian legislation, land allocations to these investors typically relate to land that has not yet been developed (i.e. irrigated) and is governed according to customary rules. However, in some cases, the state already has title deeds in respect of the areas concerned. Currently, land use is agro-pastoral, and the inhabitants include sedentary farmers, who grow cereals like millet, and transhumant herders. The arrival of private investors on this ‘undeveloped’ land often causes tension between investors and the local community.

Data from the Office du Niger (Office du Niger, 2009) suggests that developers are mainly interested in rice, oilseeds and sugarcane. Only 5.8 percent of the 871,267 hectares allocated is covered by a leasing contract. Of the 94.2 percent remaining, projects still at the ‘letter of intent’ stage account for 60 percent. So much land allocation is still covered by provisional instruments like letters of intent, rather than ‘hard’ lease contracts. Of the areas allocated under leases (which constitute 5.8 percent of total allocations), only 23 percent have actually been developed. So only a tiny percentage of total land allocations has actually been developed. Of the areas still subject to provisional allocation, 54 percent come under letters of intent where the deadline for conducting studies as a precondition for obtaining the lease and commencing farming has already expired (Papazian 2011; Djiré and Wambo, 2010). Under Malian legislation, these allocations should be cancelled. These observations suggest that developing agricultural land is not the main concern of most of the ‘investors’ active in the Office du Niger. In many cases, what is observed is speculative land acquisitions based on the recognition that high-value land is becoming scarce and will be of major financial and strategic importance in coming years.

It is therefore worth looking again at the institutional framework surrounding this race for land and analysing its effectiveness in the light of actual practice.

### 3.3. A legal and institutional framework under threat from current practice

**A multitude of management and regulatory bodies and mechanisms**

The Office du Niger, already briefly introduced, lies at the heart of the institutional arrangement and is responsible for managing the land allocated to the scheme. The ON has long been presented as ‘a state within the state’. Although not entirely false, this assertion is gradually being challenged, particularly with the arrival of major private investors and the various donor-supported pilot projects being undertaken. A wide array of organizations has mandate to work on agricultural development in the ON area. Various central bodies act directly or indirectly upstream of the land allocation process and sometimes downstream through their decentralized branches in the field.

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7 For more details on the Malibya project, see Diallo and Mushinizima (2009); Oakland Institute (2011); Adamczewski and Jamine (2011).

8 On N-Sukala, see Papazian (2011).
For example, the Presidential Investment Council (CPI) and the Investment Promotion Agency (API) are mandated with increasing private investment, in agriculture and beyond. Established in 2003, the CPI is chaired by the Head of State and has foreign and national members representing major mining, industrial and financial groups, together with several ministries (Oakland Institute, 2011). The API was set up in 2005 to ensure greater private sector involvement in the national economy. Answering to the Ministry of Industry, Investment and Trade, the agency’s task is to facilitate and increase direct, particularly foreign, investment. A one-stop shop was set up in 2008 to deal with all administrative procedures relating to enterprise creation in respect of new investments and shorten the time taken to complete the various phases. All applications for approval under the Investment Code and requests for prior authorization to set up businesses are, in principle, centralized at this one-stop office.

In addition, various central government departments are involved in managing investment in general and agricultural investment in particular. For a long time, the Office du Niger was answerable to the Ministry of Rural Development and, following an administrative restructuring, the Ministry of Agriculture. But after a ministerial reshuffle in 2009, responsibility for supervising the ON management was transferred to a new Secretary of State attached to the Prime Minister’s office – the SEDIZON. Differently to the ministry responsible for rural development and then agriculture, SEDIZON is specialized in dealing with the Office du Niger, given the area’s strategic importance. It is responsible for implementing the Sustainable Development Master Plan for the ON area, Schéma Directeur de Développement Durable de la Zone Office du Niger (SDDZON), which was adopted in December 2008. More fundamentally, the establishment of SEDIZON reflects the desire of the highest government authorities to bring decision-making power from the ON management, located in Ségou, back to the Malian capital (Papazian, 2011).

But various ministries remain involved with decisions affecting agricultural investments in the ON. The Ministry of Housing, Land-Use and Town Planning deals with granting title deeds when this procedure is required, as well as registering lease contracts at the Ségou land and property register. It also handles the compulsory taking of local land rights and is involved in resettlement operations. The Ministry of the Environment play a part in environmental impact studies and in environmental monitoring, and issues environmental permits. The Minister of Finance manages the tax benefits granted by the Investment Code. Ministries responsible for water, energy, agriculture and other may also be involved in preparing and/or monitoring projects, e.g. by sitting on the validation committee for an ESIA report or the technical committee which supervises and monitors leases.

Outside Bamako, several institutions play a key role in the governance of agricultural investments. The main of these is the Office du Niger. As discussed, this is a ‘public industrial and commercial establishment’ (EPIC) endowed with legal personality and financial autonomy. Set up in 1932 to develop irrigation in the Niger River delta, it was restructured in 1994. The ON has its head office in Ségou, not far from the dam in Markala that feeds the irrigation scheme. The Office du Niger area is divided into six production zones under autonomous management, where activities are carried out according to plans and programmes approved by the board of directors. Several joint management committees with representatives from the ON management and from farmers assist the ON in managing the land, water and infrastructure and in settling disputes.

**Challenges for land governances**

Despite this complex institutional set up, major shortcomings affect the ability of the Malian state to manage large agricultural investments. There is much diversity of institutional entry points (the authority that negotiates the contract, for instance) and of form and content of the agreements concluded between investors and state. Manifest gaps between law and practice in the process of implementing contractual arrangements have been documented. Generally speaking, legal requirements on managing the environmental and social impacts of investment projects are often sidestepped or ignored. ‘Letters of intent’ and even actual land leases are given...
out in the absence of strategic planning. It is useful to discuss these challenges in greater depth.

The first striking feature of the various agricultural investment contracts signed by the Malian Government concerned is the diversity of entry points chosen by investors (Cotula, 2011). In theory, the process for obtaining a lease involves an application to the ON management, followed by a ‘letter of intent’ and then a lease contract. This process is followed by most Malian investors (with a few exceptions). But large foreign investors mostly rely on ‘investment agreements’ (or ‘conventions of establishment’) with the central state, which effectively take the place of the ‘letter of intent’. Moreover, different contracts have been signed by different government agencies. For example, the agreement with Malibya Agriculture was signed by the Minister of Agriculture, the agreement concerning the Markala Sugar Project (PSM) was signed by the Minister of Industry and Trade, while the N-Sukala contract was signed by the Minister of Housing, Land-Use and Town Planning. Another contract with GDCM was concluded by SEDIZON. And the allocation of 100,000 hectares to the Tomota group was not the subject of any agreement with the central government, despite the large land area concerned.

As a consequence of this situation, the ON management tends to be faced with a fait accompli. Based on the contract signed by the central government, the ON is legally required to do everything it can to meet the various commitments undertaken by the state (Cotula, 2011). Also, signature of the lease contract by the ON management should, in principle, be preceded by validation by an ON lease committee on the basis of a final discussion between the various ON officials and preparation of a schedule of conditions clarifying various aspects of the contract, particularly the investor’s obligations. This committee was set up at the Office du Niger at the end of 2007 as a result of the large numbers of applications, but is apparently not yet operational. Therefore, existing lease contracts were signed directly by the CEO of the Office du Niger, with no prior assessment by the committee.

Furthermore, while the structure of the investment agreements and lease contracts is more or less the same for all private investors, there are major differences in their content, particularly as regards the tenure rights allocated to the investor, land and water fees, and various other important aspects of the contract. In other words, the content of the contracts can vary in important respects from one project to another depending on the institutional entry point chosen by the investor.

For example, while the Malibya agreement provides for a long-term lease free of charge, the agreement concerning the Markala Sugar Project (PSM) involves a long-term lease for much of the land area, and transfer of land ownership for the land where the processing facility will be located (857 hectares), with land fees being determined and deemed to be an in-kind contribution from the Malian state in exchange for an equity stake in the project. Similar considerations apply to water rights and fees, which are mentioned in all the investment agreements and lease contracts. According to the Malibya agreement, for example, Mali undertakes to give Malibya any necessary permits to use the water from the Macina canal and underground water as per the project’s economic feasibility study. It also undertakes to ‘permit Malibya to use the quantity of water needed, without restriction, during the rainy season’ and to ‘provide the necessary quantity of water for less water-dependent crops’ from the Macina canal during the low-water period (the authors’ translation). The water fee is set at FCFA 2,470 per hectare/year for sprinkler irrigation and FCFA 67,000 per hectare/year for gravity irrigation. The latter is the same amount paid by small-scale farmers on plots developed by the state. The same amounts appear in the investment agreement with another company, M3 SA. Setting the amount of the water fee in the investment agreement seems to conflict with the provisions of the ON management decree, which states that this amount should be set by an Order adopted by the Minister of the Agriculture. The desire to bring contracts into line with national law may explain why the lease contract with M3 SA, unlike the investment agreement, does not fix the water fee,
and merely refers to an order to be adopted by
the line ministry supervising the Office du Niger.
Finally, although largely ignored in most
contracts, the issue of resettlement is an
important aspect of the agreement with M3
SA. According to the clauses of its agreement
with the government, that company undertakes
amongst other things to put forward a plan
for resettlement of displaced people, where
appropriate, and to propose an operating
model which includes resident communities in
the project. Furthermore, as per standard legal
practice, the land concerned is allocated free
of any legal encumbrances preventing its use.
However, the agreement stipulates that ‘if the
allocated land encompasses sensitive areas such
as villages, sacred places, transhumance routes
or fields, its use is subject to the compensation
provisions in force’. This provision does not
appear in many earlier contracts, though
compensation is in any case required by national
law.

**Challenges for strategic planning and
scrutiny of investment proposals and
projects**

In the absence of effective co-ordination between
the various agencies, particularly the ministries
concerned and between the latter and the ON,
not only are contracts concluded with different
content but also the effectiveness of strategic
planning arrangements is called into question.
The central government has allocated land to
foreign investors, while the Office du Niger was
allocating land to national investors. As indicated
above, 871 267 hectares were allocated between
2004 and 2009 alone, vastly exceeding the
extension target of 120 000 hectares by 2020 set
in the SDDZON.

The effectiveness of the screening carried out
by the ON management is also dubious, given
the large number of letters of intent issued and
the failure to carry out the required studies for
many of these. It seems that the Office du Niger
does not properly consider the track record or the
technical and financial capacity of the applicant
before issuing the letter of intent. Because of
the lack of transparent selection criteria, in
effect anyone can file an application and receive
a letter of intent. Among other things, this
procedure allows applications from developers
that are far removed from the field and from
agriculture, even in the absence of an ability to
carry out the necessary studies (Papazian, 2011).
Multiple sources in the field indicate that land
allocations tend to be influenced by subjective
considerations, such as links between national
developers and local or national decision-makers,
or relationships between foreign developers and
the state. These circumstances explain the low
rate of conversion of letters of intent into leases,
and the recurring failure of lessees to develop
the land allocated to them. Legal requirements
concerning the deadlines for carrying out feasability studies (within one year from issuance
of a letter of intent) and developing the land
(within three years from the lease) are not being
respected or properly monitored.

The land governance challenges raised by
these dynamics have been recognized to some
extent by the ON and by the government. This
is reflected in the recent establishment of a
new Secretary of State, attached to the Prime
Minister’s office, responsible for the integrated
development of the Office du Niger area
(SEDIZON). It is also reflected in the initiation of
a revision of the ON management decree, and
in the cancellation in 2010 of many letters of
intent for which investors had not complied with
requirements to carry out feasibility studies within
an agreed timeframe. The decision to cancel
letters of intent affected 224 219 hectares.

**Challenges for monitoring compliance with
social and environmental standards**

Investment projects in the ON area all have social
and environmental impacts and are therefore
subject to ESIA (environmental and social impact
assessment) requirements. However, compliance
with these provisions is uneven and the degree of
compliance usually depends on the origin of the
funding.

As ON personnel were not very familiar with
the relevant procedures, they tended not to
apply them. As a result, the ESIA did not form a
direct part of the formalities prior to obtaining
several leases. Some developers obtained their
lease contracts without having carried out any
ESIAs. The mass influx of foreign investors eager to obtain thousands of hectares brought the issue into sharper focus. These investors were applying for large areas of land used by farmers and transhumant herders. In several cases, construction works began without any prior ESIA and sometimes even before the lease contract had been signed with the ON. Some foreign developers considered an investment agreement signed with the central government to have sufficient legal authority to authorize commencement of operations, and saw signature of the contract with the ON as ‘just one more administrative stage’ (Papazian, 2011). During the fieldwork for this chapter, several people commented that, when ESIAs do take place, it is very rare for the proper procedures to be followed.

Another key issue that large agricultural investments must deal with is payment of compensation for affected communities and with resettlement if local communities are displaced. For example, Libyan company Malibya reportedly began construction of the road and canal not only without any prior ESIA but also without taking any account of existing land uses in the project site. Traditionally, the area of Macina is used for transhumant herding. A local convention and development scheme for the agro-pastoral areas supported since 2006 by the German cooperation was trumped by the implementation of the project. Temporary camps were apparently destroyed and transhumance routes obstructed along 7 km in Kolongo municipality (Brondeau, 2011).

N-Sukala and Tomota also began to clear the land without any public consultation or preliminary ESIA. Tomota cleared around 1,400 hectares in the same way as Malibya and with the same effects. In the area of Bewani, the land cleared by N-Sukala belonged to the local villages and was used for grazing, firewood collection and dry cereal cropping. Local people were not adequately informed through the public consultation required by the decree concerning the environmental and social impact studies. They received no prior compensation. The same happened in the area of Sanamandougou, where local people originally opposed the M3 SA project before giving up after confrontations with the police which were followed by arrests and various promises made by the developer (Papazian 2011, Oakland Institute, 2011; Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009; Adamczewski and Jamine, 2011; and data collected during fieldwork).

Conversely, as will be discussed later, the operational guidelines of the African Development Bank, similar in content to those of the World Bank, were applied in respect of the environmental impact study and resettlement plan in connection with the PSM. Various provisions favouring the local people were put forward as support measures.

In the absence of clear national guidelines in respect of the displacement and resettlement of affected communities, everything depends on the goodwill of the developer and any requirements imposed by lenders.

A fundamental problem lies in the government’s commitment to make land available ‘free of all legal encumbrances and tenure rights’. As already mentioned, the land leased is usually outside the irrigated perimeter – investors are allocated undeveloped land for them to build irrigation infrastructure. In these areas, local communities exercise rights, whether customary or not, to use the land for cereal farming or for livestock grazing. Although the ON management decree affirms the monopoly of the Office du Niger over any land that can be irrigated from the Markala dam, the legal status of this undeveloped land falls into two categories: i) land that has already been registered, with title deeds transferred to the Office du Niger; and ii) land that has not yet been registered and over which resident communities exercise customary rights. Registration of this latter land category requires the taking of customary rights and compensation for the holders, following the spirit and letter of the CDF, the management decree and the ESIA decree. This is a task for the government, but government agencies are not always in a position to perform this task to standard. By 2002, only 199,046 hectares of ON land had been formally registered with the state, mainly within the irrigation schemes (according to the 2002 ON Framework Agreement). So the vast majority of ON land, and even more so of undeveloped land
in particular, has not yet been registered with the state.

Nor is the allocated of land that has already been registered with public authorities problem-free. In some cases, the state has registered the land in its name without having carried out all the required field investigations, particularly the identification and compensation of people who exercise rights over the land concerned. In other cases, the state registered the land long ago (whether or not following the proper procedures), but then left the land fallow, so that it was settled by communities who eventually came to consider themselves as the legitimate owners. In this latter case, even if local groups have no legally recognized ownership rights or even customary rights over that land, it is difficult for political, social and humanitarian reasons to evict them without compensation.

In principle, the state must cover the cost of compensating communities holding customary rights. But according to the provisions of the ESIA decree, payment of compensation is a matter for the project developer. This seems contrary to the letter of the management decree concerning the land allocated to the Office du Niger. In practice, the issue is handled on a case-by-case basis depending on the project.

In the case of the Malibya and PSM projects, the Malian Government is responsible for compensation. As regards the N-Sukala project, on the other hand, the Chinese side undertakes to ‘cover costs related to information, removal and resettlement of villages and PAP’ (article 7 of the contract). Negotiations with Tomota are still ongoing. In this last case, the Malian Government refuses to pay compensation, arguing that the developer has not undertaken any work in the area, while Tomota is also refusing to pay, arguing that other projects have received state funding to cover the cost of compensation (Interview with a ON official in Ségou; cf also Papazian, 2011). In this sense, the agreement with M3 SA stipulates that the company must take responsibility for paying compensation.

**Equity concerns and the soundness of policy choices**

Apart from problems related to compliance with legislation, private investment in the ON area also raises issues of equity and soundness of the policy choices made. Large private investors were initially allowed to come in without any concern for small-scale farmers. As Benoît Dave points out, there are some 25,000 family farms in the area, with the size of their small plots averaging 3.7 hectares (Dave, 2010). These farms are becoming smaller and smaller, as witnessed by the fact that the average area worked per family has been divided by three in the space of twenty-five years, so that it amounts to only 3.14 hectares (Bélière et al., 2003).

These farmers do not own the land. They rent it free of charge but must pay an annual charge for maintenance of the irrigation system. Failure to pay is sanctioned with eviction. These farms face many problems, which Benoît Dave mainly attributes to the shortage of land. According to that author, 56 percent of family farms have less than 3 hectares of irrigated land, the minimum size considered necessary for rice farming in the Office du Niger (Dave, 2010). This percentage is rising, because many farms split up as a result of inheritance or family conflicts, or because over-indebted farmers are obliged to sell some of their fields, even though the practice is forbidden by national law. Conversely, farmers have no real possibility of obtaining further land: there are few new schemes for small-scale farmers and the land tends to be allocated to public servants, traders or new farmers. Moreover, access to credit is beyond the reach of many small-scale producers, who are therefore unable to develop irrigation infrastructure themselves.

Against this background, allocating thousands of hectares to private investors without making any provision for a substantial increase in areas allocated to family farms is bound to raise equity issues and compound the concerns voiced by small-scale farmers that they will end up working as farm labourers in the near future.

In addition, questions have to be raised about the relevance of the policy choices made. With a few exceptions, the contracts and agreements for large investments in the ON area make no reference to the end market for the projects’ produce. For example, the recitals of the agreement between Malibya and the Government of Mali quote food self-sufficiency as one of its
objectives, but the contract makes no mention of the destination of the produce. How can a project contribute to food self-sufficiency if produce is sold on export markets?

Similarly, the key issue of whether enough water will be available in the longer term against the cumulative number of approved projects, raised by various studies (Schuttrumphand et al., 2008; Oakland Institute, 2011), has not gone away. In addition to water issues, the feasibility study for the CENSAD project (Aw, 2005) also highlighted several important issues going beyond the specific project and affecting the entire ON area. These issues include the importance accorded to large mechanized farms which are unsuited to rice production in the area, land use changes, and inclusion of small-scale farmers.

4. Case studies of inclusive investment models

While much attention in earlier research has focused on the more worrying experiences with agricultural investments in Mali, this study deliberately focused on two experiences that are widely seen as being part of better practice. One such experience is a sophisticated public–private–community partnership involving a sugar cane plantation and processing facility in the ON area – the Markala Sugar Project (PSM). This project involves the establishment of a 14 123-hectare sugar cane plantation with sprinkler irrigation, designed to produce 1.48 million tonnes of sugar cane per year; and an industrial component involving the establishment of a processing plant for the production of 190 000 tonnes of sugar and 15 million litres of ethanol per year, together with cogeneration of 30 MW of electricity. The plantation is divided in two separate zones. In Zone A, water abstraction of the company, and thus representation on the company board. While the PSM involves land acquisition, albeit in the form of an interlocked set of joint ventures, MBSA has not acquired any land for farming – it sources its entire produce from family farmers.

Besides using different models and being implemented at different scales, the two experiences are also at different stages of implementation: the MBSA experience is relatively advanced and lends itself to an analysis of preliminary outcomes, whereas the PSM is still at the stage of fundraising and testing varieties.

Beyond these differences, the two models share a common concern about taking the interests of the local communities into account. This chapter discusses advantages and disadvantages of the two models. Given the major differences between the two experiences, the intention here is not to carry out a comparative study. Also, limited access to data means that the analysis is inevitably preliminary and incomplete.

4.1. The Markala Sugar Project (PSM) – A public-private-community partnership model

Originally designed as a public-private partnership (PPP) and later expanded to a tripartite public-private-community partnership, the Markala Sugar Project is unlike most private investments in the ON area, because of the way it has been set up and the support it received from the African Development Bank (ADB). The project is led by Illovo Sugar, a South Africa-based sugar company, which is in turn controlled by a British company.

The project has two components: a farming component involving the establishment of a 14 123-hectare sugar cane plantation with sprinkler irrigation, designed to produce 1.48 million tonnes of sugar cane per year; and an industrial component involving the establishment of a processing plant for the production of 190 000 tonnes of sugar and 15 million litres of ethanol per year, together with cogeneration of 30 MW of electricity. The plantation is divided in two separate zones. In Zone A, water abstraction will be from the existing Costes Ongoiba canal,
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while the second zone, Zone C, will be irrigated from the existing Macina canal. The chosen irrigation method is by sprinkler (central pivot system) and, according to the project documents, this choice was essentially guided by a concern to save water. The first phase of the agricultural component will include clearing and preparing the land for the sugarcane plantations. The natural vegetation will have to be cleared and the arable land currently used for cereal production, together with the grazing land, will be converted into sugarcane plantations. The second operational activity in this component will be the installation and management of 200 irrigation pivots, together with construction of the other plantation infrastructure such as access roads, primary, secondary and tertiary canals. The land between the pivots will represent around 1000 irrigated hectares available to the local communities. It will be used to grow vegetables and generate income, ensuring the food security of an area known for its very low level of food production.

The project is located in the Office du Niger area to the north-east of the town of Séguo, the capital of the fourth administrative and economic region of Mali. It falls within Title Deed No. 2215 in Séguo District. With a total area of 111 377.46 hectares, this land was registered in the name of the state and the deed was issued on 23 June 2004. Within this, the land earmarked for the SOSUMAR project was split into two parts, with one to be transferred in full ownership to SOSUMAR, which is the company leading the industrial component of the project, and another to be given on a 50-year renewable lease to CaneCo, the public-sector company leading the agricultural component. The company SoSuMar is a joint venture between the Malian Government and Illovo, whereas CaneCo will be owned 90 percent by the Malian Government and 10 percent by SoSuMar, the industrial company. But, according to explanations provided by an Illovo official, “Illovo would have no economic interest whatsoever in the public sector company CaneCo. It is true that SoSuMar would own 10 percent of CaneCo, but SoSuMar has waived its rights in perpetuity to receive any dividend or profit share from CaneCo. The shareholding was purely symbolic”.

Context: The shortfall in sugar production

The PSM reflects the desire at the highest level of government to promote the agro-industrial sector. The fundamental objective of the project, according to the project documentation, is to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar, to export surplus production to neighbouring countries, and to reduce rural poverty through irrigated agro-industrial agriculture.

Annual sugar consumption in Mali is estimated at 155 000 tonnes. There are currently only two sugar production plants in Mali, both located in the Office du Niger area (in Siribala and Dougabougou) and both operated by Sukala SA, a company in which a Chinese company, the China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation, has a 60 percent capital stake. The country’s current annual output provided by Sukala SA’s plants is around 35 000 tonnes. As a result, 120 000 tonnes of sugar need to be imported to meet consumer demand. This situation, especially during the month of Ramadan when sugar consumption increases substantially, forces the Malian Government to grant customs duty exemptions to sugar importers, a drain on the public purse, to avoid vertiginous price rises.

Project history: From the feasibility study to the involvement of the ADB

Before coming to the conclusion that sugar was beginning to turn ‘sour’, the Malian Government had launched initiatives designed to meet national demand through local production. This was the background to the first feasibility study on sugar production undertaken in 2001, with funding from USAID. The study was conducted by the Schaffer & Associates LLC International (SAIL) group.

The findings of the study confirmed the potential for setting up an irrigation scheme capable of supplying very good quality sugarcane, together with a processing plant with a production capacity of more than 170 000 tonnes of sugar per year. The study recommended implementing the project in partnership with an experienced operator from the sugar industry.

As a result, in 2003, the Malian Government organized a round table in Bamako for investors
in the sugar sector. The aim was to present the project to them and seek expressions of interest. In the end, South African company Illovo Sugar was chosen as the strategic partner for the project. Following various missions and complementary studies conducted by Illovo, the partnership was formalized in an agreement signed on 27 June 2007 between the Government of Mali, Illovo Group Holdings Limited and Schaffer & Associates International LLC.

The agreement required Mali to take part in fundraising efforts. So various institutions, including the African Development Bank, were invited to contribute funding. The bank responded positively to the invitation, and its participation induced the project to comply with ABD requirements on social and environmental standards.

The agreement of 27 June 2007, a very complex, technical document, leaves little space for the local community. Following opposition to the project from some villages and following the completion of the ESIA resettlement plan prepared according to the ADB’s operational guidelines, important changes were made to project design to address this shortcoming. According to Malian environmental legislation, the PSM is classified as a ‘Category 1’ project, subject to an in-depth ESIA and to the preparation of an ESMP. The ADB also considered the PSM as a project requiring preparation of a detailed ESIA. The ESIA reports on the PSM were therefore subject not only to national law requirements, but also to the African Development Bank’s environmental and social assessment procedures. In addition, in application of the bank’s policy on involuntary displacement of local people, a detailed Poverty Reduction Programme and Resettlement Action Plan (PRP or RAP) had to be developed based on a broad development perspective. Documentation produced by the developer in these regards in May 2009 was accepted by the ADB’s project assessment committee.

Technical and financial partners (TFPs) working in the Office du Niger area made both general and specific comments on early versions of the ESIA prepared for the Board of Directors of the African Development Bank. These comments concerned matters such as environmental and social provisions and primary infrastructure, with particular reservations expressed in relation to the issue of water availability. Water was the subject of a further study conducted in 2010.

Following these various initiatives, the loan agreement between the ADB and Malian Government was signed in Bamako in June 2011. Under the agreement, the ADB is to contribute an amount of €65 million (around FCFA 43 billion) towards the financing the two major project components – FCFA 23 billion for the agricultural component and 20 billion for the industrial component – against the total cost of FCFA 275 billion (US$560 million). This makes the Markala sugar project (PSM) the first PPP development project in the agro-industrial sector to be approved for African Development Bank funding.

**Project partners and their motivation**

The project brings together diverse players having different motivations. The Malian State is, as noted above, mainly concerned about the country’s sugar supply and poverty alleviation. It sees the project as a good opportunity to solve this problem and to create employment, as well as to make foreign currency savings by importing less sugar and, in general, to promote socio-economic development in the area.

Illovo Group Holdings Limited (IGHL) is, as its name implies, a holding company. The

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9 Commenting this affirmation, Illovo’s representative notes that it would only be fair to note that it was always the stated intention of Malian Government that the entirety of the earnings from the public sector component of the project would be used for purposes of poverty alleviation within the region and across Mali. The later defined transfer of 40 percent of the cane growing area into the direct ownership of the relocated people (RAP) and out-growers (PAP) was just implementation of the original concept, but not a change in the overall purpose i.e. poverty alleviation. While one cannot contest this affirmation, it is also indisputable that the 2007 agreement does not refer to poverty alleviation.

10 It is useful to note that in a memorandum dated November 2011, the expected cost of the project had risen to €488 million ($634 millions).
Illovo Sugar group is a South African company and leading sugar producer in Africa. IGHL is registered in Mauritius and has subsidiaries in six African countries. The company is listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Illovo Sugar is majority owned by Associated British Foods Ltd, which owns 51 percent of its capital through British Sugar. Participation in the project will undoubtedly enable Illovo to achieve its stated objective of increasing its African sugar production by 50 percent over a five-year period.

Schaffer & Associates International LLC (SAIL) is a private corporation based in the United States which provides international research, management and support services for agro-industrial, energy and infrastructure projects. It is not common for this kind of company to be a direct shareholder in a project where it has carried out the feasibility study. It is understood that SAIL bought shares in the project company SoSuMAR at the request of the Malian Government, who wanted to encourage it in this way to continue and increase its involvement in the project and convince potential investors of the project’s benefits.

Differently to the first three players, the African Development Bank (ADB) is not a party to the original agreement. It became involved in funding the project at the Malian Government’s request, in line with its mission to fund development activities in Africa. More specifically, the Bank wanted to test public-private partnership funding in the agro-industrial field. The project was put together in two complementary stages, as can be seen from an analysis of the original agreement of 27 June 2007 and the essential contributions to project design made with the ESIA and the resettlement action plan (RAP).

**The project set-up**

A limited company registered in Mali was set up to implement the industrial component. Named SOSUMAR (Markala Sugar Company), its primary purpose was to build and operate a new sugar cane processing plant in Mali; to produce, market and sell sugar and its derivatives (molasses, ethanol, biomass, etc.); and to provide services for CaneCo, the second company to be set up as part of the PSM.

Article 3.1.3 of the 2007 investment agreement provides that the majority of SOSUMAR’s capital will be held by a strategic private foreign investor. On the date of signature of the agreement, shareholders in SOSUMAR were the Malian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, IGHL, SAIL and an individual. At that time, IGHL held a minority share in SOSUMAR. However, IGHL had a purchase option to acquire the majority of the company’s capital. It also made commitments concerning the future supply of technical services to SOSUMAR and CaneCo.

According to article 3.1.5 of the 2007 investment agreement, SOSUMAR is to set up CaneCo, the primary aims of which will be to establish plantations to produce sugar cane exclusively for the plant managed by SOSUMAR. Shareholders in CaneCo will be SOSUMAR (10 percent of capital) and the Malian Government (90 percent), although, as reported by an official from Illovo, SoSuMar has waived its rights in perpetuity to any dividends or profit share arising from CaneCo. So the Malian Government controls the company running the farming component of the venture, with control over the industrial component being in the hands of the investor once financing has been secured.

While CaneCo had not yet been established on the date of signature of the 2007 agreement, it was meant to approve the rights, benefits and commitments pertaining to it and be able to demand their enforcement in its favour. Similarly, although SOSUMAR is not party to the agreement, it can accept and take advantage of the rights, benefits and commitments pertaining to it in the agreement.

The financing structure of the project is quite complex. As regards funding of the necessary working capital, it is specified that: SOSUMAR will endeavour to ensure that CaneCo’s working capital requirements are met by means of loans that CaneCo and SOSUMAR may conclude with lenders; and IGHL will endeavour to ensure that SOSUMAR’s working capital requirements, including the amounts needed for CaneCo, are met by means of loans that SOSUMAR may conclude with lenders.

As regards the soft loans required for the project, article 6.3.2 of the 2007 contract
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stresses the government’s responsibility to obtain them in order in its turn to provide sufficient financing to SOSUMAR and CaneCo to ensure that the project is fully funded. However, according to article 6.3.2.2, if the Malian Government is not successful in obtaining the entire amount of funding required, it will attempt together with IGHL to make up the shortfall by means of loans from financial institutions or other sources.

CaneCo, which will initially be incorporated with the minimum capital required for registration, is to be set up by the government and SOSUMAR, which will be its sole shareholders. The share capital of CaneCo is then to be increased and the Malian Government will take a 90 percent stake in the company’s capital by means of a contribution in kind consisting of a long-term lease granted to CaneCo on the land allocated to that company, with an agreed value of FCFA 2,050,000,000. Following this, SOSUMAR is to pay cash for a 10 percent stake in CaneCo’s share capital.

Under the 2007 agreement, SOSUMAR has the following obligations:

- To build and run the plant and provide technical support to CaneCo pursuant to a technical services agreement to be concluded;
- To build the plant in such a way that it has capacity to crush 7,680 tonnes of sugar cane per day and produce high-quality sugar in line with market requirements;
- To supply the Malian Government with six-monthly reports during the construction period on the progress of the work, staff training and any difficulties encountered;
- To employ at least 5,000 people in SOSUMAR and CaneCo activities when the latter have reached full production capacity.

Although it is not directly a party to the agreement, SOSUMAR declares in article 8.2 of the contract that it expect to create 7,200 jobs for the project and to produce 195,000 tonnes of sugar and 15 million litres of ethanol per year. It also states that the estimated cost of the industrial facility is US$167 million and the estimated total cost of the agricultural facility is US$150 million. Again according to SOSUMAR estimates, the date at which the plant should be able to commence crushing sugar cane is 1 December 2009.

For its part, IGHL undertakes to supply the necessary technical services for the efficient operation of SOSUMAR and CaneCo, and to provide SOSUMAR with its expertise to enable the latter to achieve the project objectives in terms of job creation, training and establishment of a drinking water and electricity supply for the benefit of other users.

