

FORM A**COMMENTS ON THE WORK PROGRAMME OR ITEMS DOCUMENTED IN THE REPORT THAT DO NOT INCLUDE ANNEXES****Japan****Code Commission September 2024****Title of the item in the report or item in the work programme annex:**

Work Programme – New proposal.

Proposal/Comment:

Japan requests the Code Commission to consider reviewing Chapter 8.8. Infection with Foot and Mouth Disease Virus (FMDV) to add recommendations for importation of fresh meat of bovines from FMD infected countries or zones previously free from FMD without vaccination, which are applicable to before their recovery of FMD-free status without vaccination.

Rationale:

In the current Chapter 8.8., there are recommendations for importation of fresh meat of bovines from countries or zones infected with FMDV, where an official control programme exists, which are applicable to an FMD-endemic country or zone where regular vaccination is implemented.

However it is not applicable to a case when infection of FMD occurs in a country or zone previously free from FMD without vaccination and emergency vaccination is applied followed by the slaughtering of all vaccinated animals thus regular vaccination is not expected to be implemented. Japan would like to emphasis the need for addition of recommendations for importation of fresh meat of bovines from such country or zone, which do not require regular vaccination.

Supporting evidence: not relevant.

SECTION 4.

DISEASE PREVENTION AND CONTROL

CHAPTER 4.X.

BIOSECURITY

[...]

Article 4.X.87.

Components of biosecurity

Biosecurity can be applied to any type of *population*. The components of *biosecurity* focus on reducing the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents through interactions with elements outside the *population* (*external biosecurity*) and on reducing risk of transmission of pathogenic agents within the *population* (*internal biosecurity*). All relevant components of *biosecurity* should be applied to address all sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways as well as unexpected risks events, and may vary according to the *population*. *Biosecurity* can be divided into: 1) *external biosecurity*, and 2) *internal biosecurity*. *External biosecurity* mainly focuses on interactions with elements outside the *population* (e.g. other farms, other regions) whereas *internal biosecurity* focuses on reducing risk of transmission between elements of the *population*. The distinction between *external* and *internal biosecurity* is not absolute and can vary depending on the scale considered (e.g. country, region, *herd/flock*). Several components of *biosecurity* may need to be applied to a *population* and *subpopulation* to address all sources of pathogenic agents, transmission pathways, sources of *pathogenic agents* and unexpected *risks*. The components of *biosecurity* should be documented in a *biosecurity plan* when possible.

1. Components of external biosecurity may include the following:

- a) Introduction of *animals*, *animal products* and *germinal products* should be minimised as much as possible and if undertaken, the *animal health status* of the *animal* and their source *population* should be assessed.
- b) Whenever *animals* are introduced into ~~a the~~ *population*, they should go through an monitored isolation period of sufficient length, during which measures may be implemented to mitigate ~~minimise~~ the risk of transmission of pathogenic agents.
- c) ~~Direct~~ Contact between *populations* of unknown or different *animal health status* should be avoided through segregation using managerial measures, ~~or~~ physical or natural barriers.
- d) Human access to the *population* should be managed controlled. When humans come in contact ~~with the contact between humans and animals, they should be limited where possible but when required take precautionary measures should be used to mitigate~~ reduce the risk of bi-directional transmission of pathogenic agents, which includes as a minimum such as wearing farm-dedicated specific clothing and footwear, and hand hygiene.
- e) Equipment used to handle or care for *animals* should not be shared between different *populations*. If shared, equipment should undergo cleaning and disinfection before and after use.
- f) Transport vehicles in ~~direct and indirect~~ contact with *animals* or their products should undergo cleaning and disinfection before and after use.
- g) *Animal products*, Faeces, or manure or waste materials should be handled in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents.

- h) ~~Dead animals and parts thereof should be handled, and stored and disposed of in a way to mitigate the spread of pathogenic agents and in specific containers, or in designated areas to avoid contact with or attraction of other animals in particular wildlife and arthropods.~~
- i) ~~Feed should be produced, stored and transported in dedicated equipment to minimise the contact with potential sources of pathogenic agents only for the purpose of feeding animals.~~ Feeding of untreated swill should be avoided. Water should originate from low-risk sources or be treated to remove or inactivate with pathogenic inactivating agents prior to use. The safety of the water and feed should be checked regularly.
- j) ~~Direct and indirect contacts between the population and pets, birds, rodents, insects and birds, pets, other wildlife, or pests and the population should be avoided using engineering, mechanical or chemical control.~~
- k) ~~To minimise airborne transmission of pathogenic agents, Sufficient distance between populations and other possible sources of pathogenic agents should be considered. In some circumstances, air treatments/air filtration might be considered. when feasible and sufficient distance or other measures cannot be implemented to mitigate the risk of transmission.~~
- l) When cleaning and *disinfection* or other measures are not feasible or effectiveness is undetermined, an additional period of no contact between potential ~~carriers~~ sources of pathogenic agents (e.g. ~~people/humans~~, buildings, *vehicles*, equipment, materials, pastures ~~and air spaces~~) and the *population* ~~can~~ may be applied. The effectiveness of this measure will depend on the specific circumstances and should be verified.