SAIL undertakes to ‘do everything necessary and required to ensure that the suspensive conditions mentioned in Article 6.2 are fulfilled’ (the authors’ translation). Amongst other things, these conditions relate to:

- The signatories’ commitment to make every effort to facilitate signature by 31 December 2007 of the subsidiary agreements enabling the other conditions of the project to be fulfilled;
- Negotiation of the financing arrangements for SOSUMAR and CaneCo on the terms and conditions accepted by mutual agreement between the parties and all the project funders;
- Signature of a shareholders’ agreement between the government, SOSUMAR and the other company shareholders, on the terms agreed between them, together with signature of the annexes to that agreement; and
- Establishment and registration of CaneCo and signature of the deed of incorporation and articles of association.

Given that the establishment of SOSUMAR is the responsibility of IGHL, according to the agreement, SAIL’s role can be interpreted as supporting the process and play the role of facilitator in relations between the project partners.

The Malian Government undertook to contribute FCFA 1,500,000,000 towards the share capital of SOSUMAR, in the form of an assignment to the company of a title deed.
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MALIAN GOVERNMENT
Founder of CaneCo (90% of capital) and CommCo, co-founder of SOSUMAR (4% of capital), makes land available (lease and title deed); takes necessary legal steps; and raises the soft loans.

SAIL
Facilitation role; minority equity stake in SOSUMAR

IGHL
Majority shareholder in SOSUMAR (70%) and minority shareholder in CaneCo, supplier of technical services

MALIAN individual holder of a 22% stake in SOSUMAR

CANECO
Agricultural component; operation of sugar cane plantations

SOSUMAR
Constructs and runs the plant, assists CaneCo and CommCo

COMMCO
Development and management support to community schemes

ADB AND OTHER LENDERS
Finance for agricultural and industrial components; general methodological support
covering 857 hectares of land, plus a long-term lease on 134 hectares of land to be identified by SOSUMAR in the Markala area. The plant and related infrastructure would be built on the land covered by the title deed. This transfer of ownership and the granting of the lease represent the contributions in kind, in two instalments, of the Malian Government, which is not required to make any direct cash contribution.

In addition, article 12.6.1 of the 2007 contract stresses that if a future extension of the project requires additional funding, the government undertakes to grant SOSUMAR, under a long-term lease, an option giving it the exclusive right to occupy and use the additional land for fifteen years. The amount of the charge for the duration of this lease will be capitalized in SOSUMAR and represent the Malian Government’s subscription to the SOSUMAR capital increase. The project extension may include contiguous or non-contiguous land to be chosen by SOSUMAR within the zones marked as Zone A, Zone B and Zone C on a map annexed to the 2007 agreement. SOSUMAR undertakes to exercise or renounce the option to extend the project area within 15 years from signature of the agreement (article 12.6.3).

According to the 2007 investment agreement, the Malian Government is to make a 90 percent capital contribution in kind to CaneCo, in the form of a long-term lease on the land granted to CaneCo with a value of FCFA 2,050,000,000. Once the lease has been signed and registered, SOSUMAR will pay cash for new shares in CaneCo, becoming a 10 percent shareholder in that company.

This renewable 50-year long lease will, according to article 13.2 of the 2007 agreement, cover 19,254 hectares of land, on which CaneCo will conduct its agricultural operations. The terms of the lease contract will, inter alia, authorise the company ‘to use its rights over the land as surety’ to obtain future loans to develop its activities (authors’ translation). Similarly, the terms grant CaneCo the right to sublet some of the leased land to other sugarcane producers, including SOSUMAR.

Following changes to project design made following the ESIA and RAP, in addition to SOSUMAR and CaneCO a third entity, ‘CommCo’, will be set up to develop 5,600 hectares to be allocated to the local communities. The area will be developed as an outgrower scheme, though this component has not yet been initiated. One part of this area will be used to grow cereals and vegetables and the other to produce sugarcane.

Plots will be specifically allocated to women. The creation of this entity provides the PSM with its community dimension in addition to the original public-private partnership model.

In article 18.1 of the 2007 agreement, the Malian Government acknowledges the need to adopt legal measures to protect the national sugar market. It undertakes to preserve sugar’s status as a sensitive product and take the necessary steps to protect the national market as detailed in Annex D to the agreement. However, both parties acknowledge that UEMOA regulations could prevent enforcement of all these stipulations. If implementation of any provision of Annexe D would mean a breach of UEMOA norms by the Malian Government, the government undertakes amongst other things to attempt to exert a positive influence and obtain permission from other UEMOA member states to take steps to protect and preserve the status of sugar as a sensitive product.

Concerns about water

A key issue in the contract relates to commitments entered by the Government of Mali with regard to water. According to article 15.1, the Malian Government undertakes to ensure that SOSUMAR and CaneCo each have access at all times to a water supply for the needs of their respective operations. In addition to this overall
commitment, the government warrants that it will do everything necessary to ensure that the two companies are granted full rights of access and extraction with regard to water from the Macina canal or any other canal bringing water from the river and/or another source of water close to the site, at an initial maximum rate of 20 m$^3$/s every day of the year (increased to 35 m$^3$/s if the site is extended as mentioned above).

The government is also to make every effort to ensure that the water charge is set at a rate that will not affect project viability or exceed the price paid by other major consumers of agricultural water in the Markala area. The rate must take account of the proportional length of the canals used by the project and reflect the comparative efficiency of using central pivot irrigation. Notwithstanding these clauses, however, if drought results in inadequate flow in the river Niger to meet domestic water demand and the requirements of international treaties, an emergency system of concerted water management will be implemented.

According to articles 15.2.1 and 15.2.2, once the minimum flow requirements laid down in international treaties have been met, the requirements of SOSUMAR and CaneCo on the one hand and Sukala on the other will be met in proportion to their respective areas of sugarcane plantations, ‘with absolute priority rights over the quantities of water available in the Office du Niger scheme’ (the authors’ translation). So SOSUMAR and Sukala have priority access to water in the event of drought – for example, vis-à-vis other agro industrial developments and local farmers. Article 15.2.2 goes on to stipulate that the absolute priority rights will apply up to the total maximum agreed requirements of Sukala, SOSUMAR and CaneCo ‘before any other user can be supplied with water by the Office du Niger. This disposition can be considered as discrimination which is not in favour of food crops. It carries prejudice to the other users of the Niger River, particularly in the area of Office du Niger.

**Social and environmental standards**

SOSUMAR and CaneCo warrant and give an undertaking to the government that they will do everything in their power to comply with environmental legislation applicable to the project. According to article 22.3, SOSUMAR, CaneCo and IGHL must each be classified in the agricultural category and sector as regards the employment and social security requirements laid down in the respective laws. The government will facilitate the conclusion of a collective agreement once a trade union has been set up. Each of the companies agrees to observe and comply with all laws and regulations applicable to labour and employment.

However, the contract also features a very broad stabilization clause. When not properly formulated, broad stabilization clauses can raise concerns about the ability of the government to improve social and environmental standards over project duration (see Cotula, 2011). According to article 7.3, the Malian Government warrants that no law can nullify the agreement or any one of its terms, or cause it or any one of its provisions to cease to have effect. To this end, the terms of the agreement will continue to be applicable and enforceable and ‘take precedence over any new law enacted after signature of the agreement, the enforcement of which might affect the continuation of the project or cause the agreement or any one of its provisions to cease to have effect’. So the contract prevails over national law. In article 4.4, the Malian Government warrants that it will do everything necessary to ensure that the provisions of the agreement ‘shall bind the government and local authorities and all other authorities or government or similar bodies in Mali...’. More specifically, article 4.4.1 states that ‘the provisions of clauses 12 to 15 of the agreement [concerning the land and water rights aspects of the project] bind and shall bind the Office du Niger and undertakes to do everything necessary to ensure that the latter complies fully with those clauses.

However, article 7.5 of the agreement stipulates that, if the Government of Mali adopts any measures more favourable to SOSUMAR and/or CaneCo and/or their shareholders, the latter may individually or collectively adopt the more favourable arrangements provided that they adopt them in their entirety.
Final remarks about project design
Overall, IGHL and SAIL have been able to negotiate very favourable clauses for SOSUMAR and CaneCo, as regards to land and water rights as well as the stabilization of the provisions of the agreement. This makes the 2007 investment agreement look like a ‘classic’ contract where emphasis is on providing the company with legal rights and with safeguards for the protection of its investment. However, project design underwent significant changes at the financing stage, particularly following the involvement of the ADB. The arguably one-sided nature of some of the provisions in the contract was partly rebalanced through the changes induced by the ESIA and the RAP. Among other things, changes in project design involve the planned establishment of an outgrower scheme for 5 600 hectares of the plantation land, and of a third entity, ‘CommCo’, to complement SOSUMAR and CaneCo and run the above mentioned outgrower scheme. At least in its design, the project has therefore evolved from a straight PPP to a more innovative public-private-community partnership

The socio-economic outcomes of the project
The project is expected to become fully operational in 2017. It is far too early to assess its livelihood impacts on the ground. However, it is possible to outline a few considerations based on the ESIA and on the authors’ fieldwork.

The overall catchment area of the project encompasses the territory of a total of six rural municipalities, with a population of some 156 000 inhabitants (African Development Bank, 2009). According to the ESIA, the population of 64 localities (1 718 households) will be directly concerned by the major negative effects of the PSM, including people subject to physical displacement. The latter come from 23 hamlets comprising 127 households (1 644 people), while around 4 294 other households will be indirectly affected.

There are not enough health centres in the project area and living and working conditions are extremely precarious. Given the heavy dependence on the river Niger and Macina canal as sources of water supply for the population of certain villages and hamlets, waterborne diseases are extremely prevalent in these municipalities.

The area’s economy is essentially based on the primary sector, which accounts for more than 90 percent of economic activities. Cropping (46.1 percent) and herding represent the major sources of livelihood. Although cereals occupy more than 95 percent of the cultivated area, yields are quite low and this means that PSM area has a considerable deficit in cereal production in relation to consumption patterns in the Ségou Region.

Alongside these two main activities, communities undertake secondary activities to meet their economic needs. Women in the PSM area engage in gathering and vegetable growing, which represent their major sources of income and make a substantial contribution towards meeting family needs. Herding and small-scale trading, engaged in by 2.02 percent and 1.75 percent of the population respectively, are just as important sources of income for certain families. Both men and women engage in small-scale trading and craft activities.

Fishing is practised in the River Niger and the irrigation canals of the Office du Niger, but income from this source is falling constantly due to the reduced fish stocks in the river. Analysis of average annual household income structure shows that cropping (83 percent) is the primary source of cash income, followed by herding (12 percent); remittances (3 percent) come third, followed by non-agricultural activities (2 percent). Wages and rents make a negligible financial contribution to household income.

According to the ESIA report, the main impacts of the agricultural component of the project will be the loss of community land; the introduction of monocropping, which will bring about an irreversible loss of fauna and flora; and risks of soil erosion and proliferation of grain-
eating birds. All community sources of income will be affected and there will be potential disruption to ecosystem balance.

The impacts of the industrial component are wide-ranging, affecting the air, soil and water and health and safety. However, the ESIA found that the industrial optimization practices proposed by the developer, consisting of water saving, cogeneration of energy, composting, wastewater treatment, emission control and monitoring of performance indicators during production, should help to reduce these negative impacts.

During the construction phase, the main impacts discussed in the ESIA include massive loss of vegetation cover when laying out the pivots and setting up the plant, psychological disturbance induced by displacement and the destruction and reconstruction of homes, loss of immediate cash income due to the halt in economic activity during the displacement and resettlement period and, finally, the loss of socio-economic infrastructure.

The production phase is expected to cause a massive influx of foreign seasonal or permanent workers into the area. The arrival of large numbers of foreigners, most of whom will be single men, is likely to result in the emergence of new habits and changes in behaviour. There will also be a high risk of increases in sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS, together with a high risk of industrial accident in the sugarcane fields and plant, or during operation of machines introduced downstream for new economic activities (metalworking, mills, rice hullers, threshers, etc.). It is also likely that the increased population will cause local prices to rise sharply and encourage inflation.

In addition to these findings of the ESIA report, the agro-economic study estimates that the PSM will affect cropping, grazing and fishing areas. It is likely that some of these losses will be offset over time through new income-generation opportunities created by the project, together with the introduction of services such as electricity, schools and preventive health.

Nevertheless, community food production is expected to fall at least during the transition period, i.e. the time from actual occupation of the land to develop the sugarcane plantations and purchase of the cane by the plant until effective implementation of the poverty reduction project which is to improve cereal production (African Development Bank, 2009).

The ESIA also estimates that the sugarcane plantations will cause the destruction of several woody species of considerable economic and social value to the local community.

Analysis of the water management situation included in the ESIA shows that users’ water needs in the dry season could only be met without major difficulty through measures to increase water availability (namely, construction of the Fomi dam upstream in Guinea), and that palliative measures would need to be put in place pending construction of the dam.

The environmental and social management plan and resettlement scheme include relevant measures to mitigate these negative impacts. According to the project documents, positive impacts at national level are expected to include currency savings of over FCFA 31 billion per year as a result of reduced sugar imports. Similarly, the project should generate around FCFA 4 billion in tax revenue for the national budget; promote income-generating activities and benefit 20,000 people through the introduction of economic activities directly or indirectly connected with sugar production; promote entrepreneurship; and establish favourable conditions for the development of small and medium enterprises.

From the social perspective, the project could help to reduce seasonal migration from rural areas and regional, national and international emigration as a result of the creation of local job opportunities; reinforcement of existing infrastructure; promotion of the local area; self-sufficiency in energy; and local development.

The PSM hopes to contribute to qualitative and quantitative changes in the agricultural sector through the introduction of mechanization, security of tenure, training and access to the means of production. For example, irrigation pivots could be transferred to local people who would operate them and sell the sugarcane produced to SOSUMAR. In addition to SOSUMAR and CaneCo, a third company, CommCo, will be set up by the state for the benefit of local producers.
As a result, activities to implement the PSM at local level could, if carried out as planned, offer the affected communities an opportunity to improve their livelihoods. An increase in income is expected, especially for women, given that some activities such as planting and weeding the sugarcane fields will be mainly done by women. There could also be an expansion of retail and wholesale trade.

Hoped-for positive impacts on health reflected in the ESIA include the opportunity for local people to take advantage of the new health infrastructure, which will be partly funded by the project in connection with the planned development of facilities.

The compensation measures planned under the RAP go beyond legal requirements under national law. A community development programme will be set up to fight poverty. Support measures are planned, including capacity-building in respect of intensive production for rural producers (rice and vegetable farmers, foresters, herders and fishermen) in the affected areas, to compensate for the other losses caused by the project.

In line with ADB policies in respect of involuntary resettlement, the project has involved the affected people (PAP) in designing the resettlement scheme. The aim of this scheme was ‘to ensure that compensation measures, the choice of resettlement sites, development plans and service provision take account of their needs, priorities and development aspirations’. With a view to raising awareness amongst the PAP and helping SOSUMAR to put the scheme together, local government bodies in Ségou Region set up a local technical committee to help preparation of the resettlement action plan (Comité Technique Local d’Appui à l’élaboration du Plan d’Action pour la Réinstallation des Populations - CTLA). According to project officials, the CTLA was able to organize consultations during which local people could express their concerns. It is fair to note that some of the villages expressed their opposition to the project during the consultations.

As a result, the project is expected to only relocate fewer than 100 people. People involved with economic activities incompatible with sugarcane production can be resettled at their own request. A community development programme was set up to enhance RAP activities. Among other things, the project will rebuild PAP housing entirely in conventional, more durable materials, to enable them to re-establish and improve their living standards. The project will also allocate either rice or sugarcane fields, at their choice, to people who have lost their arable land. Grazing areas will be relocated to two rangelands located 54 km and 56 km respectively from the most remote places in the PSM area.

The community development programme should have positive consequences for employment and generate business opportunities. It is to be accompanied by a Poverty Reduction Programme for people directly affected by the Markala sugar project (PRP). The programme will run for 10 years and should help 6 012 households in 85 localities in the project’s catchment area to pursue or commence economic activities. The programme’s objectives could be described as ambitious, insofar as it will work in a wide variety of fields, including cropping, herding, fisheries, forestry, agro-forestry, conservation, product packaging and processing, energy, education, water, health, transport infrastructure and income-generating activities (Djiré and Wambo, 2010).

As project implementation has now started, albeit still on a limited scale, it is possible to start tracking outcomes on the ground. In the village of Welentiguila, for example, 70 hectares of land have been taken to set up sugarcane nurseries. Field research suggested that compensation paid to villagers (at a rate of FCFA 50 000/hectare/year), coupled with the wages earned by farm labourers working in those nurseries, have resulted in relative income growth in the area. However, compensation amounts are not regular incomes forever, and longer-term impacts remain to be seen.

The positive features of the venture do not mean that the project has had no local opposition. According to the authors’ fieldwork, during the local consultations some villagers did not want to be relocated or become sugarcane growers and expressed fierce opposition to the project. Evidence also suggests, however, that this opposition was partly related to local political
and clan struggles. Two major lineages in the area have been at loggerheads since the colonial era. As the municipal council of Sansanding is headed by a member of one of the two competing families, members of the other family have stirred up their allies against the project, arguing that the council, which is in favour of the project, had ‘sold off’ community land cheaply to foreigners. During the field research, some of the people who have been interviewed raised doubts about the project’s ability to carry out its planned activities. These doubts have been fed by delays in project implementation.

Advantages and limitations of the project

It is still far too early to assess the socio-economic impacts of the PSM. Certainly, the project has gone a long way towards taking account of community interests in project design and implementation. In the project area, there is now a major investment project with important development components in places where there had been virtually no alternatives. If the measures recommended by the various studies carried out at project design stage are fully implemented, they could make a substantial contribution to socio-economic development in the area. However, the project has suffered major delays and has also met stiff opposition from some villages. There are also questions about the fairness of some important clauses included in the 2007 investment agreement. Only more implementation time will enable a more comprehensive assessment of the social, economic and environmental outcomes of this project.

4.2 A private-community partnership: The case of Mali biocarburant SA

The second case study examined by this chapter concerns a partnership between a company and a cooperative of family farmers. The venture is led by the company Mali Biocarburant SA (MBSA). Differently to SOSUMAR, the project is located outside the ON area, and is implemented in the Koulikoro Region. The project involves the production of bio diesel from jatropha for the national market. The company has invested in a processing facility, and sources jatropha nuts from local farmers on the basis of contract farming. So the project does not involve land acquisition for farming purposes. The farmers are organized in a cooperative that has an equity stake in the Malian subsidiary of the company, and thus representation on the company board. This section outlines the context of the biofuel sector in Mali, the history of the project, key features of the business model, the implementation of the business venture and the its early outcomes, advantages and limitations.

The institutional context for biofuels in Mali

The steep rise and instability of oil prices on the international market, combined with environmental concerns, have stimulated new interest in biofuels throughout the world. An agro-pastoral country heavily dependent on oil imports to meet its energy needs, Mali has caught the fever and has been exploring production of several biofuel feedstocks, including jatropha.

Even before the widespread interest in biofuels, jatropha was already known in Mali under the local name ‘bagani’ and was used as live hedging. Over the period 1990-2000, the German cooperation supported projects to plant jatropha, with the nuts being used to produce oil to power mills and generators in several villages in the Koulikoro Region. In its quest for alternative energy sources, the government became interested in the sector. Two ministries were initially involved: the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water and the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Environment and Sanitation became involved in 2006. Within the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water, CNESOLER (the Malian solar power and renewable energy centre) has always been responsible for research programmes relating to biofuels (mainly jatropha). The centre runs the national jatropha energy programme (Programme National de Valorisation Energétique du Pourghère - PNVEP). As part of this programme, CNESOLER has promoted biofuel supply chain development for local rural use, for example through the Kéléya project (Geres, 2007). It is also worth mentioning the Malian agency for domestic energy development...
and rural electrification (Agence Malienne pour le Développement de l’Energie Domestique et l’Electrification Rurale - AMADER), which is a public administration body. AMADER’s primary task is to manage and monitor domestic energy consumption and develop access to electricity in rural and peri-urban areas. AMADER runs a rural electrification programme, through which it funds and grants electrification concessions to private operators. Many such operators have installed generators and are now confronted with a rise in diesel prices that cannot be passed on to rural customers because of their low purchasing power (Geres, 2007). AMADER is closely following biofuel developments, but this is seen a long-term solution that cannot be relied on to address the short-term shortages faced by operators.

The Ministry of Agriculture leads a multi-year programme known as the jatropha sector support project (Projet d’Appui de la Filière Pourghère - PADEP), which started in 2008. Also, the Rural Economics Institute, which is a public technological, scientific and cultural institution run under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, provides services to the various projects. This institute also carries out research on jatropha.

Finally, a national biofuels development agency (Agence nationale pour le développement des biocarburants - ANADEB) was set up in March 2009 with the mandate of promoting biofuels. Within this context of policy and institutional support for the development of the biofuel sector, and in the absence of significant public funding to promote operational projects, several private initiatives have been started, including both development projects and business ventures. Mali Biocarburant SA (MBSA) is a prime example of the latter.

**Origin of the initiative**

MBSA is the result of a not entirely accidental encounter between a private company and local producers in Koulikoro Region who, against a backdrop of energy crisis and renewed interest in biofuels, were looking for a partnership. Koulikoro is the second administrative region of Mali, straddling the Sudanian and Sahelian agro-climatic zones (Western Sahel). Millet, maize and sesame form the mainstay of its agro-pastoral economy.

The project developer and MBSA manager, a Dutch researcher and agro-economist, has worked in Africa for a long time, initially in East Africa (five years) and then in Mali (four years), focusing on the development of value chains. According to his own account, he has always been interested in setting up a ‘win-win enterprise’ in which both farmers and the investor would benefit. This concern led him to study various investment models adopted in both East and South Africa. He found that none of these models ensured genuine producer representation or provided them with worthwhile benefits. He concluded that only a model where producers have an equity stake in the business and where mechanisms exist to ensure a transparent relationship between the parties can ensure such a win-win.

This thinking fed directly into the concept of MBSA. The Koulikoro Region of Mali appeared promising, as the Dutch development agency SNV had been working there for a while. Technical and socio-economic studies were carried out, leading to the establishment of MBSA as a company in February 2007. According to the MBSA manager, the studies found that the production of the main staple crop, millet, in the Koulikoro Region did not provide farmers with adequate income and could not always even keep them fed all year round (50 percent of the households covered by the studies were unable to feed themselves throughout the year). It was thought that, because growing jatropha does not, in principle, require great effort, combining it with food crops could help to bridge the gap. The Malian partners were initially the Koulikoro Chamber of Agriculture, and then the local union of jatropha producers’ cooperatives in Koulikoro (Union Locale des Sociétés Coopératives de Producteurs de Pourghère de Koulikoro, ULSPP).

While the Dutch developer was nurturing these ideas, two farmer leaders in the region, who were also teachers approaching retirement, were wondering what activities they could undertake once they left teaching. Having found out about jatropha seed processing in other parts of the country, they had begun trialling the crop.
Indeed, according to the president of the ULSPP, he had already planted 5 hectares of jatropha before the MBSA initiative got under way. It was at this time that the Dutch developer got in touch through SNV with the Regional Chamber of Agriculture to present the project. At the time, one of the two teachers was the vice-president of the Regional Chamber of Agriculture. The Chamber of Agriculture had a fund available, which was provided by the Royal Dutch Embassy in Mali in connection with the Koulikoro Rural Development Programme. The Chamber used this fund to finance the preparation of the business plan and the purchase of processing equipment. It also assisted with the establishment of several cooperatives, including the ULSPP cooperative union.

The ULSPP was set up on 9 February 2007 and registered in Koulikoro. It currently has 15 cooperative society members in Koulikoro District, five cooperative society and four group members in Dioila District and one cooperative society member in Kolokani District, covering a total of 2,500 producers comprising 500 women and 2,000 men (ULSPP, no date). Also in 2007, MBSA was established as a company and registered at the company register, with the production and marketing of jatropha oil and its by-products as its primary purpose.

Jatropha planting started in the rural municipalities of Dinandougou, Doumba, Koula, Meguetan and Sirakorola, all in Koulikoro District, in 2007, and expanded in 2008 to cover the municipalities of Tougouni, Tienfala and Nyamina in Koulikoro and Dioila Districts.

**Project design and business strategy**

Having started with a relatively simple initial structure, MBSA is now turning into a transnational enterprise, with several international public and private partners and activities in both Mali and Burkina Faso.

The initial shareholders in MBSA were the Dutch developer, who was also the managing director of the company, the Dutch Royal Tropical Institute (KIT); the Dutch railway company pension fund Spoorwegen Pensioenfonds (SPF); and the private companies Power Packs Plus (PPP) and Interagro. Together, these shareholders held 80 percent of the company’s capital, while the ULSPP held the remaining 20 percent. So from the beginning, the union of farmer cooperatives held a significant equity stake in the company. As per standard practice, the company is run by annual general shareholders’ meetings; a board of directors comprising representatives of the various shareholders; and a general manager.

The cooperatives produce jatropha seeds that the cooperatives union buys and then sells on to MBSA. MBSA processes the seeds to produce bio diesel and sells the end product. In the original set-up, the ULSPP was responsible for extracting the oil from the seeds, while MBSA was to process the oil to produce bio diesel; but given the union’s difficulties in performing processing, the company now does all processing. The purchase price of the jatropha seeds is set by mutual agreement between the ULSPP and MBSA.

According to the MBSA manager, the bio diesel produced is sold to HUICOMA and Grands Moulins du Mali, two industrial enterprises based in Koulikoro, and to the ‘dourounis’ (public transport minibuses) in the town. The company is also canvassing for business from Air France and other enterprises interested in biofuels. Apart from bio diesel, MBSA also produces glycerine, which is used by a women’s cooperative belonging to the ULSPP to produce soap.

In addition to income from sales of bio diesel, MBSA generates revenues through the carbon credit market. For example, MBSA signed a contract for carbon credits with KIA Motors Netherlands. 80 percent of all revenues from carbon credits are to be passed on to the member cooperatives in the form of equipment. Technical support is also provided to farmers by MBSA and the ULSPP with the aid of the government technical services and extension workers trained for this purpose.

While the key features of this initial set-up remain valid to this day, some important changes have occurred as a result of a corporate restructuring in 2011. Indeed, the first few years of operation revealed that the model had some limitations: jatropha production was not sufficient to supply the processing plant; and some Dutch...
shareholders began to ask questions about the sustainability of the scheme. The risk of side-selling, whereby farmers receive training and technical support from the company and then sell to other buyers offering higher prices, was seen as a particular concern. According to the MBSA manager, governance challenges within the ULSPP heightened the partners’ concerns. Meanwhile, the company was initiating operations in Burkina Faso, thereby losing its original exclusive focus on Mali’s Koulikoro Region.

In light of these considerations, the company was restructured along the following lines:

- Mali Biocarburant SA was transformed into a holding company controlling two subsidiaries, one in Mali (Koulikoro Biocarburant) and one in Burkina Faso (Faso Biocarburant);
- Two foundations were established - Fondation Mali Biocarburant in Mali and Fondation Faso Biocarburant in Burkina Faso;
- The equity stake held by ULSPP in MBSA was converted into shares of Koulikoro Biocarburant – in other words, ULSPP now holds shares in the local subsidiary, not in MBSA itself;
- Measures were adopted to clarify relations between the producer cooperatives, the MBSA subsidiaries and the foundations.

As a result of this corporate restructuring, the set-up is now as follows. At the centre of the venture is the holding company, MBSA Holding. Its shareholders are KIT (48 percent), SPF (30 percent), PPP (12 percent), the company’s manager (9 percent) and Interagro (1 percent). MBSA Holding finances the subsidiaries and facilitates funding of the foundations. It owns the processing facilities. MBSA runs operations in both Burkina Faso and Mali through the two national subsidiaries. Activities in Burkina Faso are beyond the scope of this research. In Mali, activities are led by Koulikoro Biocarburant. Ownership of this subsidiary is as follows: MBSA Holding 79 percent; ULSPP 20 percent; and a Koulikoro Biocarburant executive 1 percent. Koulikoro Biocarburant purchases the jatropha seeds from producers, extracts the oil to produce bio diesel and markets the product. Farmers produce the jatropha seeds and sell them to the ULSPP, which they are members of, and which sells the seeds on to Koulikoro Biocarburant. Producers also receive support from the Koulikoro Regional Chamber of Agriculture and from the government’s technical services.

The Fondation Mali Biocarburant was established as an association under Malian law in 2010. Its registered office is in Bamako. The foundation is a non-profit organization. It members are MBSA, which holds the presidency, TFT (Trees for Travel), KIA Motors and the ULSPP, together with two other jatropha cooperatives – the Bagani Nafabo Ton cooperative of Kita and the Ouéléssébougou jatropha producers’ cooperative. The foundation supervises producers and helps the farmer cooperatives to integrate jatropha in production systems without compromising food security. According to information on the MBSA website, the foundation is in direct contact with producers to encourage them to obtain equipment and training through farmer field schools. The foundation is responsible for managing carbon credit revenues, most of which are used for the operational activities it conducts, with the balance allocated to the producer cooperatives in the form of equipment.

Both MBSA and Fondation Malibiocarburant have various partners and funding sources. The foundation has received financing from the KIA Motors Company, which is linked to the enterprise by carbon credit contracts negotiated before corporate the restructuring; by TFT, which acted as an intermediary between KIA Motors and the foundation, of which it is also a member; and through development aid funding, for example from USAID. Similarly, in addition to contributions from the shareholders identified above, MBSA has received investment subsidies from the Dutch Ministry of Cooperation and loan sureties or long-term loans granted by KIT and the French Development Agency (AFD).

Finally, as part of its efforts to promote sustainable development of the jatropha production chain, MBSA has pursued assiduous cooperation with various research institutes.
Early outcomes, advantages and limitations

Although the venture has been running since 2007, it is still too early to assess its longer-term outcomes. Important positive contributions are already visible. MBSA has created an entire jatropha value chain in Koulikoro Region where previously none existed. It has catalyzed the organization of rural producers. Today, the ULSPP has 2,500 members. The company has established an industrial jatropha oil production unit and a soap factory using the glycerine obtained during processing. The soap factory is managed by a women’s group. Fifty-five permanent jobs have been created, and a large number of farmers have received support through the farmer field schools and producer training. As a result of the publicity generated around the biofuels sector and the success of the farmer field schools, the number of producers is growing year on year. For example, the aggregate area planted with jatropha for 2009 was forecast to be 1,000 hectares; but by the end of that season, 2,028 hectares were under cultivation, more than double the initial target. The end-of-season figure for 2010, the latest available to the study, was 2,020 hectares against a forecast of 2,000 hectares. Despite this slowdown, several cooperatives have submitted applications for ULSPP membership.

The company has paid particular attention to gender, by actively promoting women’s participation in the process. The iterative approach to the business, reflected in the various changes made to the original set-up, and the extensive collaboration with research institutions underlie a genuine commitment to learning and innovation. The venture also contributes to realising Mali’s aspiration to tap into renewable energy sources and reduce its reliance on imported oil. Planting activities and the carbon credit scheme can provide a contribution to mitigating climate change, and Jatropha has been shown to produce benefits in terms of soil improvement and regeneration. The innovative nature of MBSA’s business model has attracted considerable international interest, as reflected in the company’s international partnerships and in direct mentions in several international research reports and United Nations documents.

Challenges have also emerged, however, which highlight the difficulties of making company-community partnerships work on the ground even in the presence of innovative and committed private sector players. A first such challenge concerns the limited success of the venture in raising income for rural people. As it might be recalled, this objective was an important consideration at project design stage. The assumption was that, when intercropped with food crops, jatropha farming can help farmers to increase their income without compromising food security. The project developers expected that, between 2009 and 2014, more than 20,000 farmers would earn an aggregate income of around €5 million, with estimated extra income of between €1.14 and €1.90 each per day. In addition, producers would receive dividends from the profits made by the company, from their equity participation in the company, and revenue from the sale of carbon credits.

While the project is still at an early stage and 2014 is still a long way away, and while production has not yet reached full capacity, the authors’ fieldwork suggests that producers are beginning to become impatient. First of all, productivity is hampered by several factors. One of the underlying assumptions in jatropha production projects in general is that the plant can be grown successfully on marginal land with limited water. But in the arid or semi-arid zones of Koulikoro Region, producers need to water the crop during the dry season. Lack of equipment is also a constraint on productivity, and so are the white termites which destroy the seedlings in many areas and seriously compromise production. Some of the producers interviewed complained about the poor quality of the seeds used, though the authors could not verify these statements.

Pricing is another factor that adversely affects the project’s ability to increase local incomes. Given the production costs of bio diesel, farmers can sell jatropha seeds at a very low price (FCFA 50/kg). In comparison, other crops suitable to the local ecology would offer higher returns. Sesame, for example, is sold at FCFA 300/kg in the region.

As the company has not yet turned a profit, no dividends have been paid to shareholders.
so far. The revenues received from the carbon credit scheme have been used to dig wells and provide basic equipment such as carts or tanks for a small number of farmers, selected on the basis of their production. Some farmer field schools have also been set up. In the longer term, these activities may result in higher productivity and hence incomes, but did not provide a direct contribution to raising those incomes in the shorter term and at scale. Some of the beneficiary producers expressed dissatisfaction about the support received. Some producers claim to have received carts with no animals to draw them. More fundamentally, some farmers felt that these interventions did not address one of the most critical issues, white termites. Farmers do not have the means to purchase the insecticides necessary to deal with this problem. According to the MBSA manager, a solution is now being developed to address the termites problem. But many of the producers interviewed for this research appeared disillusioned. Given the income challenges faced by the farmers, some of the carbon credit revenue might have perhaps been distributed directly to producers, rather than invested in equipment.

Another challenge that emerged during the fieldwork relates to the functioning of the institutional set-up. Although the venture reflects a partnership between a company and local communities, the fact remains that the interests of the two parties do not always coincide. Avenues for communication and negotiation are therefore critical. Both MBSA and ULSPP have a general meeting of members / shareholders, a board of directors and management staff. These bodies do periodically hold their statutory meetings. But there appear to be problems in communications among the multiple stakeholders. Communication challenges between the company management and ULSPP management have emerged. For example, the terms for awarding equipment funded from carbon credit revenue do not appear to be fully understood by producers and have caused disagreements between MBSA manager and the ULSPP leader. ULSPP officials also felt that MBSA management had taken some decisions without prior consultation of the ULSPP. An example cited was the decision to post extension workers to the villages, which was apparently taken without the knowledge of the ULSPP – though the MBSA manager disputes this point. The Union opposed this move until the details could be worked out together with company management. The extent of the communication challenges between MBSA and ULSPP management is illustrated by the minutes of an extraordinary meeting held on 13 December 2010, which the research team had access to. Even at that advanced project stage, the minutes reflect discussions about the size of the ULSPP’s equity share in Koulikoro Biocarburant, a matter which one would have expected to be very clear by then. There also appear to be communication challenges in relations between ULSPP management and its members. When interviewed, several members of the Union did not seem to be well informed about the business venture. Finally, some observers and development practitioners interviewed during the study felt that extending the business to Burkina Faso despite the challenges faced by the Malian enterprise reflected a desire of MBSA management to tap into the many public funding streams in the green energy sector. In response to this statement, the MBSA manager explains that the decision to invest in Burkina Faso was based on other factors: Farmers from Burkina Faso visited MBSA operations in Koulikoro since December 2007 and requested the MBSA management to visit their fields and set up a daughter company in Burkina Faso. After a due diligence as well as a feasibility study of Burkina faso, MBSA decided to set up a daughter company and one of the main arguments was the price of diesel. In Mali, the price of diesel is subsidized by the government resulting in a low price (now 630 FCFA/litre) while the price in Burkina is close to 800 FCFA/litre. Therefore, MBSA management anticipated an opportunity where they could pay a higher price for jatropha and still profitably sell biodiesel.

Despite these limitations, MBSA still offers much potential. The cooperatives union has plenty of competent members who have gradually built their negotiating and management skills and whose commitment guarantees that the process will be taken further. The manager is a socially committed businessman who retains a marked
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research bent and is continually looking for innovations. The model's chances of success are boosted by the manager's in-depth knowledge of biofuel marketing circuits and networks and of the carbon markets. The manager's ability to mobilise the numerous partnerships described above holds promise for MBSA's ability to overcome its challenges. And despite their disillusionment, producers say they are ready to continue involvement with the venture because they have put in a great deal of effort from which they are still hoping to get benefits.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter has discussed trends, drivers, legal frameworks and two case studies of agricultural investments in Mali. The country has great potential for agricultural, forestry and pastoral production. Faced with major challenges in mobilising the resources required to finance an ambitious agricultural modernization strategy, the Malian Government has made concerted efforts to attract private (and particularly foreign) investment in agriculture. But the ensuing wave of large-scale agricultural investments is taking place in a national context that still appears ill-prepared to ensure that benefits are maximized and risks properly managed. For example, legislation adopted to manage the social and environmental impacts of large-scale investments has faced major implementation challenges.

Even more importantly, the recent wave of large-scale land acquisitions for agricultural investments has taken place in a national context that still appears ill-prepared to ensure that benefits are maximized and risks properly managed. For example, legislation adopted to manage the social and environmental impacts of large-scale investments has faced major implementation challenges.

Despite efforts to legislate in ways that take account of the diversity of contexts and tenure patterns, many provisions of national law are incomplete, ineffective and out of touch with the local socio-economic reality, particularly in rural areas. Some national law norms are so ambiguous that they lead to confusion, resulting in conflicts and abuses, and in the ensuing tenure insecurity and poor land governance.

On the ground, multiple pressures are exacerbating competition for valuable lands and increasing the number and intensity of land conflicts between communities and the state, and between different communities. These pressures also have a negative influence on the quality of land governance, creating fertile ground for land speculation and corruption, abuses of all kinds and insecurity of tenure for the most disadvantaged groups.

While the recent wave of land acquisitions affects the whole of Malian territory, the number and size of investments and acquisitions vary significantly from one area and region to another. In the absence of comprehensive information on developments across the national territory, the trends analysis focused on the Office du Niger (ON) area, where the most iconic cases can be found. The Office du Niger area hosts a major share of Mali's irrigation potential, and is considered to have attracted particularly intense investor interest.

Given the diversity of the types of investments and farms in the Office du Niger area, this area can be seen as a laboratory where various forms of tenure can be tested, and a breeding ground for the country's future land policy. Two main categories of agricultural investment can be identified, each with several subcategories: (i) public investments made by the state with or without support from donor agencies; and (ii) private investments made by large-scale investors, whether national or foreign, with or without state involvement, and private investments made by small-scale private investors or farmer groups.

Until recently, all schemes in the ON area were publicly funded. Following the global food and financial crisis and the related renewed interest in private agricultural investment, together with the biofuels boom, the Office du Niger area has become a favourite target for private investment. Over the period 2004-2009, 871,267 hectares
were allocated to investment projects, with the pace accelerating after 2007. These allocations were made either by the Office du Niger or by the central state, in the main to large investors, on a permanent (50,419 hectares) or provisional basis (820,848 hectares). They cover an area almost 10 times the size of the irrigation schemes set up since the creation of the ON in colonial times.

There is much diversity of institutional entry points (the authority that negotiates the contract, for instance) and of form and content of the agreements concluded between investors and state. Manifest gaps between law and practice in the process of implementing contractual arrangements have also been documented. Generally speaking, legal requirements on managing the environmental and social impacts of investment projects are often sidestepped or ignored. ‘Letters of intent’ and even actual land leases are given out in the absence of strategic planning. The size of some large land allocations, compared to the neighbouring areas allocated to family farmers, raises serious equity concerns.

The land governance challenges raised by these dynamics have been recognized to some extent by the ON and by the government. This is reflected in the recent establishment of a new Secretary of State, attached to the Prime Minister’s office, responsible for the integrated development of the Office du Niger area (SEDIZON, from the French name of the institution). It is also reflected in the initiation of a revision of the ON management decree, and in the cancellation of a number of letters of intent for which investors had not complied with requirements to carry out feasibility studies within an agreed timeframe.

In addition to these recent developments, ongoing initiatives related to the implementation of the Framework Law on Agriculture (LOA) and of the deliberations of the ‘Etats Généraux du Foncier’ (Malian Land Tenure Congress, EDF) offer opportunities to improve land governance in the Office du Niger area and beyond.

While much attention in earlier research has focused on the more worrying experiences with agricultural investments in Mali, this study deliberately focused on two experiences that are widely recognized as part of better practice. One such experience is a sophisticated public–private–community partnership involving a sugar cane plantation and processing facility in the ON area – the Markala Sugar Project (PSM). This project has two components: a farming component involving the establishment of a 14,123-hectare sugar cane plantation with sprinkler irrigation, designed to produce 1.48 million tonnes of sugar cane per year; and an industrial component involving the establishment of a processing plant for the production of 190,000 tonnes of sugar and 15 million litres of ethanol per year, together with cogeneration of 30 MW of electricity. The plantation would involve a combination of estate production and outgrower schemes. Involvement of a multilateral lender involved application of international social and environmental standards. An ambitious development programme accompanies the investment.

The second experience studied is the work of Mali Biocarburant SA (MBSA) in the Koulikoro Region. This experience involves the production of bio diesel for the national market. The company has invested in a processing facility, and sources jatropha seeds from local farmers on the basis of contract farming. In other words, the venture does not involve land acquisition for farming purposes. Farmers intercrop jatropha with food crops. So although based on promoting a cash crop, the venture is not, in principle, detrimental to food security. The farmers are organized in a cooperative that has an equity stake in the Malian subsidiary of the company, and thus representation on the company board.

Both projects are based on innovative institutional designs. Both have gone a long way towards promoting inclusion of local farmers and consideration of social and environmental issues. While both projects are still at an early stage, they both have strong potential to benefit local groups through development opportunities. In the case of MBSA, the venture provides a potential source of additional income for smallholders. The profit-sharing principle on which this experience is based should help to reduce poverty in the medium to longer term. The project also offers opportunities for combating soil erosion. Similarly, SOSUMAR is an ambitious project that can bring...
multiple developmental benefits – from job creation to development of processing capacity, from opportunities for smallholders and local businesses through to improved energy access.

Both projects also present major challenges, however. In the case of SOSUMAR, for example, some clauses in the contract with the Malian Government appear to disproportionately favour the investor to the detriment of the others actors of the area. Yet, it is fair to note that the safeguard clauses in the Convention of 2007 aim, in general, to protect the viability of the overall project, not just the foreign investor. Also, opposition from part of the local community and the slow pace of implementation provide cause for concern. In the case of MBSA, problems in communication lines between the company, the management of the farmer cooperative and cooperative members, as well as difficulties in agricultural production, raise challenges for the inclusiveness and sustainability of the venture. The two experiences show that even where inclusiveness is integrated in the design of the business model, making it work in practice is riddled with difficulties, and positive outcomes cannot be taken for granted.

For a country like Mali, the renewed interest in agricultural investment presents important opportunities but also major risks. It is critical to tackle the challenges affecting the governance of land relations at both local and national level. Measures must be taken to fill the gaps in the governance of land tenure and agricultural investments. Steps need to be taken to accelerate the implementation of the land tenure provisions of the Agricultural Orientation Law (LOA). This law requires the government to develop a rural land policy to secure local land rights. Steps are also needed to strengthen institutional arrangements to monitor and ensure compliance with existing legislation. This applies particularly to regulations concerning environmental and social impact assessments and management plans. Finally, there is a need to strengthen the mechanisms to promote accountability in decision making affecting land relations. At the national level, the government has experimented with the ‘espace d’interpellation démocratique’ – a forum that enables civil society and citizens at large to bring concerns to the government and hold decision makers to account. Similar arrangements can be developed in relation to institutions involved with land governance at the local level – from local government bodies to the Office du Niger, through to deconcentrated government departments.

In addition to measures to improve the governance of land in general, several important steps can be taken to specifically address issues linked to large-scale land acquisitions. Land allocations should be subject to the free, prior and informed consent of local landholders. This would require going beyond current consultation requirements already included in legislation regulating impact assessment studies. Investment contracts with companies should also make it very clear that any land acquisition requires the consent of local landholders. There is a need for a coherent and comprehensive policy on agricultural investment, bringing together scattered provisions from different policies and laws. National policy should set land area size ceilings on land acquisitions. The duration of land leases, which is currently standardized (30 and 50 years, renewable, in the Office du Niger), should be tailored to the economics of investment projects, including based on nature of the economic activity and land area size. While local landholders at best obtain one-off compensation for their losses, thought should be given to arrangements for ensuring equity participations for local landholders, so as to enable ongoing sharing of project benefits. Land allocations above a certain size should be approved by parliament, and all contracts should be published. The capacity of government agencies to negotiate contracts with investors should be strengthened.

More fundamentally, there is a need to look at a wider range of models of agricultural investment. Family farmers have shown they can invest. In the Office du Niger area, there are experiences of cooperatives acquiring land for their members. For example, Association Niéta has obtained a lease for about 300 hectares that will benefit some 100 farmers. Smallholder farmers account for the bulk of agricultural production in the Office du Niger area. Yet their landholdings are shrinking with demographic growth, and their tenure is insecure. National farmer associations are developing tools to enable
family farmers to have access to leases (i.e. the same type of contracts that are granted to large investors) for new land areas. They are also providing legal support to their members whose land rights are being threatened. These efforts deserve to be supported.

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Assessing the nature, extent and impact of FDI in Senegal’s agriculture

1. Introduction

Despite the numerous attempts made since the early 1960s to design the right set of agricultural development policies that could successfully set Senegal on a higher paced economic growth path, the country still remains dependent on foreign agricultural supplies to meet its food security needs. However, results are not yet visible to the naked eye. Almost 50 percent of the population remains officially unemployed, more than half the country lives in poverty with GNP growth for 2009 expected to reach just 1.5 percent. Furthermore, the country relies on imports for 70 percent of its food needs – a rate higher than most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The dependency rates could even go higher, to reach 90 percent when considering the case of key staple food items such as rice. It is perhaps worth recalling here the dilemma Senegal authorities faced during the 2008 global food crisis when the prices of many food items skyrocketed in international markets as a result of cutbacks on food supplies from its key Asian food exporters (Thailand, Pakistan, etc.).

To overcome these weaknesses and reverse these alarming economic growth trends just mentioned, Senegal must swiftly reform key sectors of its economy starting with its agriculture, in order to achieve the highest economic growth rates possible – in the order of 7 percent or more per annum. In particular, to achieve the over-reaching goal of feeding its 13 million people, and especially the 2.5 million people currently known to be undernourished, Senegal must modernize its agriculture, placing more emphasis now on the reforming of its agribusiness starting with the land related issues and best ways for addressing long-term sustainability issues. This chapter reviews selected initiatives including various efforts made in the country recently to attract more FDI to help reduce the impacts of these weaknesses drawing as much as possible from foreign resources.

As is the case with other countries in Africa, Senegal’s lending decisions appear severely biased against agriculture due to the high risks associated with existing segmented gaps along the value-chain of many commodities. Agricultural lending in Senegal currently accounts for less than 5 percent of the total portfolio of the financial sector. There are almost no loans for capital investment. Loans to farmers, fishermen and herdsmen are very rare, totalling less than 1 percent of all loans. Indeed, the agriculture sector is desperately in need of credit: thus, foreign investments are vital. This is so despite the robustness of the Senegalese financial sector.

Senegal’s leaders are well aware of the country’s persistent vulnerabilities to poverty, food insecurity and lack of general economic competitiveness. In the wake of the 2008 food crisis, the government responded with the OANA

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1 This chapter is based on an original research report produced for FAO’s Regional Office for Africa by Adama Ekberg Coulibaly, consultant
2 Unless identified otherwise, statistics cited in this chapter are drawn from a number of sources, including the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) country profile (2008), the CIA’s online world fact book (2009), the OECD’s Africa Economic Outlook (2009), various studies of the United Nations, and other external publications, which themselves draw most of their data from international sources or the Senegalese Government’s own institutions.
3 Total deposits in the financial sector are about US$3.8 billion with the total loan portfolio standing at about US$3.4 million according to central bank figures covering the first quarter of 2009. Deposits grew 13 percent year by year from the first quarter of 2008, while loans grew at 11 percent.
The GOANA was launched on 18 April 2008 by Senegal’s head of state with the view of achieving “food sovereignty, in line with the objectives announced in the Agriculture-Forestry-Livestock framework Law (Loi d’orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale – LOASP) passed in 2004 (APIX, 2009). See also article “La GOANA est plus qu’une rupture” 6 May 2008. at www.lesoleil.sn, on 12 April 2009.

The GOANA programme\(^4\), an ambitious agricultural growth-led scheme whose timely implementation requires injecting, in addition to the scarce public funds available, a sustained massive finance the country does not have. For the period of October 2008 to 2010 for example, the GOANA set goals for itself to produce 2 000 000 tonnes of maize, 3 000 000 tonnes of cassava, 500 000 tonnes of paddy rice and 2 000 000 tonnes of other cereals (millet, sorghum and fonio), 400 000 000 litres of milk and 600 000 tonnes of meat. In this connection, CFA 116.8 billion \(^5\) were forecast to meet the agricultural production subsidies needed for the 2005/2006 to 2008/2009 growing seasons alone. It remains to be seen how the massive financing needed for these schemes can be met, and revive key subsectors such as sunflowers, sesame, bissap, potato and agro inputs (WTO, 2009).

2. Trends in levels of FDI inflows to Senegal

Senegal has not fared well with respect to other competing destinations in West Africa when it comes to attracting FDI and building FDI stock effectively. The country accounted on average for US$317 million of FDI inflows to West African economies in 2005-2008, which is only 1.9 percent of the total. This is lower than the FDI inflow levels registered in countries such as Ghana (5.8 percent). The same can be said with regards to FDI stocks achieved in Senegal (1 percent) relative to Ghana (4.5 percent) and Côte d’Ivoire (6.4 percent) over the same period, suggesting a much lower level of gross fixed capital formation therein.

Some studies have provided a thorough review of the Senegalese economy in general and the conditions and opportunities for doing business in Senegal’s agriculture in particular, suggesting the need to address several underlying, structural bottlenecks known to negatively affect its overall competitiveness. The present chapter draws as much as possible from these results to underscore some of the key vulnerable areas, such as:

- **High illiteracy rate.** Fundamentally, Senegal’s rates of illiteracy – around 70 percent of women and nearly 50 percent of men – are among the highest in the world. The country’s effective relegation of women

Table 1 shows the major FDI projects as annually registered by economic sectors in Senegal over the period of 2003–2009. A total of 160 major FDI projects were registered with APIX from 2003 to 2009, representing an amount of CFA 165 759 billion. These investments were unevenly distributed with agriculture accounting for CFA 58 206 billion (35.1 percent of the total) or 58 registered projects (36.2 percent). Agriculture is followed by agro-processing and fisheries, which appear among the most attractive subsectors to foreign investors in Senegal accounting for 36.2, 31.25 and 25 percent of the total registered projects respectively. The annually reported numbers (Table 2), show fisheries as a subsector in the economy with a clearly declining trend in foreign interests. As for the wood industry, this sector has remained at a standstill because of the depleted state of natural resources.

FDI inflows to Senegal have traditionally and essentially originated from France which provided about 90 percent of the total until the year 2000 when Senegal started diversifying its FDI sources. Today, the major Senegal FDI providers include the Arab states, Malaysia, China and selected African countries such as Mali. It should be noted that France has been losing ground to the group of other investors just mentioned with its share in FDI inflows now representing no more than 50 percent of the total\(^6\).

Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

Unskilled, unhealthy work means that it is ignoring the productive capacity of more than half of its population.

- **Poor basic infrastructures.** Senegal’s infrastructures - particularly the agricultural sector, is entirely inadequate. The fact that trucks cannot transport goods without undue police interference and on-the-road “shakedowns” almost dooms any hope of competitive trade.

- **Unreliable power supply.** The unreliable source of electricity and source of water supply or affordable irrigation systems remains among the most severe impediments to foreign investments in agriculture. Even where the national grid had reached pack houses and farm gates, electricity costs appear to constitute 50 to 70 percent of companies’ operating costs. Where the grid did exist, it is reported not as reliable as hoped. The risks also remain high of producers sometimes losing their entire crops when their irrigation pumps go down for the day as a result of lack of power.

- **Unfriendly tax system.** The Senegal business environment is seen as unfriendly when it comes to assessing its tax

### TABLE 1
Annual FDI projects registered with APIX by sector in Senegal, in millions of FCFA, 2003–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>No. of Projects (%)</th>
<th>Total Investments 2003-2009</th>
<th>Total Investments 2003-2009 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>58 207</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 503.0</td>
<td>11 852.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14 846.0</td>
<td>12 395.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 989.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Alimentaire</td>
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<td>6.25</td>
<td>1 031</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>81.4</td>
<td>356.5</td>
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<td>264.9</td>
<td>94.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>233.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Industrie</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>80 082</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 643.7</td>
<td>6 072.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15 244.7</td>
<td>14 190.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 944.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bois</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>200.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elevage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3 372</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>515.0</td>
<td>148.2</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>633.0</td>
<td>1 926.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peche</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22 620</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 868.3</td>
<td>5 286.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 689.6</td>
<td>4 558.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 699.2</td>
<td>518.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>165 759</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: APIX

### TABLE 2
Annual FDI projects registered with APIX by sector in Senegal, in millions of FCFA, 2003–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target sub sectors</th>
<th>No. of Projects</th>
<th>Total Investments millions of CFA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58 207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Alimentaire</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 031</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agro-Industrie</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>80 082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bois</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>447</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elevage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3 372</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peche</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22 620</td>
</tr>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total general</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>165 759</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: APIX
administration and tax regime relative to other West African competing FDI destinations. In general terms, taxes in Senegal are considered very high by the business community. Its tax authorities are found to be uncooperative in helping to meet the requirements of the country’s tax laws. For example, it takes about a month and a half more for businessmen to process the myriad tax related issues (Table 3) in Senegal compared to their counterparts in the region (Table 4). The only penalty assessed for improper tax filing and payment in Senegal is a fine. No one has been known to go to jail for tax fraud or corruption; in short, the entire tax system must be changed to rebuild confidence with taxpayers.

- There is no affordable agricultural insurance scheme in place to safeguard investors against the risks involved with subsistence agriculture, which is the most dominant mode of agricultural production in the country.
- Unrest in Casamance. Investors may perceive the no war-no peace environment caused by the rebels in Casamance as a risk to stability.
- Land insecurity. The uncertainty of title and access to land is a particular disincentive to investment, particularly in the country’s agriculture sector.
- Inflexible labour code. The inflexibility of the labour code in Senegal is notorious among agribusiness owners. The relative difficulty in terminating contracts for example, results in a situation where it often makes more sense for business owners to hire employees on a short term, without contracts than to hire contracted employees.
- Corruption. According to a report by USAID, Senegalese businessmen, civil society and government all reported high levels of corruption. It should be noted however that Senegal has a relatively strong showing for the region.
- Ambiguous competition policies. The government must also confront the concerns of several stakeholders who have been reporting persistent anticompetitive practices known to plague the business climate in several key food subsectors (sugar, rice, wheat flour, etc.).

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### TABLE 3

Taxation in Senegal that imposes the greatest administrative burden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax items</th>
<th>Tax base</th>
<th>Number of declarations per year</th>
<th>Estimated time required (hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate income tax</td>
<td>Taxable profit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-Added Tax (VAT)</td>
<td>Sales value</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payroll tax</td>
<td>Payrolls</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement contribution</td>
<td>Payrolls</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security contribution</td>
<td>Payrolls</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Economy Watch, Economics & Investing Reports
http://www.economywatch.com/doing-business/paying-taxes.html

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7 USAID, 2009, p. 89.

Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

### TABLE 4
Comparative tax burden at country, Africa and OECD levels, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>OECD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Payments (number)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time (hours)</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit tax (per cent)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour tax and contributions (per cent)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other taxes (percent)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total tax rate (per cent profit)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 5
Additional tax burden on business in Senegal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Tax base</th>
<th>Tax rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tax on interest</td>
<td>Interest income</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising Tax</td>
<td>Value of advertising</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamp duty on contracts</td>
<td>Number of contracts</td>
<td>CFA2 000 (fixed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on insurance contracts</td>
<td>Insurance premium</td>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on unimproved property</td>
<td>Rental value of land</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax on improved property</td>
<td>Rental value of property</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business tax</td>
<td>Rental value of business premises</td>
<td>Different rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle tax</td>
<td>Engine capacity</td>
<td>CFA50 000 (avg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel tax</td>
<td>Fuel costs</td>
<td>included in fuel price</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3. Institutional, regulatory and policy framework for investments in Senegal

Senegal has set for itself, since 2007 the objective of becoming an emerging country within 25 years. This is the main thrust guiding the Accelerated Growth Strategy (AGS) that Senegal hopes to achieve with the delivery of an average annual economic growth rate of 7–8 percent and a public and a private investment rate of 30 percent of GDP annually. The following describes some of the key FDI related measures the Government of Senegal (GoS) has implemented, starting with the establishment of key institutions with mandates to carry them out.

9 The two components of the AGS are the creation of an international class business environment, and the promotion of growth-inducing clusters (agriculture and agro-industry, marine and aquaculture products; textile-clothing; ITC and teleservices, tourism, culture industries, craft products).
3.1 Office of the Accelerated Growth Strategy (AGS)

The government strategy towards agriculture is led by the Great Agriculture Offensive for Food and Abundance (GOANA) as well as by the AGS and selected key institutions in charge of their implementation: the Ministry of Agriculture, Office of the AGS and APIX.

3.2 Agency for the promotion of investments and major projects (APIX)

As for attracting foreign investments to start a business in Senegal, the central institution is the Agency for the Promotion of Investments and major projects (APIX). This agency is tasked to address the following:

- Improve Senegalese business environment;
- Promote Senegal as an investment location;
- Research and identify national and foreign investors;
- Follow up on investment contacts and project evaluations.

To achieve these goals, the Government of Senegal (GoS) has offered a number of incentives to target potential investors which can be consulted at the APIX website. These are included in the Senegal’s investment code, a key national law passed in 2004 but amended several times since then.

3.3 The Senegal investment code

As outlined on the APIX web site, this code specifies tax and customs exemptions according to the size of the investment, classification of the investor and location. There are measures specifically designed to encourage potential agribusinesses to engage in business in Senegal. Noteworthy examples from the investment code include:

- Customs exemptions (3 years);
- VAT suspension (3 years);
- Tax credits
  - 40 percent eligible investment;
  - Five years;
  - 50 percent taxable profit.
- Exemptions extend to five or eight years if certain conditions of employment generation and distance from Dakar are met. This means that investments outside of Dakar receive longer periods of exemption from taxes than those carried out in the Dakar greater zone. This is a feature shared with terms met in the Ghanaian incentive package to direct more new investors towards the inland investment areas most in need of jobs or projects.

There are also incentives intended to target those who wish to invest specifically in agriculture in general sense. In order to qualify for the following, a company must show that it will export at least 80 percent of its output:

- Unlimited recruitment of expatriate workers;
- Duty-free importation of capital goods;
- Exemption of customs duties on vehicles;
- Exemption from various taxes, including the land tax and income tax on dividends;
- Exemption for registering or modifying registration of corporate documents; and
- Unlimited transfer of monies in and out of the country, subject to respecting the restrictions arising from the UEMOA money laundering Act.

These features are very appealing but not very different from what investors get also from other competing FDI destinations such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria in addition to the advantages these countries have in terms of larger market size, better infrastructures, more conducive agribusiness environment, more robust free zone package, to name but a few. Aside
from the unquestionable geographic advantage Senegal presents as a result of its proximity to the key European and American sea and airports of entry, the country has no choice but to be more aggressive towards investors contemplating investing in West Africa. Overhauling the Senegal free zone programme is an example of a good area to start reforming.

3.4 Senegal special economic zone

In terms of free zone institution buildings, the GoS also instituted an authoritative body for the administration of all special economic zones within Senegal, to deal with business licenses and registration thereof. This Authority is set to operate as a one stop-shop for the formation, registration and licensing of companies. A wide range of services, including the provision of buildings are also made available to companies operating within the zone, including the delivery of working and residence permits to foreign nationals. The Authority enjoys the powers of municipalities while serving as the Delegate of the Prime Minister and all ministers within the special economic zones. However, Senegal has not been particularly proactive about the development and use of special economic zones, such as the industrial areas that benefit from concentrated government services (utilities, licensing, customs, etc.), and tax incentives for export oriented companies of the kind successfully experienced in Ghana. Steps taken more recently have included moves to replace its free trade zone initiatives with the Enterprise Zone Franche d’Exportation (EZFE) scheme with aims at reducing taxes and offering duty free imports to companies located within the zones.

Apart from the case of the old Dakar Free Industrial Zone (ZFID) which is virtually inactive now, it is perhaps worth recalling the US$800 million Agreement which the GoS signed in 2007 with Jafza International of Dubai with the view of establishing, constructing and running the Dakar Integrated Special Economic Zone (DISEZ), a special economic zone for sanctioned investments outside of Dakar. This project was set at the time of its signing to be opened in 2010, with hopes for creating jobs as many as 30,000 posts. These outcomes barely match the results Ghana has harnessed in this area (Table 39) considering the long list of free zone companies, whose impacts have been felt in various areas of the Ghana economy as discussed in the chapter on Ghana.

3.5 Investment treaties

As discussed earlier for the case of Ghana, Senegal has also signed a number of investment treaties with countries which have demonstrated interest in developing business relationships with West Africa. These include a bilateral investment treaty with the United States, signed and ratified by the US Congress in 1990. This treaty provided for “most favoured nations” treatment for investors, internationally recognized standards of compensation in the event of expropriation, free transfer of capital and profits, and procedures for dispute settlement. Senegal has also signed similar agreements for protection of investments with several other countries namely France, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, Spain, Italy, Netherlands and Japan. The country is also member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the African Organization of Intellectual Property (OAPI) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) suggesting that it is adequately equipped with the legal instruments used to address the concerns of foreign investors in areas as sensitive as the protection of capital investments and intellectual property rights. As discussed earlier, these legal devices are important safeguards to minimize the risks for all involved be they from investors’ host or home countries, but mirror very much the kinds of incentives other FDI competing destinations usually offer. This would imply that Senegal needs to go beyond just overhauling its investment package to make a difference. The country should adopt an integrated policy approach that comprises not only agricultural investment and investment policies, but also other crucial policy areas (good governance, infrastructures, competition, trade, R&D, land...
and water policy), to tackle simultaneously the core underlying factors hindering its global competitiveness. This view is taken now to shed some more light on Senegal land-related issues starting with the role played by the key land-related institutions established to address them.

3.6 Senegal General Tax and Land Authority or Direction Générale des Impôts et des Domaines (DGID)

The DGID is one of the most influential land-related divisions of the Ministry of Economy and Finance but is in charge primarily for administrating the country’s tax policy. It is also the agency responsible for the collection of tax revenue and the administration of all national land classified as national patrimony (Domaine National (DN)). The question of the DN is one of the more complex subject areas to discuss in the context of Senegal; suggesting the need to briefly describe how land available in the national patrimony or DN can be identified, negotiated, assessed and registered safely from the perspectives of interested foreign investors.

3.7 Land offices with conflicting responsibilities at local levels

Senegal has established a land office in each of its ten regions, which contains three agencies with a mandate to report to the DGID: the Cadaster, the Conservation Foncier (CF) and the Bureau des Domaines (BD). These are branches of the national State, not the local government.

**Cadaster**

The cadaster is tasked to survey and map land and to determine property boundaries. It is not concerned with land allocation, or with the issuing of licenses. It does have responsibilities for the subdivision of land (morcellement), which is becoming more and more of a challenge in a country such as Senegal where population is growing at faster rates.

**Conservation Foncier (CF)**

The Conservation Foncier is the office responsible for the registration of land, including privately owned land and apartments. The CF is supposed to authorize morcellements (land dividing operations) before the Cadaster can survey and finalize them.

Bureau des Domaines

The Bureau de Domain (BD) is the office responsible for land zoning, and for the direct administration of State lands. Investors who want a zoning change must apply here.

3.8 Local government entities set to enforce Senegal 1996 local government code

A new local government code was issued in 1996 to provide a basis for the authorities recognized in the regions, municipalities and rural communities to serve as seats of local government. A wide range of traditionally stated state competencies – including the management and use of state, public and government lands – was transferred to selected local government institutions in the context of the government decentralization scheme, but without the required accompanying financial resources. This scheme has resulted in the creation of a three-tier system with central, regional and local levels which do not match the existing national government five levels of administrative operations: national, regional, departmental, sub-prefectural, and village. This seems complicated, especially when it comes to sorting out land-related disputes. In practice as will be seen shortly, land conflicts between the different branches and levels may arise. However, in rural communities where most agricultural production takes place, the local authorities tend to be much stronger than the State. It is the rural councils which exercise the greatest degree of power at this level, while state representatives such as sub-prefects and village chiefs are little more than record-keeping bureaucrats and tax collectors.

3.9 The special power of rural councils to allocate and withdraw available rural lands

Land is allocated by the Rural Councils (RC), free of charge to beneficiaries who must live in the
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rural communities and be able to use the land productively. Any natural or legal person who is allocated a plot receives a means of production for an indeterminate period. When they die, their heirs are allocated the land, provided they can put it to productive use. Table 6 illustrates the major steps to be followed by potential land investors seeking to work through the land policy process of identifying, acquiring and registering land potentially available for economic uses at the rural levels. As can be noted below, there are ten major steps investors have to go through with additional ones ignored for brevity. In step no. 9 for example, it is expected that the land map be signed by the land registry (Cadastre), where tasks carried out at that level are done by a private land surveyor instead of a public one. In short, there are too many land-related steps and institutions involved suggesting the need streamline the process. Furthermore, to carry out the land registration process smoothly, surveyors must be available in number and quality. This is a frequent obstacle, due to the cancellation of training programmes producing this kind of skilled labour since 1986. In the absence of surveyors, “surveys” are sometimes carried out by completely untrained individuals, resulting in “maps” that have no legal force but are used anyway. And where available, surveyors sometimes lack the equipment required to carry out their jobs in a professional manner. Consequently, projects such as PAMOCA which has attempted to tackle some of the prerequisites to resolving land insecurity concerns should be

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13 Under the 1964 law, “productive use” is understood as defined for each region by order of the Prefect, but this never seems to have been done. So the question of what constitutes “mise en valeur” is left to the discretion of the local councils.

14 An EU and ADB funded land project designed to develop a national map, cross-indexed with both satellite images and with local records, provide training and equipment to cadaster offices across Senegal, and assist the government in policy formation. See description of the project at www.devex.com/projects and www.aps.sn/aps.php.
promoted. Unfortunately, PAMOCA was due to close in December 2009 with no prospects for extension. Nor is any donor involved in a follow-on project\textsuperscript{15}.

3.10 Senegal’s current land policy

The legal framework for land use in Senegal is complex and includes provisions enacted in the colonial era as well as several laws enacted during this decade. In this connection, the most important of Senegal’s land laws is the 1964 law on the “domain national” (DN), which abrogated customary land tenure and nationalized most of the land. Under this law, the State is the exclusive trustee of the country’s land and is responsible for its management. As described, the DN is subdivided into four categories of land areas, namely:

- the urban zones (zones urbaines);
- the zones for special uses (zones classées);
- the development zones (zones pionières), which remain under the control of the state; and
- the zones for agricultural production (zones de terroir) which are by far the most important for agriculture production.

National domain land accounts for about 95 percent of the country’s total territory, and most of this is termed zones de terroir. Most of these were rural lands held under customary regimes following national independence, but with the post-independence legislative framework they are now covered by the common law regime of the national land law. In accordance with the laws, territorial lands include all lands that a rural community needs for housing, farming, livestock rearing and woodlands, and their possible expansion. The boundaries of each of the territories under review are determined by decree, and are administered by the Rural Council (RC), usually established under the oversight of the local sub-prefect, the State local representative. These coincide with the boundaries of the rural community, and the land within them is regarded as a space for development, not as a legal and economic asset. As such, the land belongs to no-one, does not form part of any estate and consequently has no rightful owner, since if everybody owns everything then no one owns anything. This administrative power has given the rural councils the authority to allocate and withdraw land and to monitor its use at local levels. In theory, the Rural Council can withdraw plots for two reasons: to sanction noncompliance with the conditions of allocation, particularly the productive use requirement, in which case the land is withdrawn without compensation; or in the interests of the community, in which case the landholder should be allocated a similar plot if practicable - although this is not possible in most rural communities.

From the above, three separate regimes are now emerging to govern land ownership in Senegal.

i. private property, a legacy of the colonial system that exists mainly in urban areas and has grown rapidly due to urban sprawl and modern economic activities;

ii. public ownership, which gives the state the option to allow local government to own or use land assets, consisting mainly of land attached to public buildings or communal amenities that do not include agricultural lands; and

iii. rural lands, most of which are covered by the national land law and enforceable through official state institutions.

This system of land ownership and control as outlined is almost universally recognized as a constraint to agricultural modernization, suggesting that the GoS pay special attention to these concerns and take measures to swiftly reform the country land policy.

3.11 FDI related land conflicts in Senegal courts

As expected, this system of land management is not without fuelling disputes. It is no wonder that Senegal’s court system receives

\textsuperscript{15} USAID, 2009.
a great many land cases every year. In Dakar for example, land disputes were estimated to account for about 20 percent of the court’s workload, while it was estimated that St Louis receives “between a third and half”, and Kaolack, “about half”. In these courts, the common types of cases include boundary disputes, arguments over rights to use lands, disputes arising from decisions of the rural councils, and disputes over who has the right to use lands. These are very common, as the rural council decisions are sometimes at odds with the law. These are sometimes not written down or grounded on any legal devices of irrefutable legal quality. In this connection, there are no established best legal practices or framework yet to guide for example the drafting of land model contracts – be it for sales or leasing – involving rural councils and foreign investors. It is striking indeed to see how “easy” it is for a foreign investor to formally arrange the alienation of a large tract of land of the order of 5,000 hectares without conceding much to the other party.

Furthermore, the land-related decisions mentioned earlier may also be delivered by a single council member, or a group of the council members, rather than the Council as a whole. Overcoming these impediments calls for strengthening technically and financially the capacities of all land-related entities starting with the rural councils.

The Senegalese legal system is recognized as technically competent to handle the kinds of land disputes mentioned earlier, but it does not seem to be working for the poor farmers. Like in Ghana, the courts are reported to be very slow, not very consistent or sufficiently reliable to allow everyone, especially the poor, to access its services. These difficulties are attributable to the high fees, costs and physical distances that the poor can rarely afford.

As dysfunctional as it may seem, Senegal’s current land system has the merit of preventing a switch to a system of pure fee, simple ownership without adequate safeguards for the poor, which would have accelerated the concentration of the most fertile lands in the hands of wealthier farmers, entrepreneurs and land dealers. Such a system would have resulted in turning the poor farmers into landless tenants and sharecroppers, or part of a great drift into the cities.

It is also striking to see how many of the offices or agencies described here are for the most parts underfunded, understaffed and underequipped suggesting the need to also take a serious look at problems of financing. Without adequate resources it remains to be seen how these key entities can meet their mandates, whatever these may be. Unsurprisingly, taking on land-related duties including land registration is one the slowest operations on record, given the numerous processing steps involved (Table 6); a known source of stress for all those who have attempted them.

4. FDI impacts on Senegal’s agriculture – some economic, social and environmental impacts

Senegal has been confronted with a serious structural current account imbalance problem which has worsened over the past ten years to reach levels of over US$1 billion per annum. In the same vein, there has also been a structural deterioration of the balance of trade over the same period as a result of the escalating spending registered for import items, reaching about US$5.17 billion in 2008. In this regard, it is encouraging to see the upward trend performance in direct investments as shown in the financial operations account from 2001 to 2008. This illustrates a positive contribution made by foreign investors in helping Senegal to improve its overall balance of payments. The balance of trade provides another good illustration of these contributions.

4.1 FDI and trade balance related effects

As will be seen, Senegal has been running a structural trade imbalance over the past ten years ending up with US$2,919 million in 2008 that is, up 586 percent from 2001 underscoring the crucial importance of any export earnings opportunities experienced elsewhere in the
Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

Foreign investors have participated actively in the agriculture production with some producing primarily for export. Horticulture is very illustrative of this orientation whereby companies such as GDS and SOCAS are among the best known, non-traditional product exporters. Until recently, in this area, Senegal had gained ground by increasing significantly its exports of non-traditional products in the period 2000–2005, thereby contributing to the increase of export earnings over the period under review. As shown in Figure 1, the country saw its tomato exports growing on average 40 percent per annum over the last ten years to reach about 18,000 tonnes in 2008/2009. In the same vein, the volume of mango exports grew remarkably well – almost ninefold from 1999/2000 to 2008/2009. This situation was very encouraging in helping the country to diversify away from its traditional export products such as groundnuts and fisheries.

There is little doubt that the tax revenues from the various production, processing, exporting and sales activities over a wide spectrum of investors involved with the food industry contributed to some extent towards improving of the levels of structural imbalances shown below in the government fiscal accounts (Table 7).

4.2 Some economic impacts of FDI in Senegal’s agricultural sector, including food security

There is a fair number of FDI related companies that are actively involved with the Senegal food industry. The review of the portfolio of activities of these companies suggests a wide range of agricultural outputs and services being carried out, and to which FDI have been contributing positively in the supply of some high quality fresh and processed food products in the country. In the same vein, FDI related companies have created large number of jobs suggesting an improvement in the levels of incomes distributed, as well as improved purchasing power on the part of concerned stakeholders. Assuming that these jobs did really materialize across the various food supply chains, the participation of FDI in Senegal’s agricultural production system can be said to be positive. These improvements are the natural result of the wide diversity of operations and the high export orientation of many of foreign investors involved.

In the case of the tomato industry (discussed below), it is the only sector known to be operating on the basis of mutually beneficial arrangements for all involved. The industry has been very successful in attracting several billions of FCFA in foreign investments to increase the production levels of fresh as well as processed tomato. There is enough supporting evidence provided by this industry to demonstrate how beneficial this orientation has been in raising and stabilizing incomes earned at the farm-gate or in exports. No doubt the resulting increase in the purchasing power of the various tomato stakeholders involved – including the State – has meant greater demand for available food products, hence improved levels in food accessibility in the food industry.

Furthermore, investing in one hectare of land in the rural areas of Senegal with the view of producing high quality fresh tomatoes to supply nearby tomato processing plants of the kind operating in the Senegal River Valley is proving beneficial in terms of levels of income distributed along the tomato value chain. This shows tomato production related activities as a profitable
venture, not only for the foreign investor concerned but also for the wide range of other stakeholders (producers, service providers, bank, state institutions, etc.) involved with this industry. It should be also be remembered that the tomato is the only food industry in Senegal whereby such clearly defined working arrangements – including the setting of guaranteed farm-gate prices – have been successfully reached among the food industry participants, contributing to ensure a win-win outcome for all involved.

4.3 Some FDI related agro-processing level impacts

Studies have shown that FDI inflowing to Senegal is essentially directed towards the formal, modern sectors, including that of agroindustry. As the following figures will show, there are also some signs of progress in the country’s agro-processing subsector as a result of the active participation of FDI in this area. In the first seven months of 2009, for example, agro-processors experienced a significant improvement in production levels, faring about 9 percent year on year, in contrast with most other industrial sectors. Among the food subsectors showing the strongest trends in growth, are vegetable oil production, cereal and sugar processing. These encouraging trends were partly attributable to the excellent agricultural season registered in Senegal in 2008/2009, particularly for groundnuts and cereals.

The recent developments mentioned previously are encouraging; however, it should be remembered that key activities such as vegetable and groundnut oil production and exports are still performing below levels reached in 2006. Taking the agricultural sector broadly into account, the overall impact of FDI inflows on the sector so far registered is rated as below expectations. An exception is the subsector driven by small farming agriculture which has demonstrated some real increase in contribution to GDP formation (Figure 2), while key subsectors such as fishing, livestock and hunting, industrial farm and export oriented farming, forestry and logging have not been contributing sufficiently to the GDP.

Putting this into a better perspective, the entire modern sector in Senegal, which currently best captures the wealth-creation activities of foreign investors, (all sources considered), accounted for only US$1 631.416 million in value addition in 2008. This is comparable to the individual achievements of selected emerging bankers in terms of their net 2008 banking product16: The Standard bank group of South Africa (US$6 504 million); the First Bank of Nigeria (US$1 547 million). Figure 2 clearly shows the key contribution which the domestically oriented small food producers make to GDP relative to other sectors. This figure also shows how limited the impacts of industrial and export oriented activities have been on the country’s economic output, despite all the FDI incentives provided. These suggest that Senegal should thoroughly review the activities of established foreign investors or established agribusiness segments, gauging carefully in due context what each investor or agribusiness venture is really bringing relative to what is it is costing in the balance to the country.

Trends and impacts of foreign investment in developing country agriculture

The relatively low performance just discussed could well be attributed to some structural difficulties or technical inefficiencies reported as negatively affecting the entire Senegal economy. Drawing from the results of a recent study in Senegal, fish and meat production investors were estimated to be losing 52 percent of their optimal outputs due to some technical inefficiency. As shown in Figure 3, key subsectors such as energy, textiles and clothing, and grain processing appear to be operating also at 50 percent, 21.1 percent and 7 percent respectively, below potential owing to technical inefficiencies.

This poorly rated performance could provide some explanations of the limited FDI related impacts on the agricultural sector as registered so far in several key strategic areas including technology transfer and R&D which are discussed in the following section.

Technology transfer and innovation in Senegal’s tomato industry

Technological progress is crucial for agricultural development. Studies have shown that improvements in agricultural productivity were closely linked to policies towards and investments in agricultural research & development (Alston, Pardey and Smith, 1999). Agricultural development through innovation is vital for reducing rural poverty as the green revolution has shown for the case of several emerging Asian economies. As in Asia, an increase in the levels of research and development spending in support of more innovation, greater productivity and increased profitability can make a big difference in rendering an economy competitive, contributing more to exports and less to imports. This has not yet happened in Senegal’s agriculture and food industry; the tomato sector is a case in point.

As the following figure 4 will show, productivity levels for many Senegalese farm products are encouraging but still below achievable levels attained elsewhere. In the tomato industry, for example, which is known to offer the best working, farm industry operational framework, yields grew only 1 percent on average over 1998/1999–2007/2008 to reach 21 tonnes per hectare in 2007/200817 suggesting that the increase registered in tomato production is essentially attributable to expansion of land areas allocated to the crop (Figure 5). There has been a

17 Down 40 percent from the pick level of 35 tonnes per hectare achieved in 2005/2006.
limited technology transfer and related spillover effects from SOCAS to downstream farming operators including the smallholders in this industry, calling for participants to take a serious look at the issues involved.

4.4 The social and environmental impacts of FDI on Senegal’s tomato industry

The following scenario illustrates a number of positive social and pro-poor development opportunities created in local economies as a result of the presence of FDI in the tomato industry, while drawing attention to some of the accompanying and emerging risks attached.

**Shaping a win-win contract farming model in Senegal – the case of SOCAS**

Since 1995, SOCAS has been successful in implementing a contract farming scheme which has made the tomato industry stand out from the rest of the country’s agricultural landscape. As can be seen in Box 1, tomato concentrate is produced for local outlets and exports in Senegal by SOCAS out of fresh tomato grown essentially in the Senegal River Valley, and on the basis of a unique contract farming arrangement between SOCAS and some 12,000 tomato farms. As discussed earlier, this arrangement has contributed to a rapid increase of the production of fresh as well as processed tomato, thereby raising incomes, and improving the social and economic conditions of all the stakeholders involved, including the small tomato producers and the State. This

18 This “success story” is essentially due to the close collaboration between the tomato producers and the processor. The partnership started with the setting up of a consultation framework in 1995 - the National Comitee for Concertation of the Tomato Industry (or Comité National de Concertation de la Filière Tomate Industrielle (Cncfiti)). This industry-wide, decision-making body included the tomato producers, the processor (SOCAS) who are the most active members, the representatives of suppliers, traders, consumers, and the State services. The Committee intervenes, among others, in the negotiation and the management of available agricultural credits. La Société d’aménagement et d’exploitation des terres du Delta (SAED) du fleuve Sénégal is tasked to serve as the secretariat. SOCAS works with producers on the basis of a contract under which the payment terms as well as farmgate pricing of fresh tomatoes are outlined.

19 Groupements d’interêts économiques (GIE).
framework helped the small producers to produce tomatoes in spite of scarce agricultural credit resources. In addition, the arrangement is believed to have brought about a number of other benefits, especially to farmers. These include the improvements in rural income generation opportunities and its stability, and some reduction in tomato post-harvest losses. Indeed, unlike the GDS agribusiness model whose working terms are discussed later in Box 1, SOCAS did not deliberately cut past the tomato smallholders in an effort to vertically integrate its food supply chain and meet the stringent food safety standards now emerging in global food markets.

In 2008/2009, the tomato industry is estimated to have produced 80,000 tonnes of produce, underscoring the importance of income levels injected accordingly in the local economies. However, it should be remembered that with these output levels, SOCAS is believed to be processing beyond its absorption and processing capacities. These developments underscore the need for increasing investments in new processing capacities, thereby creating new jobs while further reducing the level of post-harvest losses, and consequently, the farmgate poverty levels of thousands of people whose livelihoods are dependent on quality tomato outputs. Drawing from available data as shown above, Senegal’s tomato production accounted for 6 percent of the cultivated land areas allocated to major food products in the country. Depriving small producers of access to those lands – be it through land acquisition deals, land leasing or land alienation of any sort – would have some lasting and devastating social and economic implications for the local communities concerned, suggesting that the FDI and land reform related issues discussed extensively earlier need to be swiftly confronted. These remarks remain true for millions of other small producers involved in the cultivation of rice, maize, sorghum, onion, groundnut, cotton, potato, fruits and vegetables.

The agribusiness model whose advantages include the contract farming arrangements discussed above is not the rule but rather an exception. Since this institutional arrangement is a very common feature of agriculture in other regions of Africa, including some of the Senegal’s neighbours, the lack bears some examination. The following discussion focuses on the GDS agribusiness model and on why this kind of farming arrangement should be discouraged. There is a great need to build more trusting agribusiness relationships with the small farming communities in order to ensure more pro-poor development outcomes in the longer run.

**Building lasting agribusiness legacies in Senegal agriculture – the case of GDS**

Unlike many other countries in Africa, particularly Kenya and Ghana, very little contract farming has occurred in Senegal. The main difference between these locations seems to be that in Senegal, most export agribusiness such as GDS (see Box 2) prefer to grow their own crops under strict quality control procedures, especially when product quality and food safety standards are paramount. For seasonal export products that are readily available in local markets, such as mangoes, it is simpler and easier for exporters to make spot purchases from reliable producers to fill their product requirements, rather than contracting with small growers. But for others, many agribusinesses established in Senegal consider
In 1965, a French subsidiary company of the SENTENAC Group started testing the production of fresh tomato in the Senegal river valley with the view to producing fresh tomato to meet the growing demand of Senegal in tomato paste. The group has since then been manufacturing wheat, maize and millet flour, animal feeds (poultry and livestock), and other related food preparations distributed in the West African region including Senegal. It is composed of two agro-industrial subsidiaries, namely les Moulins SENTENAC and SOCAS (Société de Conserves Alimentaires au Senegal) Limited with the latter starting tomato paste production in 1970 with a first tomato processing plant with the capacity of 200 tonnes/day of fresh tomatoes and a pilot-farm capable of producing 3 to 4 000 tonnes of fresh tomato per season.

Since then, SOCAS has aimed at producing concentrate, juice and dried tomatoes out of the fresh tomato produced locally in Savoigne and Dagana near Saint-Louis, in the Senegal river delta where land and water are abundant. As initially intended, the company planned to meet local demand by 1987 with the outputs provided on a contract basis with about 12 000 tomato farmers, on condition that both the company and the State committed fully to provide the necessary technical assistance free of charge to the tomato farmers and protection to the local industry respectively. Under this arrangement, Socas bought at guaranteed prices its entire needs in quality fresh tomatoes which have been successfully grown from the 2 685 hectares cultivated on average from 1998-2007 by selected small farmers now well organized in farms organizations. This make the only industry where there is an established board representative of all the industry interest who sat every year to discuss the entire issues facing the industry before setting the fresh tomato farm gate price along with terms of remuneration of all relevant services providers.

SOCAS employs about 300 permanent staff including agronomists and quality control specialists along with 1 000 part time workers at the peak of the harvesting season, distributing some 1 220 million of FCFA in salaries. The sales levels achieved in this company have also contributed to the reducing of the known government fiscal budget problem.

In 2007, SOCAS produced 10 000 tonnes of tomato concentrates out of 2 700 hectares to meet the demand of its local as well as foreign clients. Its turnover in the same year amounted to about 12 billion of FCFA making this company the leader of tomato paste production in the Sub Saharan Africa region. To meet this performance, the company has relied partly on the company facilities for crop production, harvesting, packaging, cooling, refrigerated storage, and transport. This accounted for about 11 billion of FCFA in investments including its state of the art irrigation and labouratory facilities, thereby allowing the company to process about 100 000 tonnes of fresh tomato or 18 000 tonnes of tomato concentrate and cover the needs of its local consumers..

The company has also diversified its farm and industrial operations into the production of packaging materials (cans, etc) in a state of the art packaging manufacturing plant established in Savoigne. In addition to producing some canned vegetables, onion seedlings, aromatic plants, it now exports about 600 tonnes of fresh green beans and 300 tonnes of dried tomatoes.
that the overall state of preparedness and development by small farmers is too limited for them to become reliable suppliers of high quality agricultural products. They believe that the required investment in time, effort and money required to upgrade the technical, financial and managerial skills of smallholders to help them become responsible and reliable suppliers is simply too great to make contract purchases attractive.

This situation is explained in a recent analysis carried out to cover Senegal’s non-traditional export products, whereby the main exporter (GDS), has chosen not to engage in contract farming to meet its French parent company’s corporate policy. In this regard, it is important to recall here the emergence of more stringent and constantly changing EU requirements for food quality and food safety – such as Global Gap, traceability and maximum pesticide residue levels that have gradually become a barrier to trade for many exporters including many developing country small producers.

The general low supply capacity of the smallholders is seen by some as another factor which may have induce companies to vertically integrate the production stage of its operation by establishing its own production farms. The GDS agribusiness model (Box 2) contrasts with that of SOCAS in terms of generation of better pro-poor long-term outcomes. The GDS model is viewed as more poverty-perpetuating than poverty-eradicating in the longer run, and should be discouraged. Accordingly, it should be a policy of APIX to assess proposed large-scale agribusiness projects of this kind and see how best to retain investors who are interested in investing responsibly in agricultural ventures – including smallholders – while creating lasting agribusiness legacies in Senegal.

Drawing from available data, experience has shown that foreign investors willing to invest in the Senegal agriculture and food industry are more inclined to maintain a much greater control over the companies’ stakes than engage in agribusiness joint-ventures with local partners. As mentioned earlier, only 57 percent of foreign investors are registered with APIX, meaning they rated the joint-venture as an effective business strategy for penetrating Senegal’s agriculture, compared to 68 percent of investors registered with GIPC in Ghana. The relatively low rate of

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**BOX 2**

**Building responsible agribusiness model – the case of GDS in Senegal**

In 2001, a French subsidiary company, Grands Domaines du Senegal (GDS) with food production and distribution affiliates in a number of countries in Europe, Africa, and Latin America began producing cherries tomatoes in Senegal. By the end of the 2006-2007 seasons, GDS accounted for some 99 percent of fresh tomato exports from Senegal. The company produces cherry tomatoes near Saint-Louis, in the Senegal river delta where land and water are abundant.

GDS deliberately cut past smallholders in an effort to vertically integrate the supply chain. The company’s production of cherries tomatoes relied completely on company facilities for crop production, harvesting, packaging, cooling, refrigerated storage, and transport.

GDS established a conditioning station in the Senegal river delta for handling and processing fresh vegetables; it also invested in high-technology production practices that include mechanized and computerized drip irrigation, along with the application of fertilizer and pest control products through the drip system. These technologies along with the required inputs such as improved seeds, fertilizers, and photo-sanitary products were imported from the European Union.
agribusiness restructuring obtained in Senegal relative to Ghana suggests that there exists a higher propensity for foreign investors to trust a business partner in Ghana than in Senegal. There is a need to promote good corporate governance practices in the industry in order to create a more trust-building environment in Senegal.

**Increased risks of seeing Senegal small farmers lose available fertile land areas**

Like Senegal’s other identified, diminishing natural resources such as forests and fisheries, arable land too is becoming a scarce productive input as a result of a growing land demand pressure. With 3.3 person per hectare, Senegal appears as one the most land-scarce countries relative to possible FDI competing destinations such as Côte d’Ivoire (1.1 person/hectare), Ghana (1.9 person/hectare) and Nigeria (1.2 person per hectare).

As the following graphs suggest (Figure 7), there is no free land areas readily available in Senegal without some sort of claim or ownership attached, suggesting the need to seriously tackle the long- standing land use and rights issues with measures gauged to remove this well-known FDI related constraint. More than 3 804 900 hectares of land were available for cultivation in Senegal in 2002 (Figures 7 and 8), of which 246 000 were irrigable, underscoring the very tight situation at hand for allocating the irrigable lands left among various future uses or destinations. This matter is to become a much more acute issue for potential investors in general and small farmers in particular with the implementation of the GOANA, which foresees the unlocking of much of the cultivated land areas already identified. Indeed, there is a long list of FDI companies whose possible production expansion operations may require securing appropriate land for key future foreign investments. In this connection, some 30 percent of the firms or institutions surveyed in a recent global study assessing the business climate in Senegal perceived access to land among the most difficult obstacles that investors face in the country²⁰.

These results suggest more competition ahead to access the increasingly scarce land space. Weak enforcement of laws and regulations, and poor administration by the rural councils as currently experienced in the country all combine to create

favourable environment for more corruption in the handling of land use and rights issues, pointing to more risks ahead for the poor to hold onto the fertile lands they farm.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Senegal should adopt economic policies that promote responsible agribusiness investments built on sustainable processes to create more lasting legacies in its agricultural communities.

Like many other agriculture-based farming ventures currently established in the Senegal River Valley (SRV) area, with the view of increasing agricultural outputs, the production of fresh tomatoes in this region has required clearing an estimated 2 653 hectares on average of forest cover over the past ten years. With also a total of 3 267 hectares allocated to the cultivation of fresh tomatoes in 2007/2008 and some 52 862 hectares of additional land areas allocated to other key food products in the Senegal River Valley as shown (Figures 9-10), expanding food production in existing key Senegal food baskets such as the Senegal River Valley, the Niayes region, the Calamanco and the Nambe will not persist without creating further environmental problems.

Indeed, Senegal is set to face more environmental problems, driven by its high population growth rate and the accompanying persistent degradation of its most valuable natural resources. In many rural and coastal areas, for example, soil fertility and productivity is stagnant or declining due to a combination of overuse and poor management of fertilizers and other inputs in regions such as the Senegal River Valley or the Niayes region. Rain precipitation patterns have dropped significantly over the past ten years (down 35 percent in quantity terms), along with a reduced length for the rainy season and drop in the rain frequency. There is also a high degree of soil degradation observed in Senegal, especially for rice cultivation.

In should also be remembered that the country has exhausted almost all its natural forest resources. Indeed, only about 600 000 hectares of forest cover remain to accommodate possible

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21 Soils are believed poor in nutrients such as $P_2O_5$, $K_2O$, $MgO$, $S$, $Zn$, $Cu$.

22 The protected forest area which is made up of all the protected areas including protected forests, perimeters for reforestation and restoration, national parks, biosphere reservations, full integral reservations, and special national reservations. This area covers 624 000 hectares, which represents 31.7 percent of the national territory.
Senegal is set to implement a Saudi-Senegalese rice development project that could reduce its dependency on the world rice markets by 2015, should the investors involved successfully overcome a few remaining project hurdles. This thrust will involve private investors from Senegal (Societe agro-industrielle du Senegal (SAIS), S.A.) and Saudi Arabia with a goal to produce 1 000 000 tonnes of paddy rice locally of which 70 percent will be exported to Saudi Arabia. This rice project is set to take place on the left side of the Senegal river stretching over an area of some 30 km wide and 800 km long. The project will require land plots carefully selected from four departments covering Dagana, Podor, Matam and Bakel where rice is known to be grown from June to December. If implemented, the project will require unlocking a total gross land area of 119 583 hectares by the year 2015/2016, double rice cropping rice activities from June to December but also over the hot off-season.

Rice demand in Senegal is currently estimated to reach 900 000 tonnes per annum making this product the most consumed staple food item in Senegal. The supply of rice in the country is traditionally met by some 700 000 tonnes of rice imported from the world markets and another 175 000 tonnes provided domestically, of which 70 percent are outputs from the Senegal River valley.

Based on available data, the project stands to bring about a number of benefits to all involved. These include more than FCFA 100 billion in equivalent foreign currencies per annum by the fifth year of the project execution according to some preliminary estimates. It is estimated to cost about FCFA 581 billion (under a no state subsidies scenario) over 5 years with a financial plan structured as follows: 10 percent - Senegalese in the form of land equity swap; 90 percent - Saudi in the form of cash.

The project outcomes build upon an internal rate of return of about 39.7 percent, an actualized benefit/cost ratio of 2.26, a payback time of 5 years. It is said to require some 66 435 hectares of cultivable land space to be secured absolutely in the Senegal river valley. Its investors will inject FCFA 54 176 billion on average per year in terms of direct incomes, distributed over the first five years of the project operations while strengthening the staffing and building partnerships with various service providers (producers, phosphates de matam, concerned rural communities, local consulting firms and contractors). The project promoters have also plans to make use of more intensified cropping methods spending some FCFA 21 933 billion and 54 585 billion on phosphates 18-46 and urea respectively over the same timeframe.

As planned, the project stands to bring about some new tangible income-generating benefits as well as real risks (social, environmental, etc.). This includes seeing some increased pressure on the most fertile lands available to the small holders established in the target regions.

climate change effects in the country. APIX should pay more attention to attracting agribusinesses that will invest responsibly in agriculture, paying due attention to the best RRR\textsuperscript{23} practices available in order to maintain the country’s fragile ecosystem.

With the levels of production discussed earlier, it is worth noting that SOCAS is one of Senegalese companies in the best position to meet opportunities emerging in the growing global food markets including West Africa.

\textsuperscript{23} RePlanting, ReUsing or ReCycling of forest based resources
2007, the volume of tomato imported worldwide was estimated at 5 855 000 tonnes or US$6.9 billion. That is about US$1 184 per tonnes in terms of unit value, which compared favourably to the levels of farm-gate tomato costs. To take advantage of these potentially profitable opportunities that lie ahead, Senegal must address some of the policy related deficiencies reported in several recent business global climate and competitiveness assessments. These areas include addressing, among others, the country’s competition policy – covering sectors such as sugar, vegetable oil and tomato – to make them more transparent and competitive. There is indeed no need to buffer against competition among domestic investors which have failed to pay adequate attention to issues as important as corporate governance, innovation, R&D.

As already pointed out in some studies, there is a poorly established culture of good corporate governance in Senegal’s agribusiness sector, including the tomato industry, which is said to be performing well on the grounds of the tangible economic and social benefits provided. In this sector, there is a poorly established culture of sharing key agribusiness information with the public and this ought to be confronted by the leadership of agribusiness companies such as SOCAS. Not surprisingly, there is no information shared for example of the economic bottom lines of this company on its own website; this requires changing.

APIX should promote a culture of timely information disclosure in the Senegal agribusiness sector to enhance assessment of the key sustainability indicators of interest in an objective manner. These should include:

- **Governance and management.** These factors comprise the importance of sound business principles, transparency, values and ethics in governing a company. For example, the agribusiness companies under review including SOCAS should, among other considerations, set in place basic industry governance structures.

- **Stakeholder engagement.** This factor addresses a company’s engagement with its stakeholders regarding sustainable development issues. For example, companies may provide information on their sustainable development – environmental, social and economic – performance, principles and polices through meetings and communication with stakeholders. This can be done, for example, by regularly producing a public report shared on the company website, if any.

- **Environmental focus including environmental process improvement and environmental products/services development.** This factor addresses the companies’ use of natural resources in the production of their goods and services. It also concerns the importance of the agribusiness companies embedding enough environmental principles in their products or service development. For example, the agribusinesses reviewed should indicate on their websites, among other communication methods, how they design new products specifically with a view to improving their environmental, social or economic impacts. In the case of the tomato industry, SOCAS should indicate how it involves its key suppliers, especially the smallholders with the best production practices available when reviewing and designing new tomato products and related services.

- **Socio-economic development with attention to local economic growth.** This factor addresses the agribusiness companies’ commitments to the capture of economic benefits within the communities where they are operating, as well as contributing to the economy. In the case of the tomato industry, for example, SOCAS should be transparent enough to indicate on its website how it supports community development and capacity strengthening to generate wealth. These considerations extend to providing fair wages and benefits to contracting agricultural labour. The agribusiness companies under review including SOCAS should also show how they generate wealth and how these resources are distributed along the food value chain they serve.
Community development. This factor addresses the companies' commitments to the social development of the community (beyond economic development). In the tomato industry for example, SOCAS should indicate on its website, among others, investments made in basic need projects to help the tomato small farms in becoming self-sustaining enterprises beyond the company's involvement.

Human resource management. This factor addresses the agribusiness companies' commitments to providing a safe, high quality work environment for their employees – including management, staff and agricultural labour under contract. For example, the Senegal agribusiness companies including SOCAS should show on their web sites how they respect regulations covering working hours and payments for overtime and how fair the wage system in force in their respective industries is compared to the national average. In particular, agribusiness groups of longstanding presence such as Grands Moulins (SOCAS) should show the efforts made over the past 100 years to integrate the tomato farmer groups into the companies' shareholding systems.

Drawing from its areas of competitive advantage, Senegal has also passed several reform measures in recent years, to scale up its FDI inward efforts but without much success as yet. This policy has started paying off only recently, making Senegal the third fastest growing country behind Burkina Faso and Ghana in terms FDI inflows and the fourth largest FDI stock builder in West Africa behind Burkina Faso and Guinea. Despite this performance, the country is still lagging behind Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, accounting only for 1.9 percent of FDI inflows and 1 percent of FDI stocks in the West African economies for 2005–2008. The benefits of these outcomes appear unevenly distributed when seen from a sectoral perspective: within the agriculture subsector, crop farming accounted for around 35 percent of registered agricultural projects or investment resources mobilized over the same period.

Foreign direct investment traditionally originated from France but this is changing in favour of newly established Asian investors such as the Arab states, Malaysia and China who are all expressing renewed interest in available land acquisition or leasing opportunities to farm energy and food crops in the country. The disparity in FDI distribution just mentioned remains also true at the geographical level. Thus, the irrigated lands of the Senegal River Valley remain the most appealing investment areas to agribusiness oriented investors.

Various bottlenecks, including land tenure insecurity and technical inefficiencies, have also continued to hamper the noticeable efforts being made in Senegal to drive more FDI into its agriculture sector. Despite the plethora of land-related institutions currently operating in the country, the government has not yet succeeded in simplifying the process of acquiring or leasing land in a transparent manner. Contrary to the perceived belief that land and water resources are abundant and readily available for engaging in any profitable agribusiness activity in Senegal, the remaining resources in these areas, especially in the Senegal River Valley, are shrinking fast. This underscores how sensitive land issues will become in the future, especially for smallholders whose livelihoods are highly dependent on rural income generating opportunities. There are no more large tracts of land now available for sales or leasing without some sort of claims or opposition attaching to them, suggesting the need to swiftly address the land tenure insecurity that is still prevalent in the country. Providing sustained financial support and a strong political will to map out clearly designated foreign investment areas earmarked for most promising investment projects (PAMOCA, free zone schemes) should be considered as a priority in helping to set up working land banks – which would contribute significantly towards raising the levels of FDI flowing into Senegal's agricultural sector.

The impacts of the FDI have also been favourably felt in many areas across the Senegalese economy in general including its food sector; in particular in the case of the tomato industry and the free zone scheme, which have been discussed extensively in this chapter,
with the aim of illustrating selected FDI related economic, social and environmental effects. Foreign direct investment inflows to Senegal have helped ease various structural imbalances, including the state of food insecurity in the country, while, however, raising new areas of concern: the risks of seeing more and more small land users dispossessed of the land vital to their livelihoods, and the gradual exposing to more climate change effects. Though encouraging, the FDI results obtained so far are well below expectations in many other areas, viz. persistent agricultural yield gaps due to insufficient technology transfer, and the overall technical inefficiencies affecting the food sector.

The review suggests joint-venturing as the preferred mode of entry on the part of foreign investors to penetrate the agribusiness sector (57 percent of the registered FDI projects with APIX). Findings suggest the tomato sector as one of most profitable agribusiness activities, were good public policy, coupled with good corporate governance, would make a big difference in reducing poverty and food insecurity. Furthermore, the review of the SOCAS business model also suggests that there is still room for foreign investors to invest responsibly in profitable wealth-creating opportunities in Senegal while keeping in check their expected economic, social and ethical commitments. There exists a win-win solution to maximize companies’ economic bottom lines while at the same time reducing the risks for all involved, including the smallholders. The findings also suggest the need to go beyond established or traditional agribusiness models (outgrowers and contract farming schemes), experienced so far, to include more inventive arrangements such as farmer ownership models whereby smallholders would be given a chance to use the lands they farm in equity swapping arrangements. This would help them to keep a greater share of the value additions created along the various food supply chains in which they are involved.

Finally, the benefits derived from FDI can be maximized in countries like Senegal and the risks attached can be minimized, but this would require taking appropriate institutional and policy measures in a timely and transparent fashion to match local working conditions with opportunities arising in the global energy, food, financial and carbon markets.
1. Introduction

This chapter falls into two parts. First, it describes the policy framework and recent trends in large-scale agricultural investments in Zambia. Then, it examines two agricultural investment case studies: Kaleya Smallholders Company Ltd (Kascol) and Mpongwe Development Company Ltd (MDC). The latter went into voluntary liquidation in 2006 and its farms were bought up by ETC BioEnergy and another investor. At the time of the study, ETC Bioenergy sold the farms to another company, Zambeef. Though liquidated in 2006, MDC continued to exist until 20 July 2011 when it was finally deregistered by the Registrar of companies. Neither investment project belongs to the recent wave of agricultural investments that has attracted much international attention over the past few years. Indeed, the two projects started in the 1970s and early 1980s as joint ventures between the Government of Zambia and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), and have been privatized in recent years. The involvement of the CDC reflected the development orientation of both projects at their inception. Given this circumstance and given the implementation time behind these two experiences, the case studies provide valuable insights on the longer-term development outcomes of best practice agricultural investments. These insights may be a useful contribution to today’s international debates about agricultural investment.

Despite their similar historical roots, the two case studies are rather different. Kascol is an agribusiness company operating in Mazabuka district, in Zambia’s Southern Province. It is a single-product company that produces sugar cane on a farm situated about 8 km south of Mazabuka, the main town in Mazabuka District. The sugar cane is sold to Zambia Sugar Company, which mills the cane into sugar for the local and export markets. According to the latest annual report of the Zambia Sugar Company, sugar exports to the European Union make up 62 percent of total sales, while the rest is sold in the local market (ZSC, 2011). Interviews with Zambia Sugar Company management indicated that sugar is also being exported to a number of countries inside Africa. Kascol started operating in 1980 and holds about 4,314.9 hectares of land, of which 2,265.3 hectares are fully developed and under cultivation. Kascol’s approach to business is a combination of own-production and contract farming on land held by the company. Land is held as a 99-year lease, and Kascol subleases about 1,000 hectares of this land to about 160 outgrowers on the basis of 14-year renewable contracts. The model also involves equity participation and board representation for smallholder outgrower farmers: an organization of the outgrowers holds 13 percent of the equity in the company, and a district-level, sugar-cane grower association holds an additional 25 percent equity.

The ETC BioEnergy company (formerly Mpongwe Development Company, MDC), runs plantations for a total of 46,874 hectares in Mpongwe District, in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province. The total landholding consists of
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three farm blocks, each with a separate 99 year lease. Farm number 4451 (Nampamba, 22,921 hectares) and farm number 4450 (Chambatata, 12,490 hectares) are used for crop production, while farm number 5388 (Kampemba, 11,463 hectares) is used for ranching. Of the total land area, 10,661 hectares are currently developed, of which 3,000 hectares are under irrigation. Various crops are produced, the mix sometimes changing from year to year. In the last production season, this mix consisted of wheat, maize, soybeans, rice, mixed (dried) beans, barley and jatropha. The “traditional” crops (wheat, maize and soybeans) handled by ETC BioEnergy, however, have been grown for almost as long as the farm has existed. Of the traditional crop, wheat is exclusively grown as an irrigated crop while soybeans and maize are mostly rain fed. In recent years, the company has also produced winter maize, which is irrigated.

The map in Chart 1 shows the location of the districts where the two projects are situated.

The map also shows the overall, comparative population growth rate for the districts.

1.1 Research methodology

The research methodology involved interviews with company management and staff, villagers and other stakeholders. At the MDC, the research team conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with company management; the Mpongwe District Council; a former member of Parliament who presided over land negotiations in the 1970s; residents of Mpongwe, and a focus group discussion with residents of the area of one of the chiefs who owned and controlled the land acquired by the Mpongwe Development Company (designated “Chief N” in this chapter). Similarly, at Kascol, the research team held face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with company management, and focus group discussions with two groups of outgrowers (both men and
women). An interview was also held with a descendant of one of the original owners of the farms bought by Kascol in the early 1980s. The team also interviewed a management representative at the Zambia Sugar Company, and another at Krookes Brothers, a sugar-cane estate. In addition to interviews, observations were also made about the farms and farm infrastructure.

1.2 Study limitations

Limited access to data resulted in gaps in the information presented, which consequently affected the thoroughness of the study. Both case studies involved private corporations that do not ordinarily disclose company information to the general public: ETC BioEnergy, for instance, restricted the choice of the researchers as to whom to interview in the company. The length of time during which both companies have existed made it impossible to carry out detailed analyses of performance and outcomes over the long term. Thus, the researchers were obliged to focus on the present (while being aware of the company's history to the extent possible). The tight timeframe within which the fieldwork was conducted also limited the number of interviews conducted.

This chapter contains a further four sections. Section 2 provides the national context and discusses the policy framework and recent trends in large-scale agricultural investments. Section 3 discusses the design and implementation of the investment projects. Section 4 analyses the socio-economic outcomes for the two projects and Section 5 covers the conclusions.

2. National context

2.1 Policy framework

This section deals with the policy framework for large-scale agricultural investment. It begins by describing matters related to land and then moves on to a brief consideration of agricultural policy.

Land policy and practice

Zambia's total land mass is approximately 75.2 million hectares, of which 12 percent (or 9 million hectares) is suitable for arable use (GRZ, 2002). Of the 9 million hectares of suitable land, about 1.7 million hectares are under cultivation (GRZ, 2009). The latter figure represents the total land under crop production and takes into account both subsistence and commercial farming.

Under Zambian law (Lands Act no. 20 of 1996, chapter 184 of the Laws of Zambia), all land in Zambia is vested in the President, and is held by him in perpetuity for and on behalf of the people of Zambia. For historical reasons, land in Zambia is generally divided into two categories: land in customary areas, which is referred to as customary land in this chapter, and state (or Crown) land. Customary land is land that was defined and reserved for indigenous peoples by the colonial masters under the Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders of 1928-1964, and under the Zambia (Trust Land) Orders of 1947-1964. About 94 percent of Zambia’s land is said to be in customary areas. It should be noted, however, that continued reference to customary areas in official documents – including the Lands Act – is misleading. Many of the areas which were delineated and designated “customary” under the Zambia (State Land and Reserves) Orders of 1928-1964 are no longer customary in the sense in which the term must have been originally used. As noted later in the chapter, this has created further confusion by equating customary areas with customary tenure.

The remaining 6 percent is state land. State land was originally reserved for the exclusive use of European settlers (Roth et al, undated). Again, continued use of this term in reference to the present land situation leads to confusion and the tendency by some to exclusively equate the size of the land under leasehold tenure with the size of state land. This point is further elaborated later in the chapter. Customary areas tend to be areas with low agricultural potential due to poor soils, poor infrastructure, or both. State land, on the other hand, tends to be served with better transport and communications infrastructure, and has “attracted virtually all the skills and
investment necessary for the development of the country's resources", according to Banda (2011).

That said, there are two major systems of land tenure in Zambia which, to some extent, parallel the two land categories just described: customary and leasehold. Land that is held under customary tenure is controlled by traditional rulers, locally known as chiefs, using local customary laws, as long as such laws are not in conflict with statutory law (e.g. the Lands Act of 1996). The chiefs are the custodians of customary law and they subsequently control land in their chiefdoms. Customary law is unwritten and is area-specific; that is, it depends on the unwritten traditions and customs of each chiefdom. It is estimated that some 94 percent of Zambia's land is held under customary tenure (GRZ, 2002). However, as noted above, this is not correct in that it appears to equate customary tenure with the size of customary areas. Land in customary areas can be held under leasehold title and this happens from time to time. Thus, land held under customary tenure must have reduced over the years as some of it is now held under leasehold tenure.

Customary land tenure is what most Zambians, especially in rural areas, are acquainted with. By virtue of belonging to a chiefdom, a person has the right to use and occupy land in that chiefdom, free of charge. However, the area chief has the right to withdraw land from anyone he deems to be violating the customs and traditions of the chiefdom. This is one of the sources of tenure insecurity under customary land tenure. Evidence from the field suggests that this is a major concern for some villagers in Chief N's area in Mpongwe district. The villagers complained, in a focus group discussion, that the traditional ruler was taking land from them and giving it to people coming into the area.

Leasehold tenure is regulated by statutory laws, which allow for a renewable maximum leasehold of up to 99 years. Some official sources put land under leasehold tenure at 6 percent of the total land mass (e.g. PRSP, 2002). However, as in the case for customary tenure, this may not be correct, equating as it does, leasehold tenure with the size of state land. As indicated above, usage of the term state land is a carryover from the colonial period and was defined in the Zambia (state and reserve land) Orders of 1928–1964. Zambia became independent in 1964, and there has not been any redefinition of the boundaries of state land since that date. State land was, and has remained, about 6 percent of the total land mass. The current practice is that land under leasehold tenure can come from either state land or from reserve and trust lands, which together form customary land. It is unlikely, therefore, that land under leasehold tenure corresponds to the 6 percent state land size.

Land under leasehold tenure is ordinarily used for residential, commercial, industrial, and agricultural purposes. Both nationals and foreigners can obtain leaseholds. In the case of foreigners, the Land Act of 1996 limits acquisition to the following circumstances: that the non-Zambian is a permanent resident in the Republic of Zambia, and a legally recognized investor; or that the non-Zambian is a company registered under the Companies Act, and less than 25 percent of the issued shares are owned by non-Zambians.

The Ministry of Lands, on behalf of the President, has the legal authority to alienate land. Land alienation applies to both state and customary land. In the case of customary land, land alienation by the President means converting land under customary land tenure into leasehold tenure. Box 1 below gives some details on how this is done. In some respects, it is desirable to convert land under customary tenure into leasehold tenure because customary tenure has very little protection under the law and is often subject to abuse by chiefs; sometimes even by the state.

The practical implication of customary tenure is that no matter how long villagers may have occupied or claimed ownership to a piece of land, they will have no officially registered title to it until the President alienates such land to them. Such alienation effectively converts the tenure status of the land from customary tenure to leasehold tenure. From that point on, the villager is required to pay ground rent to the state (the Ministry of Lands), becoming, in effect, a tenant to the state. Tenure change also means that the area chief loses control over the alienated land.
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The cumbersome procedures of converting land from customary tenure to leasehold tenure, the subsequent obligation to pay ground rent to the state, and the fact that the concept of title deeds is extraneous to local practice are some of the reasons why most villagers do not obtain title deeds on the land which, in their view, is theirs by virtue of their (or their ancestors) having lived there even before Zambia was a nation.

The Ministry of Lands is the main ministry mandated to carry out the functions of land administration. Because the Ministry of Lands has no district-level structures, local authorities are appointed as agents to process applications and select suitable candidates on behalf of the Commissioner of Lands. Recommendations made by local authorities to the Ministry of Lands may be accepted or rejected by the Commissioner of Lands.

Alienation of State Land consists of the following:

a. Land Identification. Identification of land in any city, municipality, or district is the responsibility of the local or provincial planning authority concerned. Once land has been identified, the planning authority shall carry out its planning for various uses within the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act and relevant regulations. Once the planning authority has planned and approved the area, the layout plans are forwarded to the Commissioner of Lands for examination of land availability.

b. Allocation of Land. Once land has been numbered and surveyed, the local authorities may advertise the stands in the news media or any transparent medium, inviting developers to apply to the Commissioner of Lands through the local authorities, using a prescribed form. On receipt of the applications, the local authorities will select the most suitable applicants for the stands and make recommendations in writing to the Commissioner of Lands, giving reasons supporting the recommendations. This recommendation letter will be accompanied by the full set of Council minutes. The Commissioner of Lands will consider the recommendations and may approve or disapprove them. The Commissioner of Lands will not approve a recommendation if it is apparent that doing so would cause injustice to others or if a recommendation is contrary to national interest or public policy.

Alienation of Customary Land involves a different process. Any person who holds land under customary tenure may convert it into a leasehold tenure not exceeding 99 years on application, in the manner prescribed. A person who has a right to the use and occupation of land under customary tenure, or has been using and occupying land for a period of not less than five years, may apply to the chief of the area where the land is situated. The chief shall consider the application and shall give or refuse consent. Where the chief refuses consent, s/he shall communicate such refusal to the applicant and the Commissioner of Lands, stating the reasons for such refusal in a prescribed form.


This tenure context creates a breeding ground for tensions in cases where the government takes land away from local groups and allocates it to an outside investor. The situation is aggravated by the fact that while the government is able to convert land from customary to statutory tenure, there are currently no legal mechanisms for conversion from statutory tenure to customary tenure.
Ordinarily, this should not be a problem. However, in the case of Zambia (where the majority of its people cannot afford to hold land on statutory tenure), it poses a challenge and potential source of tension. Most Zambians use land for subsistence farming and the low productivity that characterizes subsistence farming implies that the subsistent farmer is only able to produce enough for own consumption and is severely cash constrained. Furthermore, since holding land on statutory tenure requires payment of ground rent to the state, which most poor subsistence farmers cannot afford, conversion of huge tracts of customary land to statutory tenure by the few who can afford to do so practically deprives the majority poor of a means of livelihood. When this happens, tension can potentially build up.

Both Mazabuka District, where Kascol is situated, and Mpongwe District, where the MDC is located, are rural areas with over 90 percent of the land being under customary tenure. No land in Mpongwe District and, in all probability, in Mazabuka District constitutes what was formerly designated Crown land (now called state land), implying that land that is currently under leasehold tenure in these areas was converted from customary tenure in customary areas – which consists of reserve land and trust land which the colonial government had reserved for indigenous use. The terms ‘state land’ and ‘customary area’ are here being used in the original sense, that is, state land means that portion of land originally reserved for European settlers and customary land is as that portion of land originally reserved for indigenous people. As discussed, land in customary areas is held by chiefs on behalf of their subjects, though ultimately this land is vested in the President for and on behalf of the people of Zambia. Land under customary tenure can be turned into leasehold tenure by following procedures laid out in the Lands Act. One important element of those procedures is the consent of the chief himself, although in practice chiefs do not always act in the best interests of their subjects.

The role of chiefs is illustrated by the acquisition of land by MDC. In the 1970s, land currently held by the MDC was under the control of chiefs, among them two chiefs designated in this chapter as Chief N and Chief L. It was a forested area used for hunting and gathering of wild products by villagers who lived near the area. In 1976, the Government of Zambia, through the Ministry of Agriculture, asked Chief N for land which they could use for commercial agriculture. Chief N referred the government officers to the family who held the piece of land in which the government was interested under customary tenure. At the time, a member of this family was area member of Parliament and he surrendered the land to the Ministry of Agriculture which, in fact, was facilitating land acquisition by the MDC.

The procedure for the acquisition of customary land is largely the same today (see Box 1). Apart from titled land, land acquisition must involve local chiefs who, in consultation with their subjects, can either give or decline to give land for investment purposes. In practice, the government has taken measures to proactively facilitate investors’ access to customary land. Under the Investment Act of 1995, an investment centre was established to facilitate investments in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. The centre was later amalgamated with various other government bodies, and is now known as the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA).

One of the roles of the Zambia Development Agency is to facilitate land acquisitions by investors, including through the creation of ‘farming blocks’. Chiefs have been encouraged to give land to investors in the name of economic development. Thousands of hectares have since been given to investors by chiefs and have either been converted to leasehold tenure or are in the process of conversion.

In contrast to the land acquired by the Mpongwe Development Company in the 1970s, Kascol land was already under leasehold tenure when it was acquired by the company. The land was thus already earmarked for commercial agricultural use and part of it was already under agricultural use when it was acquired by Kascol. Similarly, in addition to the “virgin” land that MDC originally acquired in Nampamba, subsequent expansions of company operations involved acquiring titled land (Nchanga Farms) from an existing commercial establishment. The purchase of land which is already titled is largely
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...a private arrangement between the buyer and seller. However, even in private transactions, the government often facilitates the acquisition of land by “big” investors, and this was the case with both Kascol and the MDC. In the Kascol case, the government persuaded three farmers who owned the land to sell it to Kascol. Although the original farmers may have been happy with the money they got (as indicated by a grandson of one of the original farmers), it is not clear to what extent the transaction was one between a willing-seller-willing-buyer, given that the government was heavily involved.

**Agricultural policy**

The overall goal of Zambia’s agricultural policy is to promote a self-sustaining, export-led agricultural sector, which ensures increased household income and food security. Agriculture is seen as having the greatest potential in the fight to reduce poverty through its contribution to economic growth, and its inclusive nature. The emphasis on export-orientation implies a shift from the traditional focus on maize to other high value, exportable crops. Historically, Zambia’s agricultural policy has favoured maize production. The shift to a more diversified agricultural product base is seen as something beneficial for the sector, as the emphasis on a single crop led to the neglect of infrastructure and service support to other equally rewarding agricultural activities in the sector, and ultimately, to the detriment of the sector as a whole.

The agricultural policy has continued on its path towards market liberalization – begun in the early 1990s – which involved the removal of consumer subsidies on maize and maize products and that of price controls. The policy encourages exports and imports of agricultural commodities and inputs and thus, in the past 15 years or so, the policy thrust has centred around (a) consolidating the liberalization of agricultural marketing; (b) strengthening the liberalization of the trade and pricing policy; and (c) streamlining the land tenure system (PRSP, 2002). Current policy intentions are to: (i) develop and implement policies and programmes that support crop diversification, livestock and fisheries production, increased productivity in crops and livestock, sustainable land and water management, including forestry, agro-forestry, climate change adaptation and mitigation and other environmentally friendly agricultural systems; (ii) facilitate equitable access to land for agricultural purposes; (iii) adhere to predictable, rule-based market and trade policies and strengthen public-private coordination and dialogue; (iv) facilitate the private sector to scale-up investments in production, input and output markets, processing and value addition in crops, livestock and fisheries; extension linkages focusing on Public Private Partnerships (GRZ, 2011).

In spite of these policy pronouncements and intentions, there still seems to be a bias towards maize production, probably understandably so, because maize is the country’s staple grain. In 2001/2002, Zambia experienced a severe maize shortage and was offered genetically modified (GMO) maize donations by the WFP, which it rejected out of environmental and health concerns. This move appears to have pushed the government back to maize subsidies through the introduction of the targeted Fertilizer Support Programme (PSP), renamed Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) in 2009. The maize bumper harvests that have been experienced over the last three consecutive farming seasons may be attributed partly to the FISP. The government also introduced its own Food Reserve Agency which buys maize from small-scale farmers. This was clearly a reaction to the slow pace at which the private sector was filling the vacuum left by the abolishing of government controlled marketing companies at the height of liberalization policies.

Apart from these isolated success stories in agriculture, the country does not yet boast a vibrant agriculture sector. The fact that less than 2 million hectares are under cultivation means that Zambia’s agricultural potential has still to be realized and government is making efforts to encourage agricultural investments in these areas. To that end, investment legislation includes a number of general safeguards for investors: free repatriation of net profits and debt payments; safeguards on investment protection (including full compensation based on market value for expropriations); and facilitation services provided by the Zambia Development Agency (e.g. in
obtaining water, electric power, transport, and communication services and facilities required for their investments, in regularizing investor immigration status, or in acquiring other licences necessary to operate a business in any particular sector). Tax incentives are also provided, including:

- Implements, machinery and plants used for farming, manufacturing or tourism qualify for a wear-and-tear allowance of 50 percent of the cost per year in the first two years;
- Duty-free importation of most capital equipment for the mining and agriculture sectors;
- Corporation tax at 10 percent on income from farming;
- Farm works allowance of 100 percent of expenditure on stumping, clearing, prevention of soil erosion, boreholes, aerial and geophysical surveys and water conservation;
- Development allowance of 10 percent of the cost of capital expenditure on growing of coffee, banana plants, citrus fruits or similar plants;
- Farm improvement allowance – capital expenditure incurred on farm improvement is allowable for the year when the expenditure is incurred;
- Dividends paid out of farming profits are exempt for the first five years the distributing company commences business;
- For rural enterprises, tax chargeable reduced by one-seventh for the first 5 years; and
- For business enterprises operating in a priority sector under the Zambia Development Agency Act 2006, a 0 percent tax rate for the first 5 years, a rate reduced by 50 percent from years 6 to 8, and a rate reduced by 25 percent from years 9 to 10.

2.2 Recent trends in large-scale agricultural investments

Zambia’s economy has traditionally been dependent on mining, especially copper production. However, agriculture has often been given emphasis by successive governments at various points in the history of the country. In the 1970s, state enterprises dominated the Zambian economy and private sector investments played a minimal role. This trend was initiated by the 1968 economic reforms and institutional changes that favoured increasing state control of the economy. The government of then President, Kenneth Kaunda, encouraged Zambians to “go back to the land” and it actively participated in agricultural production and marketing through state-owned farms and the then National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD). In this context, the government became the major investor in large-scale agricultural projects.

Both Kascol and the MDC were a consequence of this policy. The major objective for agricultural investments was to “increase agricultural production to achieve self-sufficiency in staple foods, both nationally and regionally where possible, and to provide raw materials for agro-industries” (GRZ, 1979). Because of the need to achieve self-sufficiency in staple foods, the major focus of large-scale agricultural investments was on cereals and livestock production. The MDC and a related company, which Mpongwe acquired after government divestiture – Munkumpu Ipumbu Crop Farm and Kampemba Ranch – are examples of such focus. On the other hand, Kascol is an example of a large-scale agricultural investment aimed at providing raw materials for agro-industries.

The trend of public investments in agricultural land was reversed in the 1990s when Zambia shifted from a characteristically command economy to a market economy. Agricultural policy reforms were undertaken, the main thrust of which was the liberalization of the agricultural sector and the promotion of private sector participation in production and marketing of agricultural inputs and outputs. Enterprises that were fully or partially state-owned were privatized and private investment was encouraged.

The MDC, which was jointly owned by the Government of Zambia and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), was effectively sold to the CDC by way of increasing its shareholding in the company from 50 percent to 70 percent. The government reduced its shareholding to 30 percent, and this equity was meant to be transferred to the Privatization Trust
Fund (PTF) for subsequent public floatation. This did not happen and by 2005, the CDC had 100 percent ownership of the company. In a surprising turn of events, the MDC went into voluntary liquidation in 2006 and its assets were sold to other companies, the main one being ETC BioEnergy.

The government’s equity stake in Kascol was partly through the Development Bank of Zambia, and partly through the Zambia Sugar Company; when the latter was sold to Tate and Lyle in 1995, Kascol was effectively privatized.

The trend of private investments in agriculture has continued in recent years. In the ten-year period starting from 2000 to 2009, total pledged investments in agriculture have been on an upswing, reaching US$315,027,378 from US$8,343,207 according to data from the Zambia Development Agency (see Figure 1).\(^3\)

These figures represent both start-up companies and investments in existing companies, and indications are that the majority of the investments are purchases of existing farms. For instance, the data includes the purchase of MDC assets by ETC BioEnergy in 2007 by an investor of Indian origin, with a pledged investment of US$59,648,687. This was the second largest pledge in the agricultural sector in ten years. It also includes the purchase of Munkumpu Farms, once part of Mpongwe Development Company, by Somawhe Estates Ltd, with a pledged investment of US$14,060,000. Somawhe is owned by a Danish investor.

In 2011, ETC BioEnergy sold its farms and associated assets to Zambeef Products Plc at US$47,390,000. Zambeef Products Plc is a Zambian agribusiness company involved in the production, processing, distribution and retailing of beef, chickens, pork, eggs, milk, dairy products, flour and bread, edible oil and stockfeed through its own retailing network throughout Zambia and West Africa. Could this signify a new trend – where foreign-owned companies are bought by locally-owned companies? It is perhaps too early to make a case out of this one isolated incidence.

What is worth noting, however, is that there are exceptions to the apparent trend of new investments being focused on purchases and expansions of existing farms. In a few cases, completely new farms have been started, although this phenomenon has taken place mostly in the biofuels subsector. Investments were started in earnest a few years ago, driven by the rising prices of fossil fuels. Since 2010, however, investments in biofuel crops, especially jatropha, have almost ground to a halt. The fall in fossil fuel prices that has undoubtedly made investments in jatropha unattractive, is probably one of the reasons why ETC BioEnergy sold Mpongwe farms in 2011. ETC BioEnergy planted 500 hectares of jatropha on an estate that was originally being used to grow coffee, and had plans to expand the area under jatropha to 12,000, which, however, did not materialize.

The preference for investing in existing farms may be explained by various factors, among them the high cost of land clearing for virgin land. It is estimated that it costs about US$900 to clear one hectare of land. At this rate, one would need an investment of close to one million dollars to clear land which is just slightly over a thousand hectares. The other possible reason is that

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\(^3\) These figures represent the investments pledged when obtaining investment licences. The amounts actually invested may be different.
investors may be unwilling to commit investment funds to an untested business concept. Actis, which manages an agribusiness fund targeting Africa, generally focuses on established firms and avoids greenfield start-ups.

There could be a third reason: most of the new investments are being made in areas that are generally accessible by road and rail. These are the areas that have traditionally attracted investments in commercial agriculture and even though these areas may have unused land, most such land is owned by commercial entities, even though only small proportions of that land are being used. This gives room for expansion and modernization by injecting money into an already existing establishment. Graham Rae, managing director of Zambezi Ranching & Cropping Ltd is reported to have said: “When we first moved to Zambia, only 100 hectares of Zambezi Ranching & Cropping Ltd were cultivated but we’ve changed that …. We are now cropping 4 000 hectares with room for expansion” (Armitage, 2011). Zambezi Ranching & Cropping Ltd is one of the recent investments in commercial agriculture. Most commercial farmers in Zambia hold undeveloped/underutilized farm land which offers room for expansion should there be an injection of capital (and perceived product demand, of course). Kascol and Mpongwe farms also have undeveloped land and have thus significant room for expansion.

Another trend appears to be emerging: the government has recognized that one of the key constraints to the growth of commercial farming in the country is poor infrastructure and has come up with a land development programme that identifies and demarcates land and provides basic infrastructures and facilities, such as trunk roads, bridges, electricity, dams, schools and health centres. A number of farm blocks have been identified (Table 1) for that purpose. These farm blocks are essentially virgin land and if the programme succeeds, investments in new farms is likely to increase. Most of the land in the farming blocks is being taken up by Zambian farmers. It remains to be seen to what extent these areas will develop into fully-fledged commercial farms.

Additionally, a large number of Zambians in urban areas have woken up to the prospect of being found landless should the current trend of land purchases by commercial entities continue, and have obtained tracts of land in villages from their chiefs. Currently, most such land is yet to be put on title. The challenge lies, of course, in obtaining the capital to develop such land.

**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm block</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Size (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nasanga</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Serenje</td>
<td>155 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalumwange</td>
<td>Western</td>
<td>Kaoma</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luena</td>
<td>Luapula</td>
<td>Kawambwa</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manshyia</td>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>Mpika</td>
<td>147 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikelenge/Luma</td>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>Solwezi</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musakashi (SADA)</td>
<td>Copper-belt</td>
<td>Mufulira</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muku</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Kafue</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simango</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mwase-Phangwe</td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>Lundazi</td>
<td>100 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Design and implementation of the investment projects

3.1 Origin and overview of the businesses

The MDC and Kascol represent two distinct organizational and transactional configurations. The organizational configuration of Kascol combines elements of contract farming, tenancy farming and joint ownership. This configuration has evolved over time, initially starting as contract-tenancy farming and culminating into smallholder outgrower equity ownership. The MDC, on the other hand, is a business with a rural development dimension. It is centred on large plantations and does not involve collaboration with smallholders, or equity ownership by low-income groups. The main development contribution is seen in employment generation in a rural setting, where poverty levels are around 80 percent; in payment of public revenues; in contributing to the food security of its employees and of urban dwellers in the nearby towns on the Copperbelt Province; and, more generally, in opening up the area to investment in agriculture by demonstrating success and by persuading the government to improve infrastructures.

The Kascol and MDC investment projects were each conceived of as both a business opportunity through which shareholders would obtain a reasonable return on their investments, and as a development initiative that would help propel the poor in the respective districts out of poverty. The creation of Kascol was a response to a business opportunity arising from the increased demand for sugar and the derived demand for more cane to feed the sugar-processing factory at the Zambia Sugar Company. The original shareholders that partnered up with the Zambian government, particularly Barclays Bank (a purely private, profit-seeking entity), saw an opportunity for maximizing shareholder wealth. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and the Development Bank of Zambia, which were also involved as shareholders, had explicit development objectives. This led to the inclusion of the outgrower scheme in Kascol. MDC was set up to exploit a business opportunity arising from the growing demand for agricultural produce in the country and the region. However, to the initial owners of the company (the Government of Zambia and CDC), Mpongwe Development Company was not only a business opportunity but also a development opportunity, as can be gauged from its name.

The Kascol and MDC investment projects reflect a vision of agricultural modernization through large-scale agricultural enterprises. They were a response to two policy measures: the first was to increase agricultural production to achieve self-sufficiency in staple foods, both nationally and regionally, and provide raw materials for agro-industries; and the second was to create employment and income opportunities in the rural areas in order to counter rural-urban migration (GRZ, Third National Development Plan, 1979). The design of the two investment projects reflects these elements. Both projects are in the agricultural sector and both are rural-based. The central government played a direct role in the formation of both Kascol and the MDC. Firstly, the government was a shareholder in both companies. Secondly, it was involved in the land purchase negotiations in the case of Kascol, where land was purchased from existing farmers. The government also facilitated the allocation of land by Mpongwe chiefs to the MDC. As discussed, both Kascol and the MDC were more recently privatized, reflecting a shift in national policy towards liberalization and privatization. In the case of Kascol, privatization enabled associations of local farmers to acquire equity stakes in the company – as will be discussed below.

3.2 The impact of privatization

The privatization drive started in 1992 and was conducted within the wider context of economic liberalization and against a backdrop of apparent economic decline that started in the 1970s, barely a decade after gaining political independence from the United Kingdom. The main objective of economic liberalization was to arrest this economic decline and privatization
was offered as the kingpin of that process. According to Cheelo and Munalula (2005), citing the World Bank, the immediate objectives of privatization were:

1. To scale down the government’s direct involvement in the operations of enterprises;
2. To reduce the administrative load associated with this direct involvement;
3. To minimize state bureaucracy in enterprise operations;
4. To reduce the costs of capital expenditure and subsidies from public funds;
5. To promote competition and improve efficiency of enterprise operations;
6. To encourage wide ownership of shares;
7. To promote the growth of capital markets;
8. To stimulate both local and foreign investment;
9. To promote new capital investment.

In that regard, many state-owned enterprises were privatized, including Kaleya Smallholders and Mpongwe Development Company. As stated above, one of the immediate objectives of privatization was to improve efficiency of enterprise operations. This particular goal has generated a lot of interest and in Zambia attempts have been made to measure the impact of privatization on firm performance. One of the most rigorous studies is that by Cheelo and Munalula (2005) who, using panel data, took an econometric approach to measuring the impact of privatization on firm performance. They came up with the following conclusions:

1. There were significant differences in the performance of privatized firms between their pre- and post-privatization periods in terms of improvements in operating efficiency, capital investment (investment in land and building, and investment in plant and machinery).
2. The influence of liberalization was arguably more important in determining turnover and profitability performance than change of ownership (i.e. privatization).
3. Privatization had a negative impact on firm employment levels, at least in the short term.

How do Kascol and the MDC measure up to these conclusions? The impact of privatization on Kascol are not sharply defined because the company was, for all practical purposes, in private hands even before the privatization programme was embarked on. In fact, it was not even on the list of state-owned enterprises that were to be privatized. As stated elsewhere in this chapter, the government had no direct equity stake in Kascol – it was a state enterprise to the extent that two government-controlled entities – the Zambia Sugar Company and the Development Bank of Zambia – had shares in it; 50 percent in total. Thus, when the Zambia Sugar Company was privatized, the effect on the operational management of Kascol was minimal. The situation was, however, different for the MDC. Originally a joint venture between the Government of Zambia (GoZ) and CDC, the company was 60 percent owned by the Government of Zambia just before privatization (Kaunga, undated). After privatization, there was a significant injection of capital into the company and a major expansion programme got underway, about 5 000 hectares were to be cleared, together with major investments in capital equipment.

Indications are that the MDC was one of the most viable agricultural investments in the CDC portfolio. Anecdotal evidence suggests that by 1996-1997, the MDC was more profitable than the then Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). In terms of employment, there is no evidence to suggest that there was an immediate drop in employment levels following privatization, perhaps because of the expansion programme that the company had embarked on soon after privatization which required an increase in manpower levels. In 1996, a number of young university graduates were recruited (including the author), mostly in middle management positions. In 1998, the MDC was merged with a newly created milling company – Mpongwe Milling – and another CDC-owned farm – Munkumpu-Ipumbu Farm. The merger did not negatively affect employment levels. In the same year, however, it became clear that tough times lay ahead as CDC itself was facing imminent privatization and the financial return
threshold for remaining in the CDC portfolio was to be raised.

Following the change in strategy within CDC, a number of assets in the agricultural business were sold off between 2000 to 2003 (Tyler, undated), including Nanga Farms and York Farm in Zambia, but the MDC was unaffected, implying that it was not immediately considered for disposal though plans to do so were still in the offing. The changes within CDC had a ripple effect on the MDC and there was much discontent among employees, some of who thought the company was no longer being well-managed. In 2006, the MDC went into voluntary liquidation and its assets were sold off. Two new companies, ETC BioEnergy and Somawhe Estates Ltd, were now the new owners of the farms. Even though ETC BioEnergy pledged to inject capital in the company, employment levels were significantly reduced.

With regard to the impact of privatization on firm performance, it is admittedly difficult to separate the impact of privatization from that of market liberalization. To say that privatization had an impact on company performance is equivalent to attributing performance to the form of ownership and control. While a causal relationship might exist, no study of the Zambian experience has successfully measured that relationship. That said, a World Bank Post-Privatization Study on observed that “performance by companies purchased through pre-emptive rights sales (usually to foreign investors holding minority shares and a management contract) was unaffected by privatization” (Serlemitsos & Fusco, 2003, p. 6). This, apparently, was the case for both the Mpongwe Development Company and the Kaleya Smallholder Company.

Ownership
The ownership structures of both Kascol and the MDC present similarities and differences. Both companies started with similar owners. Kascol was originally owned by the Government of Zambia (through Zambia Sugar Company, a then state-owned enterprise which owned 25 percent shares in Kascol; and through the Development Bank of Zambia, a development finance institution established in the early 1970s by an Act of Parliament), CDC and Barclays Bank. The MDC was owned by the Government of Zambia and CDC, each having a 50 percent share in the early stages of company's
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development. As discussed, the substantial government involvement reflects the prevailing government policy at the time the companies were established.

The CDC’s involvement shows that both companies were, to some extent, formed to contribute to national economic growth and poverty reduction. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) is the development finance institution (DFI) of the Government of the United Kingdom, and is currently established as a company owned by the Department for International Development (DFID). The CDC has had an economic development agenda for poor countries since its establishment in 1948. One of its objectives at the time of investments, it would seem, was to ultimately divest itself of its investments in the companies once they had matured enough to serve their development role without the CDC’s continued support. For instance, in a 1995 press release by the Zambia Privatization Agency announcing the acquisition of Munkumpu Farm and Kampemba Ranch by the CDC, this objective was explicitly stated (ZPA, undated). The CDC eventually divested from both Kascol and the MDC.

Fieldwork for this study suggests that the understanding by Kascol outgrowers was that CDC shares would ultimately be sold or perhaps even donated to them. This was perhaps a misinterpretation by outgrowers of CDC’s intention to divest from the company once fully established. When CDC eventually divested from Kascol, it sold its shares at market price. The outgrowers could only afford to buy a relatively small percentage of shares (13 percent) through a bank loan. The significance of this, however, is that outgrowers engaged in the outgrower scheme have an equity stake in Kascol. This is an important difference compared to MDC, where people with low incomes have no equity stake in the company.

Kascol outgrowers own their shares through a Trust – the Kaleya Smallholders Trust. This Trust is part of a consortium known as View Point Investment Holdings. In addition to the trust, the consortium also includes two companies – Nzimbe Ltd and Kascol Consultants. Collectively, the three members of the consortium hold 50 percent of the shares in Kascol, which were sold by CDC and Barclays Bank. The Development Bank of Zambia has maintained its 25 percent equity stake.

The remaining 25 percent of Kascol shares are held by the Mazabuka Cane Growers Association, an association of cane growers who supply cane to Zambia Sugar Company Plc. The Mazabuka Cane Growers Association assists cane growers in Mazabuka District to improve cane production and productivity. It acquired its equity stake in Kascol through a donation from the Zambia Sugar Company Plc, which previously owned this equity stake. The donation was probably intended to ensure close collaboration with cane suppliers and thus assure continuity of supply of cane to the sugar factory. The effect of the 25 percent stake held by the Mazabuka Cane Growers Association and of the 13 percent stake held by the Kaleya Smallholders Trust is that bodies representing local farmers own a substantial share of Kascol. The demand for cane by the Zambia Sugar factory is big enough to take in all the cane supplied by the cane growers in Mazabuka and as such, relations among suppliers (for instance, between Kascol outgrowers and other cane growers in the district) are virtually non-competitive. However, having a single buyer of cane may work to the disadvantage of the cane suppliers (going by Michael Porter’s oft-cited model of competitive forces).

As noted above, another important difference between Kascol and the MDC is that the former but not the latter involves an outgrower scheme. Of the 4,314.9 hectares of land held by Kascol through a long-term lease, about 1,000 hectares are subleased to some 160 outgrowers (contract farmers) on the basis of 14-year rental contracts. Each outgrower has, on average, 6.5 hectares of land. Only about half (50 percent) of the land leased to Kascol is under cultivation. Part of the land is rocky and therefore not suitable for cultivation. More importantly, Kascol sources suggest that irrigation water availability represents the main limit on how much land can be brought under cultivation. Processing facilities (a sugar processing plant located within a 10 km radius of the farm) are owned to Zambia Sugar Company, to which Kascol sells its entire produce.
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**Voice**
Participation in the management of an enterprise is related to the amount of control and influence that an individual or group has on the strategic and/or operational decisions of the enterprise. The amount of control that outgrowers and other low-income people have in an enterprise is related to the role they play in the value chain – whether they are shareholders, suppliers/ producers, employees or customers, and how critical the company perceives their role to be in its survival.

At Kascol, low-income groups participate in the value creation process as shareholders, suppliers/producers and employees. They are represented at the board level, where the chairperson of Kaleya Smallholder Farmers Association is a member. The board is the highest decision-making organ of Kascol. The Kaleya Smallholder Farmers Association is a producer association which seeks to assist farmers in issues of production and outgrower welfare. Sources from among the outgrowers indicated that their representation on the board was not as effective as they would have liked, particularly in matters regarding the sharing of rewards from cane production. The outgrowers are of the view that the 55 percent of the outgrower gross sales which goes to the company represents more than its fair share of the proceeds. Since the Mazabuka Cane Growers Association is also represented on the Kascol board, the interests of outgrowers would be expected to be taken care of in an effective way. But this may not necessarily be the case, as the other members of the Mazabuka Cane Growers Association are independent commercial farmers who deal directly with the Zambia Sugar Company (the buyer). It is possible that the board representative from the Mazabuka Cane Growers Association is more inclined towards the interests of bigger commercial cane farmers than those of smallholder outgrowers. The smallholder outgrowers do not deal directly with the Zambia Sugar Company because the transactions costs would be higher on the part of Zambia Sugar Company if it opted for that approach, and also because the smallholder outgrowers produce on contract with Kascol.

Apart from board representation, smallholder outgrowers are not ordinarily involved in the day-to-day running of Kascol, except during the tendering process, when the company is deciding to procure major inputs for use on smallholder outgrower farms. To facilitate collaboration between smallholder outgrowers and company management on a more regular basis than would be warranted by the involvement of the board member, a Smallholder Relations Officer, who is a fulltime employee of Kascol, is engaged for that purpose. He is the link between smallholders and the company.

In contrast, low-income people at the MDC are not represented on the company’s board and they barely participate in determining the direction of the company. Their role is confined to that of employees, and virtually all of them hold non-management positions.

Thus, it would appear that the low-income people have a greater voice in Kascol, where they participate as producers, shareholders and employees, than in MDC where they only participate as employees. Even though the low-income groups at Kascol are not directly involved in the day-to-day management of the company, they exert an influence in the choice of senior managers due to their representation at board level, taking into account, however, the limitations noted above on the extent of the effectiveness of this representation. In addition, Kascol is heavily dependent on outgrowers, as these produce close to 50 percent of the sugar cane that the company sells to the Zambia Sugar Company. This circumstance would be expected to increase the leverage of the outgrowers.

**Risk**
Risk relates to possibility of loss of assets or income-earning potential. Clearly, this is in turn related to the contribution each individual makes towards the value creation process and the value of the rewards derived from participating in value-creation. Again, the contribution in the value-creation process is dependent on the role each person plays in the value-chain – that is, whether a shareholder, supplier/producer, employee or customer. In Kascol, low-income groups participate as producers, shareholders
and employees. Therefore, the risk they bear is higher than in the case of MDC, where they only participate as employees. In Kascol, smallholder outgrowers face the risk of loss of assets and income-earning potential. In MDC, low-income groups face the risk of loss of income earned through wage employment. The severity of loss (and the probability of it occurring), influences the decision whether or not to put in place a risk management system. At Kascol, where the severity of loss seems higher, smallholder outgrowers, in conjunction with Kascol management, have put in place a risk management system: crop insurance. Kascol has taken out a single crop insurance policy for the whole sugar estate (which includes the fields of smallholder outgrowers), in its name. The smallholder outgrowers pay for the insurance by allowing Kascol to deduct a small percentage of money from their cane sale proceeds. In the MDC, there is no such insurance designed specifically to protect the assets of the low-income categories, except the legal requirement of facilitating the remittance of statutory contributions to employee pension schemes, which Kascol also does. According to the Pension Scheme Regulation (Amendment) Act number 27 of 2005, a pension scheme means “any scheme or arrangement, other than a contract for life insurance, whether established by a written law for the time being in force or by any other instrument, under which persons are entitled to benefits in the form of payments, determined by age, length of service, amount of earnings or otherwise and payment primarily upon retirement, or upon death, termination of service, or upon the occurrence of such other event as may be specified in such written law or other instrument.” The pension schemes are thus safeguards against loss of income arising from retirement, job loss or death (in which case the beneficiary will be the surviving relative(s)). They do not safeguard against reduction in wages. The MDC has also taken out crop insurance policies.

Rewards

In an equitable system, rewards, like risks, are related to the individual’s contribution in the value creation process. In practice, the value of economic rewards depends on various factors, including the forces of demand and supply for the factors of production contributed and the products produced. The Kascol investment project is an interesting case in that low-income groups participate as shareholders, producers and employees. The annual incomes of outgrowers are generally higher than those of their counterparts who are engaged as employees. On average, an outgrower obtains a net income of up to ZMK15 000 000 (US$3 167.40) per year from a good harvest of cane, while the average annual wage income of a unionized employee at Kascol is currently around ZMK3 657 120 (US$772.24). In addition, through their equity participation, the outgrowers are entitled to a dividend whenever the company declares one. So far, the dividends have been used to pay back the loan obtained from a commercial bank to buy shares from CDC and Barclays Bank. The loan is likely to be cleared within three years.

It would also appear that outgrowers are wealthier than employees. The researchers’ observations were that outgrowers had more assets (some even had cars) than those who were working for a salary. This excludes those in management positions. Apart from tangible economic rewards, psychological rewards also seem important and these depend on an individual’s perceptions and values. Those individuals who value independence would rather be outgrowers producing for the company, than employees. Currently, no outgrower is also a Kascol employee. Some of the outgrowers were former employees who chose to become outgrowers. Those who remain in employment are, presumably, individuals who prefer the certainty and regularity of wage income – or people who cannot afford to become outgrowers.

3.4 Constraints and success factors

The Kascol and MDC investment projects have faced some factors that have restricted their

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4 The research team could not obtain salary scales for non-unionized permanent workers who, in both companies, are regarded as management staff. Those interviewed could not disclose this information.
operations and others that have accounted for their successes. Some of these factors are now described, beginning with constraining factors and then moving on to success factors.

**Low levels of financial returns**

While investments in the agribusiness may be profitable, returns on investment are generally low compared to other sectors of the economy. Low levels of financial returns in the agribusiness sector are what motivated CDC’s divestiture from the MDC and many other agribusinesses in Africa. The case of low returns in the agribusiness sector has long been recognized by investors. Tyler (undated), quoting from the 1972 CDC annual report, states that “many agricultural projects, particularly involving smallholders… have had to be ruled out in the past because … the overall rate of return is well below that necessary to cover the service of the capital invested”. This makes it a lot harder for the sector to attract private sector investors. Tyler (ibid), quoting from the 2000 CDC annual report quotes the Chairman of CDC as having said: “It was with considerable reluctance that the board concluded that many of our agribusiness investments, with which CDC has been proudly associated throughout its history, are unlikely to meet our minimum financial return requirements. We have therefore substantially written down the values attributed to them, to reflect a ‘for sale’ rather than ‘going concern’ status.” Gauging from two of the biggest and most successful agribusinesses in Zambia – Zambia Sugar and Zambeef – which, incidentally, are associated with the present case studies, the average return on investment for agribusinesses in Zambia could be around 10 percent (Table 2). The average return on net assets for ZAMBEEF, the new owners of Mpongwe Farms, was 10.3 percent for the years 2010 and 2011. Similarly, the average return for Zambia Sugar PLC – the single buyer of Kascol of cane – was 10 percent for the years 2010 and 2009. Note the contrast in the average return for Arcades Development, a newly established shopping mall in Lusaka, whose average for 2010 and 2009 was 27 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Return on net assets</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambia Sugar Plc</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambeef Products Plc</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arcades Development Plc</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computed from company financial statements

That said however, the individual, yearly returns are very disparate from those of other businesses. The returns, for instance, compare favourably with the returns on the CDC portfolio for the years 2007 and 2006 which posted returns on net assets of 14 percent and 12 percent, respectively. It would appear, though, that returns from agribusinesses are subject to wide variations, probably a reflection of the sensitivity of agribusiness, especially agricultural commodities, to both local and global economic conditions.

There is, however, a likelihood of a sustained rise in returns in agribusiness given the rising trend in global food prices. Increased demand for food is expected to increase even as world population increases and countries like Zambia that still have arable land may reap high returns from investments in agriculture.

**High operating costs**

As noted elsewhere in this chapter, Zambia has vast tracts of arable land which are not being utilized (except for gathering wild fruits and other forest products), but poor infrastructures in most parts of the country where this land is found makes agriculture investments an expensive venture. Poor transport and communications infrastructures, the absence of commercial services such as banking and suppliers of inputs, materials and operating requirements significantly increase operating costs. Additionally, investors who choose to invest in such places are often forced to make additional investments in assets that are not directly related to their core business. The MDC, for example, was obliged to invest in road maintenance and telecommunications equipment and such investments have a depressing effect on returns. Further, in the
1990s, the MDC had high vehicle maintenance costs due to the bad road leading to the nearest town, Luanshya.

**Imbalance of power relations in the cane supply chain**
The case of Kascol is that of many suppliers and a single buyer. There is only one buyer of cane in Mazabuka. This has created an imbalance of power relations in the supply chain. The suppliers of cane are dependent on Zambia Sugar PLC, which can therefore dictate the price of cane supplied by cane growers. Outgrowers at Kascol complained that they are told the price at which their cane will be sold and have no say in the setting of that price.

In spite of these constraints, there are many factors that induce investors to continue investing in both the Kascol and Mpongwe Farms. The following are some of the key ones.

**Favourable investment climate**
The favourable investment environment created since the early 1990s, when Zambia liberalized its economy, has made continued investment in the case study businesses an attractive option. The section on Recent Trends in Large Scale Agriculture Investments outlines some of the factors that have attracted investors to the Zambian Agriculture sector. Following liberalization of the economy, the MDC was able to set its own price for maize and soybeans and to export its commodities and earn income in foreign currency at a time when the base lending rates in Zambian currency were over 50 percent. Its international customers included Glencore International plc, and Otterbea; in 1996, the company sold all of its 3 788 tonnes of soya crop to Otterbea of South Africa.

**Comparatively low transaction costs in the outgrower scheme**
The oft-stated downside of contract farming systems involving a large number of small outgrowers are the high transaction costs. Kascol, however, has managed to keep these costs at manageable levels because 1) the outgrowers are geographically concentrated on one farm which makes it easier to provide them with extension services and to supervise their farming activities; 2) the outgrowers use Kascol land, and this increases compliance levels in contractual matters as the cost of eviction from company land is high on the part of the out grower should they abrogate the contract; and 3) outgrowers do not have alternative buyers of cane and this prevents from side-selling their cane.

4. **Socio-economic outcomes**

While the socio-economic outcomes of the two projects are difficult to determine due to the problem of attribution and to constrained data availability, there is evidence that the companies have had some impact, both positive and negative, on the poor and their environment. The following section takes into account the situation prior to the investments and then contrasts this with the socio-economic outcomes of the investments.

4.1 **The situation prior to the investments**

It is impossible to produce a proper assessment of the development context in the project areas at the time of project inception. Too much time has passed since then, and data on key socio-economic indicators is in scarce supply. However, it is possible to make some general observations.

In the mid-1970s, when the negotiations for the acquisitions of land for the agricultural investments were taking place, Zambia was a young nation. It had only been an independent state for ten years. One of the major challenges faced was human capital. The country had very few schools: by 1976, it had 2 743 primary schools (most of these just went up to the fourth grade) and 121 secondary schools. College education was scarce. In 1976, Zambia had 13 teacher training colleges, 14 technical and vocational training colleges and 1 university which had opened ten years earlier, in 1966. Mpongwe District (then part of Ndola Rural District) at that time had about 9 primary schools while Mazabuka District had about 39 schools (GRZ, EdAssist Database, 2002). However, compared
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

In Zambia, to Mpongwe and many other rural districts, Mazabuka District (where Kascol is located) was much better off. Mazabuka's location along the main (and the country's first) railway line attracted missionaries and white settlers (mainly as commercial farmers) and, as such, the Kascol project catchment area benefited from earlier investments in human resource projects undertaken by the government, missionaries and commercial establishments (e.g., the Zambia Sugar Company). By 1980, a number of schools existed in the project catchment area at both primary and secondary levels. These included Mazabuka Basic School, Saint Columbus Primary School, Kaonga Primary School, Saint Edmonds Secondary School, and Mazabuka Girls High School. Vocational training centres, however, were very few, and perhaps only the Zambia Institute for Animal Husbandry was found within the project area. A farmer-training centre that catered to the needs of the entire Mazabuka district existed about 60 km away, but the distance meant that it was of limited use to the farmers in the project area.

The vast majority of the rural population in the project catchment areas probably made a living through subsistence farming and herding. To date, about 90 percent of Zambians who live in rural areas derive their livelihoods from agriculture (CSO, 2003). Only 6.3 percent of the rural population is in paid employment, implying that 93.7 percent are most likely engaged in independent agricultural activities, whether for subsistence or for commercial production.

While formal employment opportunities existed for work in government offices (both central and local) and in parastatals that were being established by the government in the first decade after independence, few rural people, who made up the majority of residents in the catchment areas of the two case studies, could get such jobs, due to lack of education and training. Most, therefore, could only work as 'labourers', a term used to refer to unskilled labour in Zambia. In Mazabuka District, where Kascol is located, some farming enterprises, notably the Zambia Sugar Company, had just been established. These enterprises provided whatever type of employment the local residents could pick up (cane cutting, office cleaning, etc.). Management and other jobs requiring technical expertise were mostly in the hands of expatriates. Mpongwe District had even fewer, if any, opportunities for wage employment.

The employment situation was particularly bad in the second decade after independence, because although Zambia recorded a growth in wage employment due to growth in the economy in the first ten years after independence (1964–1973), from the mid-1970s growth in wage employment grew less than growth in the labour force (CSO, 1986) (see Figure 2). This period marked the beginning of Zambia's economic decline, largely due to the decline in copper prices on the world market, increased oil prices and policy mishaps.

4.2. Direct livelihood contributions

According to Scoones (1998), “a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living”. The same author adds further that “a livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base”. The terms
‘livelihoods’ and ‘employment’ are inexorably linked and according to the Zambia Labour Force Survey (1986) a “person is employed if he performs some work for pay, profit or family gain”, and this includes subsistence farming. Thus, employment can include a wage for the employed person or independent production of a product for direct consumption or market sales (Scoones, 1998).

**Wage employment**

One of the policy objectives at the time Kascol and MDC were being set up was to create employment and income opportunities in the rural areas; both companies were seen as an operationalization of this policy. Today, Kascol is one of the largest employers in Mazabuka District and Mpongwe is the biggest employer in Mpongwe District. When the project started in the 1980s, Kascol had over 300 permanent staff – both management and non-management. By 1999, the number had dropped to 78 and this has been maintained to the present. The drop in the number of employees came with changes in ownership structure. The company underwent a restructuring process which led to over half of the employees being laid off and salaries being reduced for those who remained. Apart from those who work directly on the farm, Kascol also runs a clinic which employs four staff. Besides permanent staff, Kascol employs between 250 and 350 seasonal workers, mostly cane cutters. These seasonal workers are employed for up to eight months in a year and, as such, receive an income for two-thirds of the year. The ratio of workers to area cultivated in hectares is about 0.38, or 38 workers per 100 hectares.

Between 2004 and 2007, MDC employed an annual average of 457 full time workers and 1,082 seasonal workers – a combined average of 1,539 workers per annum. This figure translates to roughly 38 percent of all salaried employees in the district in the 2000s. The figure in terms of workers per cultivated land in hectares is 0.14 or 14 workers per 100 hectares, significantly lower than that of Kascol. The difference is most likely a reflection of the difference in the levels of mechanization in the two companies: the MDC is more highly mechanized than Kascol. At the time of interviews (July 2011), the company had 520 permanent staff and 1,200 seasonal workers.

These figures are certainly low by international standards, though still significant within the Zambian context. A recent survey of Zambian businesses sponsored by the World Bank and others (Clarke et al., 2010) found that “even large Zambian enterprises are small by international standards. Close to half have between 51 and 70 employees – just above the notional cut off size of 50 employees for medium-sized enterprises”. Thus, a company like MDC, which employs over 500 persons in a year, is, by Zambian standards, a large employer. This is especially true if such a company is in a rural area – as in the case of the two businesses studied.

That said, the level of job creation appears small compared to the size of the rural labour force. In 2000, Zambia had a total labour force of 3,165,151 persons, of which 2,151,776 were in rural areas (CSO, 2003). The rural labour force was 64 percent of the total labour force, implying that Zambia’s labour force was (and still is) predominantly rural. Of the rural labour force, only 6.3 percent (about 133,205 persons) were in wage employment.

In 2005 (the year for which comparable national data on wages is available), unionized/general workers at Kascol were getting a minimum of ZMK704,711 (US$206.28) per month, while seasonal workers were getting a minimum of ZMK15,816 (US$4.63) per day. In the same year, the average wage of an unskilled, unionized worker at MDC was ZMK300,000 (US$87.81). For instance, Brian, who in 2005 was working as a centre pivot irrigation equipment operator at the MDC, was earning ZMK370,000 (US$108.30) per month, while Peter who worked as a security guard was earning ZMK300,000 (US$87.81) per month. These figures are higher than the national average figure of ZMK293,621

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5 This figure has been estimated by taking into account a population of 64,371 in 2000 for Mpongwe District (CSO, 2000) and a wage employment rate of 6.3 percent in rural Zambia, according to 2000 national census.

6 Exchange rate of ZMK3,416.34 to a 1 US$ (Bank of Zambia, average 2005 rate).
(US$85.95) per month for all salaried workers in 2005, and much higher than the national average figure of ZMK105 426 (US$30.86) for those employed in the agricultural sector (CSO, 2005), though farm labourers would be expected to have lower pay. Currently, unionized workers at Kascol get a minimum of ZMK15 238 (US$3.22) per day, which is about ZMK304 760 (US$64.35), less than half what they used to get in 2005. Management explained that this major reduction in salaries was due to a move from an enterprise-based salary scale to an industry-wide scale. An enterprise-based salary scale is negotiated at an enterprise level, while an industry-wide salary scale is negotiated and set at an industry level. Similar salaries are paid at the MDC (now Zambeef Mpongwe Farms), where unionized workers get a minimum of ZMK419 000 (US$88.48) per month. This figure is the legal minimum wage obtaining in the country. Based on the above figures, it would seem that Kascol is paying less than the legal minimum wage for staff in non-management positions. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, those interviewed could not disclose the salaries of management staff.

**Who gets the jobs**
For both Kascol and MDC, management jobs are predominantly held by individuals who come from outside the surrounding communities, while low-skills jobs are held by locals. In the case of seasonal labour, the demand for labour may be too high for the surrounding communities to meet and the two companies have often obtained such labour from outside their respective districts. At Kascol, most of the seasonal workers (cane cutters) are migrant labourers from other parts of the country, the Western Province in particular. This has been the trend from project inception, as locals (Mazabuka residents) who are traditionally cattle keepers, have often viewed cane cutting as an unattractive employment option. With the depletion of cattle stocks due to disease outbreaks, however, a number of locals have also started seeking seasonal employment as cane cutters. Similarly at MDC, during coffee picking years, the company used to hire coffee pickers from other districts. In 2011, the company had 121 locals in permanent employment (out of the 518) and most of the seasonal workers are locals (Mpongwe community members).

From a gender perspective, a parallel study on gender in large-scale agricultural investment, also supported by FAO and steered by IIED, suggests that Kascol does not have a deliberate policy for affirmative action or promoting gender equity in decision-making positions, though some efforts are being made to encourage women applicants once a vacancy arises (Wonani, in press). Thus, out of 78 permanent employees, only 8 (10 percent) are female. Table 3 below shows the positions held by female staff in the Kascol. The situation is slightly better with regard to outgrowers, as 27 percent of the smallholder outgrowers are female, though it is possible that the larger proportion of female smallholder outgrowers is linked to inheritances arising from the demise of the original male smallholder outgrowers.

**Livelihood opportunities other than direct employment**
As discussed, Kascol has contracted 160 outgrowers who supply the company. These outgrowers have annual sales of up to ZMK60 000 000 (about US$12 669.6) each. After deducting the cost of fertilizers and chemicals (average of ZMK26 000 000, US$5 490.29), water (ZMK12 000 000, or US$2 533.98, on average), transport and other,
the outgrower would remain with something like ZMK15 000 000 (US$3 167.40). Income from the sale of sugar cane is variable and when the harvest is poor, or when there price is unfavourable, incomes can be much lower than stated here. In a situation where an outgrower fails to get enough income to sustain him/her for the rest of the year, Kascol gives an “advance” (that is, a loan) of ZMK1 000 000 (US$211) to the farmer. The price of sugar cane is set by the Zambia Sugar Company, which takes into account several factors including the demand for sugar on the local and international market.

Outgrowers also receive dividends from their equity stake in the company, although as discussed, this revenue stream has so far been used to repay a bank loan. As already mentioned, outgrowers tend to have higher incomes, better living conditions and greater self-satisfaction than wage labourers employed by Kascol. Besides income from sugar sales, each out grower has about 0.5 hectares of farmland used for residence and for staple crop (maize) production for household consumption. Kascol’s mode of operation also impacts the livelihoods of local suppliers who provide agricultural inputs and operating materials directly to Kascol, and those who supply to the Zambia Sugar Company factory which mills Kascol cane into sugar. There are more men (73 percent) than women (27 percent) among the 160 outgrowers. Older farmers appear to dominate; the few youths that are involved are heirs who have taken over the estate from parents who have either died or are too old to farm.

In the case of the MDC, the main direct livelihood contribution is through wage employment. Other avenues through which the MDC may have positively impacted the livelihoods of local communities appear limited. Virtually all its inputs, other than unskilled labour, are sourced from outside Mpongwe District, and this implies that the low-income members of the surrounding communities do not participate in the value chain as suppliers of inputs. Additionally, all its products are sold to corporate customers outside Mpongwe District, so that the low-income members of the surrounding communities do not participate in the value chain as consumers of affordable products.

The comparison between the Kascol and MDC models suggests that a model in which low-income groups participate more in value creation (as shareholders and suppliers, as well as labourers) offers more potential for local livelihoods than models that are mainly centred on wage employment.

**Productivity, technology transfer and skills development**

Both businesses offer training, but only to those members of the communities that are directly involved in the production activities of the businesses. Kascol provides training to outgrowers in areas such as cane production, farm management and good citizenship. Workshops and seminars are also held on matters relating to the health of outgrowers (e.g. HIV/AIDS). The MDC/ETC BioEnergy only provides training to its workers. However, the company believes that some transfer of expertise takes place by employing local farmers as seasonal workers. It was not possible for this study to verify this claim. However, earlier research by the study author in the same areas found that smallholders who obtain occasional employment with the company tend to have a higher productivity than those who do not (FinScope MSME Study, 2008).

### 4.3 Impact on food security

The impact of the cases studied on food security is difficult to quantify in the absence of data on production and price trends. However, since two of the key elements of food security are the availability of, and access to, food, it can be argued that both projects have had significant impacts on the food security situation of employees, outgrowers and urban dwellers. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, both projects have enabled sections of the low income groups to earn cash incomes. These incomes are used to buy food – and this constitutes access, which is an element of food security. The MDC’s contribution to food security in the nearby towns on the Copperbelt Province is significant. Though data on the MDC’s maize production is unavailable, we can gauge its contribution by
considering aggregate production data at the district level. In 1996/97, for instance, Ndola Rural District, where the MDC is located,\(^8\) contributed about 80 percent of the total maize produced on the Copperbelt (Table 4). In other words, one district produced virtually all the maize crop in the province.

Maize production estimates for 2004/2005 makes the contribution of MDC even clearer as the data is disaggregated by farmer category. The large-scale farmer category in Mpongwe District’s contribution to total maize production on the Copperbelt was 45 percent and this was the highest production level in the region (see Table 5).

### 4.4. Public revenues and public infrastructure development

Kascol pays land fees (ground rent) to the Ministry of Lands. On average, the company pays ZMK130 million (about US$27 450.83 at an exchange rate of US$1 to ZMK4 735.74). The annual tax to the government by Kascol is about ZMK500 million (about US$105 580.12). The annual contribution to Water Board by Kascol is ZMK 68 million (US$ 14 358.90). Payments for ground rent, water rights and tax go the central government. The local authority receives about ZMK40 million (about US$8 446.41) for rates and billboards. Councils charge a fee for advertisements and other information displays by organizations on billboards in their districts. A breakdown of public revenues provided by Kascol in 2010 is presented in Figure 3.

ETC BioEnergy, on the other hand, has an agreement with the Government of the Republic of Zambia – the Investment Protection and Protocol Agreement – whereby the company enjoys a tax holiday. This means that for the first three years of investment in Zambia (starting in 2007), ETC BioEnergy has been exempted from paying tax. ETC has, however, been paying ground rent and the latest figures are as shown in Table 6.

ETC BioEnergy also pays annual water rights and the 2010 figure was ZMK43 442 000 (US$9 173.22). Figure 4 shows that the biggest proportion of ETC BioEnergy’s payments is for ground rent. The volume of water utilised by ETC is 102 000 m\(^3\) / day. The cost of the water rights is calculated on the basis of water volumes as follows:

- Up to 500m\(^3\) per day: ZMK5 000 (US$1.06) per day;
- For every m\(^3\) above 500m\(^3\)/day: ZMK2 (US$0.0004) per m\(^3\);
- Charge for registration: ZMK2 000 (US$0.42).

In comparison, Kascol, although the smaller of the two projects, contributes more to public

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\(^8\) Since 2000, following a change in district names and boundaries, the MDC lies in Mpongwe District, as discussed throughout the chapter.

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### TABLE 4

Maize production estimates, Copperbelt Province, 1996/97

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Expected production (mt)</th>
<th>% Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chililabombwe</td>
<td>2 876.76</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chingola</td>
<td>1 338.12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalulushi</td>
<td>1 725.21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>496.08</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>2 006.28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufulira</td>
<td>2 249.28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndola Rural</td>
<td>42 410.34</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>53 102.07</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: CSO Crop Forecast Surveys
TABLE 5
Maize production estimates, Copperbelt Province, 2004/2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Farmer category</th>
<th>Expected production (mt)</th>
<th>% Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chingola</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>9,708.89</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chingola</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>1,081.04</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalulushi</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>770.35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalulushi</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>1,524.24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>453.86</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>1,743.99</td>
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<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>6,741.56</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masaiti</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>2,765.93</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masaiti</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>8,094.12</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mpongwe</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>51,761.8</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>Mpongwe</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>14,224.89</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Mufulira</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>307.8</td>
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<td>Mufulira</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>1,534.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ndola</td>
<td>Large-Scale</td>
<td>510.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ndola Urban</td>
<td>Small-Scale &amp; Medium</td>
<td>6,379.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>113,943.25</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: CSO Crop Forecast Surveys

FIGURE 3
Kascol’s contribution to public revenues (2010)

Data source: Kascol

FIGURE 4
ETC bioenergy’s contribution to public revenues (2010)

Data source: Kascol
Part 4: Business models for agricultural investment: Impacts on local development

ZAMBIA

revenue than ETC BioEnergy, on the basis of the 2010 figures. In 2010, Kascol contributed a total of US$155,836.26, compared to US$5,355.89 contributed by ETC BioEnergy. For every hectare developed, Kascol contributed US$68.79 to public revenues, compared to ETC BioEnergy’s US$5.92 (see Table 7). The difference is due to ETC’s tax holiday – the tax incentive given to investors by the Government of Zambia. ETC BioEnergy qualified for this incentive because it came in as a new investor in 2007 and bought assets from the MDC, which went into voluntary liquidation in 2006. It is possible that the MDC, prior to liquidation, was contributing more to public revenues than ETC BioEnergy.

Both companies have provided infrastructure and social amenities for their operations and employees. Kascol provides housing (316 units) for its employees. It also has a clinic with four staff members. The clinic serves the company employees and outgrowers. The company also supports a basic school within the estate. Transport is provided for taking schoolchildren to schools outside the estate. Kascol has also built nine water boreholes, which supply water to houses for its staff and to the residences of outgrowers. Roads and irrigation facilities have been constructed within the estate. These various facilities are not accessible to third parties not related to the project.

ETC BioEnergy maintains an access road owned by the local authority. Apart from this, the company has not invested in public infrastructure projects, but it provides housing for its employees. ETC BioEnergy has five company clinics; a doctor visits the clinics every two weeks. The number used to be seven under the MDC but two have since closed. Senior and middle managers have an insurance scheme with Company Clinic, a privately owned surgery in Kitwe; this scheme is not available to other employees. The company also has a school with 330 pupils and 15 teachers. The number of schools was two during the period under the MDC but one was sold together with Munkumpu Farms. Services are provided free of charge to company employees.

### TABLE 6
Annual ground rent payments for ETC Bioenergy (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of farm</th>
<th>Ground rate (in ZMK)</th>
<th>US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chambatata (4450)</td>
<td>61,044,860</td>
<td>12,890.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nampamba (4451)</td>
<td>105,044,860</td>
<td>22,181.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kampamba (5388)</td>
<td>57,359,860</td>
<td>12,112.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>223,449,580</td>
<td>47,183.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: ETC BioEnergy

### TABLE 7
A comparison of Kascol and ETC contributions to public revenue (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ground rent</th>
<th>Corp. tax</th>
<th>Water rights</th>
<th>Local authority</th>
<th>Total public revenue (US$)</th>
<th>Ratios</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public revenue to developed land</td>
<td>Public revenue to total land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kascol</td>
<td>27,450.83</td>
<td>105,580.1</td>
<td>143,58.9</td>
<td>8,446.41</td>
<td>155,836.26</td>
<td>68.79/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETC</td>
<td>47,183.67</td>
<td>9,172.22</td>
<td>56,355.89</td>
<td>5,29/ha</td>
<td>56,355.89</td>
<td>5.29/ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Kascol and ETC Bioenergy
The company also provides housing to its permanent staff and the staff residential areas have the basic social amenities (such as markets, shops, and social clubs).

4.5 Social and environmental impacts

Though agriculture is a beneficial and desirable activity, it often brings with it social and environmental costs that are not often taken into account when assessing its full impact. This is at least true in the Zambian context. Thus when Kascol and MDC were being set up in the 1980s, environmental and social impact assessments were not undertaken, nor have they been undertaken at any other time in the lives of the projects. One reason for this is that at the time the projects were being set up, and to some extent even now, Zambia lacked the capacity to carry out environmental assessments at a scale and with a scope able to include the majority of agricultural projects. At the time of project inception, the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA), which regulates environmental issues, had not yet been established. The Environment Council of Zambia regulations cover issues like environmental impact assessments, air pollution, waste management, pesticides and toxic substances (PTS), water pollution, hazardous waste, and ozone depleting substances (ODS).

Presently, both companies claim to adhere to ZEMA standards. However, both projects generate toxic emissions into the air, soil and water. Additionally, land clearing on a scale practised by the two projects has the potential to negatively impact the ecosystem. With regard to emissions, both projects are heavy users of chemical fertilizers and some of this fertilizer certainly finds itself in areas beyond the farms through such means as running water, seepage into underground water systems and evaporation. Mpongwe Development Company relies heavily on chemical weed killers. These chemicals are applied through aerial means. This method of application creates the possibility for the chemicals to be blown far beyond the farm with consequent damage to the atmosphere. A related problem is the safe disposal of used containers for pesticides and other toxic substances. Poorly disposed, used containers are a real danger to the surrounding communities who pick up these containers and start reusing them for such things as water and food storage. The villagers are often not aware of the dangers inherent to the use of such containers.

Kascol contributes to polluting the atmosphere through the burning of sugar cane plantations in readiness for harvest. This is done annually and is a source of particulate matter (smog) and of oxides of nitrogen (NOx). Further, some environmental concerns may not directly be addressed by ZEMA. A study by German et al (2010) revealed that, for example, industrial-scale biofuel plantations negatively impact the environment through deforestation. In this regard, it is reasonable to conclude that the jatropha plantation developed by ETC BioEnergy contributed to deforestation. From the resource point of view, the abstraction of water for irrigation purposes is certainly having some effect on the water resource. Both companies are heavy users of irrigation water and though the impact could not be determined, the abstraction of water to irrigate 2 000 hectares must have a telling effect on the resource.

On a positive side, Mpongwe Farms practise zero tillage which is an aspect of conservation farming. Kascol also only tills the land once in seven years. Mpongwe does not burn the fields. These practices are more environmentally friendly than the slash-and-burn method which is practised by the majority of subsistent farms in the country.

With regard to the social impact, it is impossible to assess the livelihood impacts of the loss of land at the time the investment projects started. In both cases, too much time has passed to permit meaningful assessment. It is, however, worth noting that no involuntary resettlement was involved, as the land was acquired from existing commercial operations or through deals negotiated with local landholders (see above). The area which makes up the Mpongwe farms was unoccupied when it was being acquired, even though the nearby villages claimed ownership of it and it was communally used for gathering forest resources. As noted earlier, permission
had to be sought from the family who held the piece of land in order to have land allocated to Mpongwe Farms in the Nampamba area.

However, although at the time of allocation of land to Mpongwe farms the villagers saw no serious problems, growing land scarcity in the project catchment areas is now being felt by local people. This growing land scarcity is being driven by demographic changes: the population of Mpongwe District has been growing at the fastest rate in the Copperbelt Province for the past three decades (CSO, 2011). Growing land scarcity is compounded by the existence of big commercial farms that have been established in the area, e.g. Dar Farms, which is said to comprise about 76,000 hectares, in addition to the area taken up by the MDC.

The severity of the problem of land scarcity may be appreciated when one considers that apart from the small numbers of people that are in paid employment, the majority of Mpongwe residents derive their livelihoods from the cultivation of crops for own consumption. For these people, land is their most important asset. Growing land scarcity erodes local access to a most important livelihood source for rural dwellers. This situation has resulted in tensions at the local level and with the company. The MDC’s land wrangles with the so-called ‘squatters’ on their farm exemplifies this tension. Squatters started encroaching on the MDC land around 2003. Initially, these were mostly individuals retiring from the MDC and companies in urban areas. Later some local villagers joined in. When the company noted the presence of squatters around the farmland, it engaged independent surveyors to verify the farm boundaries. It was ascertained that the squatters had in fact encroached on company land. Squatters resisted attempts to remove them, and sued the company. The case was resolved in favour of the MDC in the Supreme Court. But getting all the squatters to move out of the farm has not been easy even after the court ruling. As a compromise, some of the squatters have been allowed to stay on the edge of the farm, while others have moved out. The focus group discussion held with N villagers revealed that growing land scarcity is fostering hostile attitudes among villagers towards large-scale land investments in their area. A former member of Parliament at the time of the MDC land transaction, now a villager in the area of Chief N, regretted that he had given land to the MDC back in the 1970s and wished it could be repossessed. The company is aware of the growing dissatisfaction among villagers due to land pressure and is considering introducing an outgrower scheme whereby land would be subleased to local farmers for these to produce for the company on contract.

For some residents of the area, the blame for these tensions lies also with their chief who, they claim, has continued to give out land to investors in exchange for gifts, with little regard to the needs of his subjects. They argue that he does not want them to get leasehold title: “It is not easy to get title deeds. The chief refuses to give us (application) forms because he fears that he would lose control of the land”, said the members of the focus group discussion at Kantatamo Market. The loss of control that the villagers were referring to is the chief’s inability to give land to investors once the villagers get leasehold title. Without leasehold title, the chief can easily take away land from the villagers and allocate it to investors.

The social impact of the problem of land scarcity may also be gauged from a statement made by one villager, a former member of Parliament for Mpongwe who claims to have given the land to MDC in the 1970s: “If I heard that Nampamba (Farm) was closed, I would be very happy because we would get back the land”. Yet, it is nearly impossible for the villagers to get back land that is held on leasehold title.

Constrained access to land may throw many into poverty, particularly if agricultural investments do not generate sufficient employment for local people. The youths are especially vulnerable, as their land access is particularly limited and they may face growing food needs as they establish new households. In the area, the youths who are setting up their independent households can only get pieces of land from that held by their parents.

9 Land scarcity is location-specific. There are areas in Mpongwe District where land is still available, but these areas are far from the road and, as such, they are unattractive to both the investor and the villager.
assuming their parents have enough. It is difficult to find suitable "virgin" land that can be brought into production.

On the other hand, the MDC has land lying idle - only about 22.7 percent of the farm is being utilized. Growing land scarcity and idle plantation land are the two factors that underpin the encroachment by squatters on company land. Legal battles have been fought over the matter and, from the legal point of view, ETC has emerged a winner. Socially, however, the company has had to contend with growing hostility exhibited in such behaviour as deliberate damage to company property from some community members. A senior manager intimated that the majority of the people held in prison cells in Lusanshya town probably had something to do with the disturbances at the MDC. As mentioned previously, the company has tried to reach a compromise by allowing squatters to use company land for free, on the understanding that they can be moved out when the company needs the land. Another solution under consideration is to turn the squatters into tenant or contract farmers.

Besides land scarcity, other types of adverse impacts on local communities are also possible, but they could not be documented by this research. For example, reference made by Kascol staff to irrigation water constraints as a limit to the land area that can be cultivated suggests that there may be a problem of water scarcity. More research is needed to establish whether this is indeed the case and, if so, what impacts it has on people around the farm.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

This chapter has examined two experiences of large-scale agricultural investments in Zambia. Both experiences have been implemented for decades – the MDC since the 1970s, Kascol since the early 1980s. While this circumstance made it impossible for this study to assess the socio-economic impacts of the projects on local livelihoods at the time of their establishment (for example, with regard to impacts linked to loss of land), the sufficient implementation time has enabled us to learn lessons on how agricultural investments may work in the longer term.

The important caveat to this consideration is that, for much of their duration and until their recent privatization, both projects had a strong development component beyond commercial returns. This characteristic makes the project significantly different to the many, more recent investments that are being carried out in many parts of Africa as part of the ongoing global land rush. Recent changes in employment conditions, including wage levels, following the privatization of the two companies, illustrate the difference between investment mainly or solely driven by commercial returns and projects with an explicit development objective.

In both experiences, enabling factors have played an important role in making the ventures possible. A key enabling factor in the initial stages of the Kascol project was the configuration of expertise and contributions provided by the different shareholders. The Zambia Sugar Company and the Commonwealth Development Corporation brought production and management expertise, while the two banks brought financial resources to the new company. The CDC, in particular, managed the initial set-up and provided management expertise. The involvement of the CDC may also have played a role in lowering the risk profile of the project, thereby making it more appealing to private investors and lowering the rate of return needed to make the project a commercially interesting proposition.

The early association with the CDC was an important enabling factor also for the MDC. The CDC injected cash into the company and provided management expertise. The abundant rains and fertile soils of Mpongwe District have also contributed to its success. The company sits on an aquifer which has proved invaluable as a source of irrigation water. Partly due to the high productivity of the company, the road infrastructure has been developed and this has presumably reduced the company’s transport costs. Current company management believes the company (that is, ETC BioEnergy) is making a sufficient return on investment to satisfy the shareholders. Even though the MDC went into
liquidation in 2006, it was neither a loss maker nor was it facing liquidity problems – it was liquidated because it could not meet the higher targets of return on investments demanded by its owners, the CDC. Presumably, the company was liquidated instead of being sold as a going concern because its owners believed there was more value in selling a ‘dead cow than a live one’ – they may have obtained more by selling individual assets than by selling the company as a going concern.

Both companies are large employers in the Zambian context, but overall job numbers have remained small compared to the rural labour force. Both projects have experienced downward pressures on wages. And while both projects have created jobs in skilled positions, the rural poor are most likely to take up low-paying jobs due to their generally low educational status. These circumstances raise real questions as to the best ways of reducing poverty in rural areas. Investment projects that maximize positive economic linkages with local rural areas through multiple avenues appear to have the highest potential for impact on poverty.

More specifically, investments that include low-income groups as producers in the supply chain and as shareholders in decision-making and profit-sharing are more promising than models that only purport to involve the poor as wage labourers. At Kascol, outgrowers involved in the outgrower scheme appear to have higher incomes, better living conditions and higher levels of overall self-satisfaction than their counterparts who work as wage labourers in the same company. Similarly, joint ownership of the company, whereby local groups have an equity stake in the business, provides the poor with additional income opportunities and with avenues to oversee the management of the business. That said, the higher returns associated with participation in a business as a supplier or a shareholder are also associated with higher business risks. But mechanisms can be developed to manage some of these risks, particularly with regard to crop insurance.

On the other hand, growing scarcity of valuable land in parts of the country is resulting in tensions around agricultural investments involving large plantations. This is particularly relevant in those parts of the country that appear attractive to outside investors, for instance due to water availability or soil fertility. This is the case of the Mpongwe area, where commercial pressures on the land are on the increase. The circumstance is exacerbated by the different ways in which formal legislation and local people view land ownership in customary areas. Even in projects that have been established for a very long time, this situation can result in conflict over land, including encroachment and litigation.

Neither project is using the land allocated to it to its full potential. Where land is becoming scarcer and investors hold big tracts of land that they are not using, it may make economic sense to rent land to local farmers as part of contract farming arrangements. Renting unused land to local farmers can also help stem hostile attitudes by poorer groups towards large-scale operators. As mentioned previously, the MDC is contemplating this option as a possible solution to encroachments on its land by villagers that have run out of land for farming as a result of demographic growth and increasing commercial pressures.

These case studies have demonstrated that large-scale investments in agriculture have beneficial impacts on the poor, largely on three fronts: first, through contributions to the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP); second, through direct provision of income to the low-income groups; and third, through access to social services. However, large-scale investment in agriculture can also negatively impact on the poor by limiting access to their most important asset – land.

Recommendations

1. Since poverty is predominantly rural, agricultural investments have a significant potential in providing the rural poor with jobs and income growth. However, agricultural investment in rural areas is expensive, and financial returns are generally low. Additionally, where investments have taken place, the rural poor often take up low-paying jobs due
to their lack of education and skills. In addressing the daunting problem of rural poverty, the government should put in place policies that promote inclusive investments in agriculture. Investments in rural infrastructure should be the top priority. The government should also double efforts in the provision of education to the rural population: adult education, and vocational training should be extended to rural areas.

2. Consistent with previous studies on privatization, e.g. Cheelo and Munalula (2005), employment levels and/or conditions of service generally fall after privatization. The decline in employment is likely to persist when there is no significant growth in the size of a firm. Improvements in efficiency that accompany privatization should be followed by action to support firm growth in order to generate new jobs. Firm growth will most likely require that investors actually inject into the company the amounts pledged during the bidding process. Effective monitoring and enforcement of the contractual relationship by government authorities play an important role in this.

3. The country as a whole has abundant arable land, but access to arable land by poor people is becoming increasingly difficult in some places. Land policy should strike a balance between the need for agricultural investments and the interest of poor farmers. Before any land is allocated to an investor, the government should take into account both the present and future land needs of local people. The impact of large-scale investments on demographic changes should also be taken into account in estimating future land needs. Ideally, the discipline of town and country planning should be developed to the extent where it takes into account the peculiar conditions that obtain in rural areas. With increasing population and the need for rural investments, it is becoming clear that land use planning should be extended to rural areas. The current system where chiefs are heavily involved in land allocation is not working well in some cases. The chiefs are demonstrating a growing unreliability in matters of protecting the needs of their subjects.

4. There is a tendency for investors to take up large tracts of land which they do not fully utilize, and by so doing, they create artificial shortages of land in some cases. Investors should only obtain land that they can utilize within a reasonable span of time. Depriving the poor of access to land is socially and economically irresponsible. The government should proactively protect the rights of the poor by ensuring that investors do not hold on to land they do not utilize for many years. Mechanisms should be put in place to allocate to investors only such land as they can utilize within a reasonable span of time, and to withdraw land from investors who do not comply with agreed development plans.

5. A key enabling factor in the initial stages and in the ultimate successes of the Kascol and Mpongwe investment projects was the association with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). The CDC provided investment funds and managerial expertise to both companies in return for comparatively low levels of financial returns. Although not set up as a development aid agency, the CDC was in practice a vehicle for delivering development aid to poor countries. It invested in the least developed countries and in sectors that would ordinarily be shunned by private investors; it undertook investment projects where financial returns were too low, too distant or too risky to attract capital flows from private investors. The Government of the United Kingdom did not require it to make a profit beyond that needed to service its debts (Tyler, undated). Strategically targeted development aid can play an important role in promoting commercially viable and socially inclusive models of agricultural investments.
6. Investment projects that include low-income groups as producers in the supply chain and as shareholders in decision-making and profit-sharing are more promising than models that only involve the poor as wage labourers. In countries where governments are genuinely committed to poverty reduction, this observation creates a powerful argument for effective policy interventions aimed at promoting equitable inclusion of the low-income as producers and equity owners. Given the benefits of collective action, collective equity ownership through a trust is perhaps more advantageous to the low-income groups than having individual poor people each owning few shares.

7. The outgrower scheme at Kaleya Smallholder Company has managed to keep at manageable levels the transactions costs that arise from dealing with a large number of outgrowers by avoiding the geographical dispersion of outgrowers. It has done this partly by keeping all the outgrowers on the company estate. While the overall number of Kascol outgrowers is limited, this experience shows that collaborative models are possible and can be commercially viable. This experience provides insights on practical ways to include smallholders in investment processes, both as suppliers and shareholders, and it is hoped that this chapter may help feed lessons learned into international policy debates about agricultural investments in the global South.

8. One of the challenges faced by this study was data availability. This was undoubtedly related to the choice of companies for the case studies. The companies under study are private entities not listed on the stock exchange. As such, they do not make their financial data public. A quantitative study would be of great benefit if it involved publicly listed companies. However, in Zambia very few agribusiness companies are listed on the stock exchange and make their data publicly available. A difficulty related to collecting data from private companies is assurance of confidentiality. Management of private companies want to be sure that data made available to the researcher will be kept private, and they do not want their identity to be made public. Notwithstanding cost implications, this may be achieved much more easily when a bigger sample of companies is involved in a study rather than one or two case studies. The confidentiality challenge is not a big issue when obtaining data from rural small-scale farmers. It would be interesting for future studies to carry out quantitative analyses of externalities of large-scale agricultural production. The economic cost to communities and the larger economy of holding unused land by large-scale agricultural entities could also be investigated. Such studies could also be extended to individuals who hold huge tracts of unused land. It has become fashionable for many to obtain huge tracts of land which then stay idle for a long time; this creates artificial shortages of land.

Often, the financial returns of large-scale agricultural investments are not known. Future studies could consider investigating the financial returns of agribusiness in Africa. Such studies could include the cost of developing a large-scale farming operation. Comparative analyses of the performance of agribusinesses and firms in other sectors could also be done. Other studies could target sources of equity capital for agribusinesses in agriculture.

References


SYNTHESIS OF FINDINGS
The findings of the studies presented in this publication confirm the increasing trend of foreign investment into the agricultural sector of the surveyed countries. Resource-seeking investment accounts for a substantial share of the increase, although it was not possible to quantify it more precisely due to the lack of recent disaggregated data. In spite of the increasing trend, the share of total FDI that is directed to agriculture remains low with respect to other sectors. In almost all the surveyed countries it was under 5 percent of total FDI inflows and in the majority of them it was even below 2 percent.

The case studies provide indications on the various types of impacts (economic, social and environmental) of foreign agricultural investment at national and local levels in the host country, although it is difficult to draw general conclusions due to the limitations inherent in the case study approach. There are substantial differences in the analysed contexts and models. The observed impacts were very diverse and depended on a range of factors as discussed below. Also, the time frame of agricultural investment is very long and the full impacts may only materialize after decades.

1. National impacts of agricultural FDI

At the national level, the studies found some evidence that FDI contributed positively to increase in agricultural production and yields. In Ghana, investment by a single transnational company was expected to contribute significantly to the increase of the nation’s total palm oil output. In Uganda, companies such as Tilda (U) Ltd contributed to the production of rice, which nearly doubled over the last decade due to the introduction of a new rice variety (Nerica 4).

Some case studies suggest that FDI favours the diversification of crops. In Senegal FDI contributed positively to the production of some high quality fresh fruits. In the cases where the investment targeted export markets, evidence of higher export earnings was found for some countries. For example, in Ghana, exports earnings of non-traditional agricultural commodities (e.g. fruits and vegetables) increased four-fold between 2000 and 2009 due to FDI. A positive effect was also observed in Senegal, where for example, the volume of mango exports grew rapidly. These findings are consistent with those of another study by FAO which found that, in Egypt and Morocco, agricultural production projects to which foreign investment contributed had considerable positive impacts on agricultural exports. In Morocco, for example, foreign companies have contributed to the development of early tomato exports to Western Europe, a high-value market. The studies suggest that FDI contributed to an increase in value added. In some cases, foreign investments led to the adoption of higher standards. A variety of standards was adopted. Some were product-related standards, while other standards addressed the production and/or processing process (e.g. use of the ISO 9000 series and GlobalGAP standards in Uganda). Certification to widely-recognized voluntary standards can increase market access and value-added for farmers and export businesses.

Employment creation, in particular in rural areas, where most of the poor live, is often presented as an expected advantage of international investment in agriculture. The study observed this effect in Ghana, where employment creation by FDI in agriculture was estimated to exceed 180,000 jobs in the period 2001-2008 and Uganda where an estimated 3,000 jobs were provided by eleven transnational corporations in the agricultural sector in 2009. These findings complement those of another study by FAO which found that in Sudan over 6,500 jobs were created over the period 2000-2008. Beyond the observed effects, some surveyed projects expect to have high employment creation effects in the future.

The country studies show mixed results on technology transfer. There are some positive examples of adoption of new production

This chapter was prepared by Pascal Liu, Trade and Markets Division, FAO
technology, such as in the tomato export industry in Senegal or the adoption of improved crop varieties, such as the introduction of a new rice variety in Uganda. In some investment projects involving outgrower schemes and contract farming, small farmers have acquired new skills through either formal training organized by the project's promoters or by working on the nucleus farm (learning by doing). However, the studies suggest that the actual transfer of technology is seldom up to the level announced by the investors.

Some investments led to the development of new infrastructure or improvement in existing ones (e.g. roads, storage facilities, cold stores), either directly by the investor or indirectly, when the government built the infrastructure as part of the investment contract. Yet, in a few cases access to the new infrastructure was restricted to the investor's operations only and local people could not use it.

The studies found evidence of negative environmental impacts, mainly due to the intensification of production generated by the investment which puts higher pressure on natural resources. The intensive use of land and water may result in the degradation and depletion of these resources. There is some local evidence of reduction in forest cover and biodiversity as a result of the investor's activities. These adverse effects are often due to the lack of proper environmental impact assessment (EIA) prior to the investment and the absence of effective environmental management system (EMS) during its implementation. In some cases the EIA was conducted in a superficial manner and could not assess the full risks of the project. Nevertheless, some investment projects led to the adoption of environment-friendly technology (e.g. drip irrigation; adoption of organic farming methods in the case of ITFC in Ghana).

Finally, the data suggest that returns to investment tend to be higher where the investor builds on existing ventures in a gradual approach, as opposed to new ventures which are the most risky type of investment. Greenfield investments to establish very large farms in unknown areas and relatively new industries (such as biofuels) are probably too risky to be recommended as a strategy for agricultural development.

2. Local impacts of agricultural FDI

At the local level, the studies suggest that one of the main short-term benefits of FDI is the generation of employment, although there are limitations. First, the new jobs created by an investment project may not all be sustainable. In some case studies it was observed that projects are labour intensive during the initial phase but become increasingly mechanized later on, thus reducing future labour requirements. Similarly, a change in the type of crops cultivated on the farm may reduce the job number, as some crops are less labour intensive. Second, the new jobs are not always taken up by local people; labourers may come from other areas or even from abroad. Third, the net employment creation effect may be limited if the new jobs replace former ones or self-employment. Beside the purely quantitative aspects, the quality of the new jobs is important. For example, replacing independent small-scale farmers with low-skilled and poorly-paid worker jobs may threaten the resilience and sustainability of the local food system.

Evidence of other benefits to the local economy included higher prices obtained by farmers selling to the nucleus farm, as well as income generation when the nucleus farm subcontracted some services (e.g. soil preparation, weeding) to local residents. In addition, positive spillover effects were observed in cases where small farmers who worked for the investment project as wage earners reinvested the earnings to increase the productivity in their own farm.

While the studies found substantial evidence on the local impacts of agricultural FDI, it is difficult to draw general conclusions, as the effects depend on a number of factors among which the business model and local context are critical.
3. The significance of business models

The studies examined a variety of business models with various levels of involvement of local farmers. The models ranged from the most classical and simple one where local farmers are at best involved as waged workers (acquisition of land by a foreign company for establishing a large plantation) through more inclusive but still classical ones (outgrower schemes, contract farming) to more innovative models where outgrowers are also shareholders of the business venture.

The case studies suggest that positive effects on local communities are unlikely to arise when the investment involves large-scale land acquisition, especially when the land was previously utilized in some ways (including informally). Then, the evidence suggests that the disadvantages far outweigh the benefits. The only economic benefits found were job creation (although there were some limitations as explained above).

On the other hand, there is ample evidence of the risks of large-scale land acquisition in countries where governance is weak. Many developing countries do not have in place all the necessary legal or procedural mechanisms to protect local rights, be they formal or informal in nature. Local interests, livelihood patterns and welfare are seldom taken into account adequately when contracts are signed with outside investors. Land deals are too often characterized by lack of transparency, creating opportunities for corruption. In situations where the government and customary authorities have the power to allocate collective land, the absence of clearly defined land rights, the lack of transparency in transactions for land allocation and arbitrary decisions may harm local communities and hamper economic development. The gap between legality – whereby the government may formally own much if not all the land – and legitimacy – whereby local people feel the land they have used for generations is theirs - exposes local groups to the risk of dispossession and investors to that of local contestation. The fact that many land deals are being negotiated behind closed doors and without local consultation compounds these problems.

The negative social impacts found include the displacement of local smallholders (often with inadequate or no compensation at all), the loss of grazing land for pastoralists, the loss of income for local communities, and in general, negative impacts on livelihoods due to reduced access to resources, which may lead to social fragmentation. In the case of an Economic Land Concession project in Cambodia, villagers suddenly lost access to the nearby forest when the investing company fenced it off. In a few days they lost the possibility to collect timber and non-wood products such as herbs and berries, which had provided an important income for their households.

Not surprisingly, these negative effects generate opposition by the local community and may lead to hostile action against the investor. In the case of the above project in Cambodia the villagers protested vehemently against the investor and the local authorities had to step in. In the case of ETC Bioenergy in Ghana, local people damaged the company’s property. In the case of the Solar Harvest Ltd project in Ghana, the fire on the company’s Jatropha plantation might have been the result of a widely shared perception that the company appropriated community land against the interests of local people.

The studies suggest that large-scale acquisition of land can raise problems even when the transaction is transparent, complies with the established regulations and relates to land that is not utilized (formally or informally) by anyone at the moment of the transaction. In the case of the ETC Bioenergy project in Zambia the purchase was completely transparent and strictly followed the regulatory procedures. The land acquired by ETC had belonged to commercial companies for many years, therefore no local person was dispossessed of their land and the villagers were not against the transaction. However, the large size of the transaction has contributed to putting
upward pressure on land prices in a region where land is becoming increasingly scarce due to demographic factors. ETC holds some 47,000 hectares but utilizes less than a quarter of this area, the remainder being left idle. Villagers that have run out of land for farming as a result of demographic growth and increasing commercial pressures have encroached on the company’s idle land. The company has fought back with law suits and won, but this has generated the hostility of some community members. Deliberate damage to the company’s property has been reported.

These considerations suggest that even from the perspective of the investor, large-scale land acquisition may not be the most profitable model. In spite of the possible discounts on prices (or rents) and tax rebates granted by the host country, transaction costs are generally high. This is because land is such an important asset for rural people that their interests are likely to diverge from those of the investor sooner or later. Consequently, it may be more effective for the investor not to compete with local farmers but on the contrary provide what they do not have, i.e. financial capital, modern technology, management expertise, marketing skills and business know-how. The findings suggest that investment projects that do not involve the local community actively at an early stage tend to be ill-designed and are likely to fail.

4. Inclusive business models

In view of the above observations on the impacts of large-scale land acquisitions there is a case for the promotion of different business models that involve smallholder farmers while letting them keep the ownership of their land. In these models, local farmers and other members of the local community are active partners. There is a variety of such models with varying degrees of participation, including the classical contract farming arrangement, management contracts, outgrower schemes and more innovative models such as joint ventures between the foreign investors and a local farmer cooperative. One of the main objectives of the studies was to gather evidence on the impacts of these models on the local community and its economic development. The case studies found evidence of positive effects on the local economy. These effects include value addition for outgrowers and higher incomes. In the case of the Kaleya Smallholders Company (Kascol) in Zambia, local farmers involved in the outgrower scheme appear to have higher incomes and better living conditions than their counterparts who are wage workers in the same company. A similar observation was made for farmers participating in the outgrower scheme of the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC). They reported that their income was much higher than the average local farm income of US$300 per year and growing. Their target income after the repayment of the loan to ITFC is US$2,000, which is more than six times the average income. The study of Kascol in Zambia found that on average an outgrower obtained a net income that was four times as high as the wage income of a unionized employee in the same company. In addition, the outgrowers had more assets than the employees.

Different types of business models were analysed with varying levels of inclusiveness. The most inclusive ones gave shares in the company to the association of local farmers participating in the outgrower scheme. This was the case of Kascol and Mali Biocarburant S.A. (MBSA). Holding shares enables the farmer association to have a say in the management of the company and in decisions on production and marketing. This increases local farmers’ sense of ownership of the project. At the same time, it also increases the economic risks they bear. It may also create unrealistic expectations that may be disappointed in the initial phase of the business. In the first years of project implementation the shareholders of MBSA and Kascol earned no or little dividends as explained below.

Further, the surveyed inclusive business models successfully introduced and disseminated new technology and know-how. The technology is low-cost and adapted to small-scale farmers (e.g. use of irrigation pipes for the mango seedlings in Ghana), which makes its dissemination to a wider group of farmers easier. New methods of work
were introduced to enhance productivity. Some of them promote active collaboration between farmers (e.g. work in groups), thus strengthening the local community. The inclusive business models emphasize continuous improvement and practical training. Farmers are not viewed as a passive recipient of training, but rather as a source of feedback for the improvement of the course and as potential trainers. Inclusive business models tend to give farmers an active role to train their peers. For example, the MBSA project has organized farmer field schools to train a large number of farmers to Jatropha production.

Some of the inclusive models have helped farmers obtain certification against standards that are demanded in export markets. For example, the ITFC project in Ghana helped its outgrowers become certified to the European Union’s organic agriculture standard and the GlobalGAP standard. Through the organic certification the farmers have gained access to the European Union’s market, the largest market for organic foods in the world, where they can obtain higher prices for their products. Similarly, the GlobalGAP certification gives farmers access to several large-scale retail chains in developed markets. Thus, successful inclusive projects can help small-scale farmers in developing countries access international value chains and increase the value of their products. The access is not direct in the initial stage, in the sense that the farmers export through the investing company. However, through this experience the farmer organization learns the requirements of export markets and gains marketing skills. This gradually builds its capacity to export directly in the longer term.

The studies suggest that in inclusive business models the investor (alone or with partner organizations) provides a number of public goods and services to the local community. These include housing, health and education. In the Tamale case study, for example, the project along with development NGOs built housing facilities for teachers, renovated the school and provided text books, nutritionally-balanced school meals and clean drinking water. It also provided training on health issues, prevention of bush fire, protection of biodiversity and local tree species and responsible harvesting of medicinal herbs. In the Kascol case study the company provided training on health. It should be noted that the provision of public goods is not a specific characteristic of such models. There are several examples of large plantations and nucleus estates that provide health, water or schooling benefits to local people. The difference may lie in the fact that in inclusive projects local people have more say in the selection of services to be provided in priority and in their management.

In addition to these tangible benefits, inclusive business models provide other types of advantages that may be even more important to long-term economic and social development. These include strengthening rural people’s self-esteem; outgrowers expressed higher levels of self-satisfaction, motivation and feeling of ownership than waged workers. The surveyed inclusive projects supported the organization of the local community, in particular farmers in the form of associations or cooperatives. They strengthened existing farmer associations and, when no such organization existed, they facilitated efforts by local farmers to create one. For example, the ITFC project and partner organizations (including the Ministry of Food and Agriculture) facilitated the establishment of the Organic Mango Outgrowers Association (OMOA) in Tamale. The association has some 1 200 members. In this way, inclusive business models contribute to the development of institutional capital. These are important assets for the expansion of the business venture and the growth of the local economy. The lack of effective farmer organizations is one of the main constraints to agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa.

However, the studies suggest that while inclusive business models can potentially benefit local economic development to a larger extent than large-scale land acquisition, the model per se is not a guarantee that the expected benefits will arise. More importantly, the expected positive impacts are unlikely to arise in the short term. Some commentators have tended to portray inclusive business models as the ideal solution to
the agricultural investment dilemma. However, the studies reveal a more mixed picture. They could only find limited evidence of the expected benefits. The time factor is critical. Some investment projects have less than five years of implementation. In view of the long time frame for returns on agricultural investments, it is obviously too early for their full effects to be observed. Time will provide more evidence on the impacts on local economic development.

Furthermore, inclusive business models face strong challenges and high costs in their initial phase. They are unlikely to be profitable during the first years and this has an impact on the participating local farmers. For example, MBSA has not paid dividends to farmer shareholders because it has not made any profit yet, while in the case of Kascol the dividends are used to pay back a bank loan that outgrowers took to purchase their shares in the company. In the case of ITFC it will take 14 years before growers can obtain the full income from their mango orchards (although some limited income has materialized and increased gradually). This long time frame is the result of two factors: the long cycle of tree crops that require several years before entering into full production and the need for outgrowers to repay the loans to the company during the first years. The fact that the venture is not profitable in the starting phase is not a surprise: investing in developing country agriculture requires considerable of time, capital and expertise. The recovery period is long by definition.

In the case of inclusive business models, these characteristics are compounded by higher transaction costs due to the large number of local participants. Some outgrower schemes may involve hundreds of small-scale farmers. Their education level is generally lower than that of businessmen, not to mention the language barrier. Even in the presence of a common language, communication problems can affect the development of the project. These problems commonly arise between the investor and the local community, but also within the community, in particular between the local leaders (who are supposed to represent the interests of the community in the project but might have conflicts of interests) and the rest of the community.

The studies suggest that even in the case of inclusive business models there is generally one individual (or at best a handful of individuals) who drives the project due to his/her specific knowledge, background, experience and connections. Arguably there is a need for strong leaders and they have an important driving role to play especially at the inception of the project, but they may later become an obstacle to the greater participation of the community and the redistribution of profits. The capture of the benefits by the local elite is still possible, although its probability may be lower than in the classical form of foreign investment.

In order to overcome these various types of constraints, inclusive investment models need substantial external support (public and private) initially to ensure that the expected benefits materialize. In the case of Kascol, the presence of the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) as shareholder was critical. The CDC provided capital with a demand on the return to investment that was below the level demanded by commercial lenders. It also designed and managed the establishment of the project and brought much-needed expertise in management. Another large shareholder, the Zambia Sugar Company provided expertise in agricultural production and local knowledge. In the case of the ITFC, the mango production project received support from a variety of private and public sector institutions, including a number of Dutch NGOs, Ghana’s Ministry of Agriculture, the African Development Foundation, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. Similarly, MBSA in Mali has been supported by international donors and NGOs. The Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) from the Netherlands is one of its majority shareholders.

It must be borne in mind that these partnerships bring together players (agribusiness, local farmers) with very different negotiating power, and that sustained support to farmers groups is key to making them work.
The presence of enabling factors is critical in determining the success of a business model. The existence of farmer organizations that are effective and genuinely represent the local farmers is certainly an important success factor. The internal dynamics, decision making mechanisms and workings of the farmer organization will determine its success in negotiating a good deal with the investor and engage in sustainable growth. Farmer organizations that are based on effective participation of members, democratic decision making and redistribution of profits are likely to be more successful in the long-term even though the nature of the democratic decision making may create some delays in the initial phase. But this is the price to be paid for building consensus and trust that will prove an invaluable asset in the medium and long terms.

The presence in the locality of farmer leaders that have technical knowledge, experience of the crop, a vision for development and access to decision makers is another significant enabling factor, as illustrated by the MBSA case study. These leaders with a vision are pioneers and drivers that can induce profound changes in the local community. Their role is determinant in the initial phase of the project. However, democratic mechanisms for the appointment and renewal of leaders should be in place. Strong leaders who stay in control of the project for too long might eventually become an obstacle to development in the longer term, as they can act as a barrier between the foreign investor and the other members of the community.

The contractual arrangements that govern the relationship between the investor and the local farmers are critical. However, the farmers seldom have the technical and legal knowledge necessary for the negotiation of fair contract terms and conditions. The difference in bargaining power often creates an unbalanced deal with a contract that favours the investor disproportionately over the local community and the host country. The local authorities can only provide limited help, as they often are in a similar situation of insufficient expertise. In some of the case studies the intervention of independent third parties (e.g. development agencies or the African Development Bank in the case of Mali) was useful to provide the missing knowledge and increase the bargaining power of the local community.

5. Other determinants of impacts

The studies suggest that while the type of business model is an essential determinant, it is not sufficient per se to ensure positive outcomes. Other factors have a strong influence on the impacts of agricultural FDI on the local community, its economic development and the wider economy of the host country. These factors are discussed below.

5.1 Good governance

The existence of a good governance system in the host country appears to be a key determinant, if not the most important one. The quality and adequacy of laws and regulations, their effective enforcement and the existence of grievance and redress mechanisms are extremely important factors. The land tenure system, laws and regulations and clear property rights should create conditions that ensure secure access to land for investors and local people. Also essential is the existence of adequate regulations on investment, agriculture, water, the use of natural resources and other sectors related to agricultural production and their effective implementation. Good governance, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, peace, stability, the absence of corruption and participation are conducive to more sustainable investment projects.

Conversely, investment projects that fail or have negative impacts on the local community and the environment are generally the result of governance failures. The existence of effective national institutions that have the capacity to effectively review investment proposals, improve their design, involve local stakeholders and enforce regulations is essential. The capacity of
the host government to monitor and enforce investment contracts is an important factor, including the capability of local governmental institutions to intervene to correct failures and develop mechanisms for mediation and conflict resolution.

5.2 Local context

The social and economic conditions in the area where the investment is made are important determinants. The presence of adequate infrastructure and an educated workforce increases the rate of success. Communities that have a good level of organization, solidarity, collaboration and where members participate actively in decision making and have a relatively high level of education and technical knowledge are likely to negotiate better deals. As a result, the agreement will be more balanced, the likelihood of opposition lower and the project will have a higher probability of success.

In the local context, the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs), in particular farmer organizations plays an important role. A well-functioning local group of farmers can be a strong asset for a foreign investor. It will complement the technology, capital and management expertise of the investor with local assets (especially natural assets such as land and water), skills and knowledge. This may create a win-win partnership.

5.3 Involvement of local stakeholders

The active involvement of local civil society organizations in the project, in particular local farmer organizations is a critical factor. This point has been discussed in details in the above section on inclusive business models.

5.4 Formulation and negotiation process

The process through which the investment project is negotiated, designed and planned is essential. Processes that are transparent, inclusive, participatory, democratic and documented tend to lead to more successful and sustainable investment outcomes, even if these characteristics mean that delays will be likely at the initial stage.

5.5 Contents of investment contract

The terms and conditions of the investment contract will determine the relationship between the project partners, the sharing of responsibilities, decision making, benefits and risks. Investment contracts are often too general and vague. There is a need for well-specified and enforceable terms. In particular, the contract should specify the benefits that the investor will bring to the local community (e.g. number of jobs created, type of infrastructure built and training provided).

5.6 Profile of the investor

The profile of the investing company, its management and technical skills, its experience in the production of the crop and its priority objectives (e.g. speculation, long-term development, long time horizon for financial return) will have an important impact on the outcome of the investment. In the Kascol case, the CDC’s willingness to accept lower than average financial returns on its capital in the initial phase contributed to the success of the project. The ability of local project managers to maintain good communication with the local community and forge partnerships with its members is critical.

5.7 Support from third parties

The presence of impartial and effective external support from third parties is an important enabling factor, especially in the case of inclusive business models as detailed above. Good intentions are not sufficient; supporting organizations should have the relevant experience, skills and knowledge if they are to play an effective supportive role.
5.8 Type of production system and crops

The impacts on the local economy will also depend on the production system and crops selected by the investor. Production systems that rely on a large quantity of imported synthetic inputs and equipment are unlikely to create backward linkages with the local economy. Conversely, other systems make a large use of local inputs. This is the case of agro-ecological farming and organic agriculture. The type of crops selected by the project is also important. Crops such as coffee, fruits and vegetables are more conducive to the involvement of smallholder farmers than industrial crops.
PART SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Part 6: Conclusions and recommendations

The available data confirm that there has been a marked rise in FDI into the agri-food sector of developing countries since 2007. Although agricultural FDI flows contracted after their peak of 2009, their level in the 2010-2011 period was still higher than the average for 2003-2007. The flows are characterized by regional patterns whereby intra-regional flows are greater than inter-regional flows except for Africa. The share of FDI that goes to the agri-food sector almost doubled between the periods 2000-2005 and 2006-2008 but is still low compared to other economic sectors, accounting for less than 5 percent over the period 2006-2008. The bulk of agricultural FDI flows is directed to the food manufacturing sector, while primary agricultural production accounted for less than 10 percent over the period 2006-2008. More recent trends for foreign investment in the primary agricultural sector are difficult to track due to the lack of recent disaggregated data.

The case studies presented in this book provide some evidence on the various types of impacts (economic, social and environmental) of foreign agricultural investment at national and local levels in the host country. The observed impacts were very diverse and the studies shed light on the various factors that condition the success or failure of agricultural investments. Overall, their findings are consistent with those of other studies, although it is difficult to draw general conclusions due to the limitations inherent in the case study approach.

1. Large-scale land acquisition

Over the last four years many analysts, development agencies, NGOs and the media have focused on one specific category of primary agricultural investment, namely acquisition of agricultural land on a large scale. This emphasis is due to the numerous economic, political, social and environmental implications that land acquisition has, especially if it is done by foreigners or for them. Estimates of the area acquired by foreign firms vary substantially across sources due to methodological differences. The more reliable cross-checked figures are not as high as what the media headlines suggest. Nevertheless, they do show that foreign investment in agricultural land in developing countries has increased markedly over the past decade. More importantly, the lands acquired by foreign investors tend to be among the best ones, with good soil quality, high production potential, irrigation and proximity to infrastructure and markets. As a majority of foreign investment projects aim at export markets or the production of biofuels, they may pose a threat to food security in low-income food-deficit countries, especially if they replace food crops that were destined for the local market. The net effect on food security will also depend on the additional income generated by the project, its sustainability and how it is distributed in the local economy.

Large-scale acquisition of agricultural land can have other adverse impacts, especially in countries where there is a lack of good governance, rule of law, transparency and clear land tenure rights. These negative effects include the displacement of smallholder farmers, the loss of grazing land for pastoralists, the loss of incomes and livelihoods for rural people, the depletion of productive resources, and in general, negative impacts on local livelihoods due to reduced access to resources, which may lead to social fragmentation. There is also evidence of adverse environmental impacts, in particular the degradation of natural resources such as land, water, forests and biodiversity. The case studies show that when such impacts arise they generate opposition to the project by local people, which at times translate in occupation of part of the land or hostile action such as damage to the company’s property. Opposition can force the investor to engage in costly and time-consuming litigation and lawsuits; it increases transaction costs and reduces the return to the investment. The negative effects are likely to be worse when the company only utilizes a small share of the land it has acquired in areas where land is high in demand.

This Chapter was prepared by Pascal Liu, Trade and Markets Division, FAO
While a number of studies document the negative impacts of large-scale land acquisition in developing countries, there is much less evidence of its benefits to the host country, especially in the short term and at local level. The main type of benefits appears to be the generation of employment, but there are questions as to the sustainability of the created jobs. In several projects the number of jobs has decreased over time and, in any case, was lower than what was initially announced by the investor. There is also the issue of the quality of the created employment and who benefits, as managerial positions tend to be occupied by expatriates or persons originating from other areas than that where the project is located. In some projects, even low-skilled worker jobs were mainly taken up by non-locals. Another expected advantage of FDI in developing countries is the transfer of technology. In the case of large-scale land acquisition the evidence is mixed. There is obviously a time dimension in the assessment of this effect as for other outcomes of investment. It may be that the investment was too recent for the transfer of technology to have occurred or to be observed.

In conclusion, the studies suggest that for investment involving large-scale land acquisitions in countries where land rights are unclear and insecure the disadvantages often outweigh the few benefits to the local community, especially in the short run. This outcome is even more likely when the acquired land was previously utilized by local people whether in a formal or informal manner. Consequently, acquisition of already-utilized land to establish new large farms should be avoided and other forms of investment should be considered. Even from the investor’s perspective, business models that do not involve the transfer of land control are likely to be more profitable.

2. Inclusive business models

The studies suggest that investment projects which give local farmers an active role and leave them in control of their land tend to have positive effects on local economic and social development. Successful projects combine the strengths of the investor (capital, management expertise and technology) with those of local farmers (labour, land, traditional know-how and knowledge of the local conditions). This combination can provide the basis for win-win outcomes. Business models that leave farmers in control of their land give them incentive to invest in the improvement of the land. Since the bulk of agricultural investment comes from farmers themselves, these models are more likely to raise the level of agricultural investment in developing countries. Also, inclusive business models empower farmers by giving them a say in the implementation of the project or even its management. In some cases, farmers are shareholders and therefore they are joint owners of the business. These characteristics make inclusive business models more conducive to sustainable development than land acquisition.

However, their benefits do not arise immediately. The time factor is essential. By their nature inclusive models involve more stakeholders, hence building consensus on the project requires time and decision-making is slower. Transaction costs are high, especially in the initial phase. They should be viewed as a necessary investment that will enable higher returns in the longer term. However, most companies need relatively rapid returns to their investment and their time frame is not compatible with that of local economic development. There is a need for ‘patient capital’ provided by investors with a longer time horizon initially to ensure that the expected benefits materialize. Such investors are usually from the public sector (e.g. governments, development banks and sovereign-wealth funds) or the non-profit sector, but some private companies such as “impact investors” and “social investors” also have longer time frames and their number is increasing.

The high transaction costs inherent in inclusive models and their heterogeneous nature makes them very fragile in the beginning. There is a high risk that faced with high initial costs, slow progress and the absence of tangible benefits in the starting phase, both the investor and local players might become discouraged and abandon.
Conclusions and recommendations

Part 6: Conclusions and recommendations

The project. This situation increases the possibility of misunderstanding, suspicion and distrust. Consequently, inclusive investment models require substantial support from an independent and competent third party which can play the role of honest broker and facilitate collaboration between the investor and the local community. The projects surveyed in this book received substantial support from a variety of institutions such as governmental agencies, foreign development agencies, NGOs and multilateral banks.

Support is also needed to strengthen the capacity of local farmer organizations so that they can become a more solid business partner for the foreign investor. The support organization can help them raise their bargaining power to create a more level playing field. Training the leaders of farmer groups will help them represent better their members in the negotiations, communicate more effectively with them, adopt effective management practices and promote democratic decision making in their organization.

There is a broad variety of inclusive business models and the studies suggest that none of them can be presented as the ideal solution to agricultural development in all contexts. There is no one-size-fits-all. Different situations will require different models. Local economic and social factors including the level of organization of the community, the strength of local institutions, the technical level of farmers and the effectiveness of their organizations will condition the type of model which is most likely to succeed. In cases where farmers are unable or reluctant to create an organization, contract farming may be the most appropriate model. Conversely, in communities where there is a strong tradition of collaboration and effective farmer organizations, an outgrower scheme giving farmers a share of the capital, or possibly a joint-venture between the investing company and a farmer cooperative, may be the most appropriate option. Other factors that condition the success of business models include the national legal and institutional framework, the specific terms and conditions of the investment contract and the experience, skills and motivations of the investor.

Obviously there is a tradeoff between benefits and risks for local farmers. The higher their participation in the venture and their share of its benefits, the more risks they bear in case of failure. Therefore, their level of involvement in the business should be commensurate to the strength of their organization. Weak farmer organizations should avoid being directly exposed to responsibilities and risks that they do not have the capability to manage. Nevertheless, risk reduction strategies and tools (e.g. crop insurance) can be devised. External assistance can help farmer organizations develop such mechanisms. It can also take on the responsibility for some of the risks in the initial phase of the project and gradually transfer the responsibility back to the farmer organization as it becomes stronger.

3. International guidance

Among the many factors that condition the impacts of foreign investment on the local economy, the domestic laws and institutions governing agricultural investment and land tenure are critical. However, in developing countries they are often inadequate to ensure sustainable agricultural development, especially in terms of enforcement. Developing country governments and local institutions need support in the form of policy advice, capacity building and technical assistance. Useful guidance can be obtained from some of the international agreements that have been adopted in recent years. In particular, after three years of international consultations involving governments, civil-society organizations and companies, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) adopted in May 2012 the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of National Food Security (VGGT). The VGGT serve as a reference and provide guidance to improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the overarching goal of achieving food security for all. Implementation guides relating to specific issues are being developed. One of them will deal with agricultural investment. Another important

internationally-agreed instrument is the FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food3. 

In addition, the CFS is preparing to launch a consultation process for the development and broader ownership of principles for responsible agricultural investment that enhance food security and nutrition. It is expected that the principles resulting from the consultations will have international recognition and serve to guide agricultural investment. They will refer to and build on the VGGT. The consultations will take into account various existing instruments, including the voluntary principles for responsible agricultural investment that respect rights, livelihoods and resources (PRAI)4. The PRAI have been jointly formulated by FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank (the Interagency Working Group - IAWG) to serve as a possible reference framework for governments in the development of national policies, laws and regulations, or in the negotiation of international investment agreements and individual investment contracts. The PRAI are a set of very general principles that need to be translated into more operational guidance. To this end, the IAWG implements pilot projects with governments, investors and civil-society organizations in selected developing countries. The results of the projects will feed into the CFS consultations.

4. **Recommendations**

4.1 Further research on the impacts of agricultural investment

While the findings of the case studies indicate useful directions, one should refrain to draw general conclusions for several reasons. First of all, the case study approach has inherent limitations and cannot fully capture the wide variety of situations. Some observed changes may be due to other factors than the considered investment. Another reason is the issue of time frame. Most studies analyse recent investments, while the full effects may materialize many years after the investment has taken place. Over the long run, the outcomes of a project may change drastically. Finally, it is difficult to compare the results due to the differences in local contexts. Several research institutes and development agencies have conducted case studies on the impacts of FDI so far. However, comparing their results and drawing general conclusions is uneasy, as the studies use different analytical frameworks. There is a need for normalizing the approaches of the various research activities on the impacts of agricultural investment.

It is recommended that the organizations working in this area develop a common analytical framework that would be applied to all studies. They could develop a typology using the business model as the entry point, building on the available results of studies. The development of a common system could build on the Investment Development Indicators Framework, an analytical framework developed by UNCTAD for assessing the development impacts of investment. The Framework encompasses input-output analysis (backward and forward linkages) and a range of impact indicators in categories such as employment, economic value added and sustainable development. This instrument might be complemented as appropriate (e.g. at the level of the farm and/or of the local area) by the World Agricultural Watch's analytical tool. FAO and CIRAD collaborate on the establishment of the World Agricultural Watch to monitor structural changes at the farm/local area level and assess their effects on the three dimensions of sustainable development. More meta-analysis is necessary. The approach should consider the counterfactual. The common analytical tool should consider different geographical scales and time frames to capture the full effects of investment over space and time. It should examine the structural changes induced by the investment project over the short, medium and long term, at both macro- and microeconomic levels.

The case studies have not found sufficient evidence on the impacts on food security, although this is a fundamental issue in the current

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4. [www.responsibleagroinvestment.org](http://www.responsibleagroinvestment.org)
debates on resource-seeking foreign investment in agriculture. The lack of conclusive findings is probably linked to the fact that most of the surveyed investments were made recently, hence it was too early to evaluate their effects on food security. More gender-disaggregated analysis is also necessary to assess the differential effects of investment models on men and women.

The research has identified a large number of factors that determine the impacts of investment. These factors need to be clustered in broader categories, and their respective importance in different contexts should be assessed.

The financial returns of large-scale agricultural investments are seldom known. Future studies could consider analysing the financial returns of agribusiness in developing regions, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. Such studies could include the cost of developing a large-scale farming operation. Comparative analyses of the performance of agribusinesses and firms in other sectors could also be done.

The main topic of the studies was foreign agricultural investment. However, it is difficult to dissociate foreign and domestic investment, as they are often intertwined and complementary. The current analyses should be broadened to all forms and source of agricultural investment, including domestic investment, which is far greater than foreign investment. In the international debate on “land grabbing”, concerns have focused on the role of foreign investors. This can be easily explained by the implications in terms of sovereignty, national food security and other politically-sensitive issues. Yet, in most developing countries large domestic investors acquire more land than foreign ones and there is no evidence that these acquisitions are more respectful of the rights and interests of local communities. The research and debate on large-scale land acquisition should therefore include domestic investors more systematically and give them similar attention to foreign ones.

More importantly, investments by farmers account for the bulk of agricultural investment and play an essential role in ensuring food security in developing countries. Small-scale farmers and their families are both a fundamental source of agricultural investment and the possible victims of food insecurity. Investment by small-scale and family farms should be the focus of the research on increasing agricultural investment in low-income food deficit countries.

4.2 Policies for promoting investment for sustainable agricultural development

In order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by FDI while minimizing its risks, developing-country governments should ensure that the policies, laws and regulations governing land tenure and agricultural investment are consistent and mutually supportive in order to avoid loopholes and contradictions. There is a need for a coherent and comprehensive policy on agricultural investment, bringing together scattered provisions from different policies and laws. National land tenure systems must be clear and accountable. Governments should follow the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of National Food Security. The duration of land leases could be suited to the economics of investment projects, taking into account the area where the project is located, the size of the land to be leased, the business model and the economic activity. Governments could consider establishing a maximum area for land acquisitions. They should proactively protect the rights of the poor by ensuring that investors do not hold on to land they do not utilize for many years. Mechanisms should be put in place to allocate to investors only the land area that they can utilize within a reasonable span of time, and to withdraw land from investors who do not comply with agreed development plans.

Land allocation contracts could be published to ensure transparency and public scrutiny of the fairness of the deal. Coordination with related sectors (such as water management) should be enhanced so that the national political
and institutional framework is conducive to sustainable agricultural development.

Furthermore, measures are needed to strengthen the institutional capacity to monitor and enforce existing laws and regulations. It is necessary to strengthen the mechanisms to promote accountability in decision making related to land allocation. Land allocations should be subject to the free, prior and informed consent of local landholders. This would require going beyond generic consultation requirements already included in laws regulating impact assessment studies. Precise requirements and criteria should be set for meaningful environmental and social impact assessments. Impact assessment should be conducted with wide participation from concerned stakeholders. The reports of the assessments should be scrutinized by competent institutions where local people could have access. Investment contracts with companies should clearly specify that any land acquisition requires the consent of local landholders.

More generally, improving governance, transparency, accountability and the rule of law in all sectors will increase the positive impacts of FDI at both local and national levels.

In addition to ensuring an enabling environment, governments should take active steps to enhance the participation of local landholders and farmers in the design and implementation of the investment projects. Economically-sound projects that give local actors an active role and a say in decision-making should be favoured. Their financial participation through the distribution of shares in the business can be considered in order to promote better sharing of the project’s benefits. The shares could be jointly held in a collective trust to promote collaboration among local actors. Higher participation by local actors means higher benefits for them in case of success but also higher risks. Mechanisms should therefore be devised to reduce the risks, especially in the early stage of the project. Host governments could provide investors with incentives to involve local people, for example through discounts on the rent or taxes.

Government authorities should monitor and enforce the implementation of the contract by the investor. They should provide independent and effective mechanisms for channelling grievance and resolving dispute. They should support the development of organizations that genuinely represent local stakeholders, in particular farmer organizations, and strengthen their capacity.

More generally, governments should utilize the international guidance instruments indicated above.

Further, investments in rural infrastructure should be a priority. Governments should also invest more in the provision of education to rural communities, including vocational training and technical extension.

Finally, although this is outside the scope of this publication, it is important for governments to keep in mind that FDI only accounts for a small share of total agricultural investment and that national policies should give more emphasis to increasing domestic investment, in particular by farmers, as they account for the bulk of investment in agriculture.

4.3 Increasing the effectiveness of support

The studies suggest that good governance at both national and local levels is one of the most important conditions, if not the first one, for positive impacts of foreign investment on local development. The organizations that provide assistance to governments, farmer organizations and other stakeholders in developing countries should support efforts to strengthen the governance systems at national and local levels. Before designing support programmes they should analyse the needs of governments and local civil society organizations in terms of capacity building, policy advice and technical support. They should provide developing country governments with guidance, including practical assistance in analysing investment proposals and making informed decisions. To this end, they could set up a specialized technical assistance facility and training
programmes for government officials. The facility could train local consultants who could then act as local resources. They could help governments formulate policies that orient FDI in directions that enhance smallholder family farm investments and livelihoods and national food security. They could support consultations between governments and major actors, in particular small-scale producers, for developing such policies. The capacity of government agencies to negotiate contracts with investors should be strengthened.

In addition, it is essential to strengthen the capacity of local communities, farmer groups and other civil society organizations to analyse and negotiate projects with investors and governments. There is often an asymmetry of information and power. A more level playing field must be created. Local communities must be informed of their rights. Legal assistance should be provided when an investment project is being considered. There is a need for training, capacity building, technical advice and assistance at all levels.

Development organizations should support inclusive negotiation processes at various levels, especially in the negotiations between the government and the investor, between the government and the local community, between the investor and the local community, and between the different stakeholders within the local community. They should assist developing country governments in formulating agricultural development strategies that focus on investment that nurtures sustainable food security and supports family farming. This formulation work should be done in collaboration with farmer groups and other organization genuinely representing the various interest groups of civil society.

Support programmes should identify schemes that reconcile the development objectives of host countries and local communities with the commercial objectives of investors. Strategically targeted development aid can play an important role in promoting commercially viable and socially inclusive models of agricultural investment. It is possible to bridge the gap by providing investors with incentives to design and implement projects that yield sustainable benefits to the local community as a whole.

Development organizations should raise the awareness of key investors (e.g. industry leaders and business champions) on the importance of a responsible approach to agricultural investment to their own business interests. Engaging them in the development and implementation of guidance tools such as principles for responsible agricultural investment is likely to promote adoption and a sense of ownership. They could become the best advocates of a responsible investment approach vis-à-vis other companies. This would accelerate the pace of dissemination and buy-in of the guidance tools.

With the support of development organizations, governments should devise tools to reduce the risks of foreign agricultural investment for local farmer organizations. The risk management strategy should be adapted to the level of development of the local organization.

Support programmes should promote and support multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development. The roles of the public and private sectors are complementary and cannot always be substituted for each other, although their respective roles may differ by location depending, among other factors, on the level of economic and institutional development of the country and the nature of the agricultural development challenges at hand. A successful strategy for agricultural investment must be based on a partnership between governments, donors and farmers, in which each delivers in its area of responsibility.

4.4 A more proactive role for civil society organizations

Agricultural investment projects are more likely to benefit local economic and social development when local farmers and landholders play an active role. In order to be successful, inclusive business models require effective local organizations.
These organizations should be consulted and the detailed arrangements of the project should be negotiated with them, including the sharing of benefits, as discussed above. Further, local NGOs should actively engage in raising community awareness regarding civil rights and how to exercise those rights. They should advocate for better recognition of community rights by investing companies and local authorities.

Local NGOs should closely monitor potential conflicts between local communities and investing companies, keep records and inform the public. They can play the role of whistle-blower and draw the attention of the local and national authorities when a project is creating hardship to the local community or damaging natural resources. In order to represent the interests of their members effectively, these organizations should establish procedures to ensure that they function in a democratic and effective manner. Their management should be transparent and accountable to all members. Organizations aiming to be the voice of the local community must ensure that groups that tend to be underrepresented such as women, the youth, landless farmers and migrant workers are given a say in the decision-making.
Substantial increases in agricultural investments in developing countries are needed to combat poverty and realize food security and nutrition goals. There is evidence that agricultural investments can generate a wide range of developmental benefits, but these benefits cannot be expected to arise automatically and some forms of large-scale investment carry risks for host countries. Although there has been much debate about the potential benefits and risks of international investment, there is no systematic evidence on the actual impacts on the host country and their determinants.

In order to acquire an in-depth understanding of potential benefits, constraints and costs of foreign investment in agriculture and of the business models that are more conducive to development, FAO has undertaken research in developing countries. The research aims to provide better knowledge on the trends and impacts of foreign direct investment on host communities and countries, to gather evidence on inclusive business models, to identify good practices and to develop guidance for host governments.

This publication summarizes the results of this research, in particular through the presentation of the main findings of case studies in nine developing countries. It presents case studies on policies to attract foreign investment in agriculture and their impacts on national economic development in selected countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The publication also examines the business models that were used in selected agricultural investments in five developing countries. It assesses their economic, environmental and social impacts at the local level and how they are influenced by national policies. It then offers a synthesis of the studies’ findings and points to the main factors determining the impacts of investment projects. The publication concludes with recommendations for policy makers, local community organizations, development organizations and researchers.