2. Components of internal biosecurity

Japan	<p>Category: editorial</p> <p>Proposed amended text: 2. <u>Components of internal biosecurity may include the following:</u></p> <p>Rationale: For consistency with 1. <u>Components of external biosecurity.</u></p>
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- a) ~~Diseased/Sick animals~~ should be isolated to prevent other *animals* from being exposed. Treatments should be administered safely to avoid iatrogenic transmission.
- b) All-in all-out management should be applied to all *animals* kept in the same air space including cleaning and disinfection of the space between groups of animals.
- c) Stocking densities that ~~may~~ result in impaired health through increased transmission rates of pathogenic agents or increased susceptibility to *infections* should be avoided/avoided/considered in the risk analysis.
- d) ~~Animals Within the population, units with~~ different characteristics such as age and immune status ~~should~~ be kept separately.
- e) ~~It is advisable to organise the~~ When the management of the population involves contact with different units, the workflow should be organised according to disease the risk assessed for each animal category, starting at from the lowest risk to and ending with the highest risk of infection, considering transmission of pathogenic agents and susceptibility of the units. When moving between the units, Whenever entering into contact with a new group or new animal category, biosecurity measures to mitigate transmission of pathogenic agents such as changing footwear and clothing and conducting hand hygiene should be applied/considered. Dedicated equipment or material should be used in each group.
- f) Cleaning and *disinfection* of the equipment and surfaces should be applied between consecutive groups of *animals*.

[...]

CHAPTER 1.6.

PROCEDURES FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, ENDORSEMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CONTROL PROGRAMME, AND PUBLICATION OF A SELF-DECLARATION OF ANIMAL HEALTH STATUS, BY WOA

[...]

Article 1.6.4.

Specific provisions

The animal health status of a country or zone is not affected by:

- the presence of the disease, infection, or infestation in imported animals in a quarantine centre;
- the importation or the presence of the *pathogenic agent*, or of *commodities* or organisms carrying the *pathogenic agent*, in a *laboratory* or other *approved* facilities with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the *Terrestrial Manual*.

This should be supported by evidence of compliance with all relevant standards of the *Terrestrial Code* and *Terrestrial Manual*.

Japan	<p>Category: addition</p> <p>Proposed amended text:</p> <p><u>The animal health status of a country or zone is not affected by:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">– <u>the presence of the disease, infection, or infestation in imported animals in a quarantine centre;</u>– <u>the importation or the presence of the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, in a <i>laboratory</i> or other <i>approved</i> facilities with appropriate laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity in accordance with the <i>Terrestrial Manual</i>;</u>– <u>the presence of the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, or of <i>commodities</i> or organisms carrying the <i>pathogenic agent</i>, at a border inspection post</u> <p>Rationale:</p> <p>There may be the case where a pathogenic agent of a listed disease or a disease referred to in the importing country requirements, or a commodity or organism carrying such pathogenic agent is detected by import quarantine at border inspection posts. Provided that appropriate actions are taken following the detection of the pathogenic agent, such detection should not affect the animal health status of the importing country.</p> <p>Without the clarification in this regard, for example, if a small hive beetle (<i>Aethina tumida</i>) is detected in honey at a border inspection post of an importing country, free status of the country may be affected by the presence of the beetle in accordance with Chapter 9.4.</p>
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CHAPTER 5.6.

MEASURES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE INTO THE IMPORTATION OF COMMODITIES

Article 5.6.1.

Purpose and scope

This chapter provides general principles for measures and procedures that are applicable ~~to in~~ the importation of *commodities* to prevent the spread of pathogenic agents through *international trade of commodities*, without creating unjustified restrictions, covering from ~~the time of arrival at the~~ point of entry border of the *importing country* until clearance of *commodities*.

This chapter provides *importing countries* with recommendations on measures and procedures, and the roles and responsibilities of the *Veterinary Authority* and other relevant Competent Authorities, and of any natural or legal entity or person responsible for import of commodities subject to the provisions of this chapter ~~business operators (hereafter 'operator')~~, in addition to responsibilities that are described in Article 5.1.2. This chapter provides guidance to ensure the quality and ~~implementation performance~~ of official controls for importation. This chapter not only covers legal importation, but also provides general recommendations for illegal or informal entry of commodities.

Japan	<p>Category: general</p> <p>Japan requests that the Code Commission provide clarification on 'informal entry of commodities'.</p> <p>Rationale: In the current Terrestrial Animal Health Code, "informal entry of commodities" is not used and it would be better to avoid ambiguous words.</p>
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~~The animal health status of the importing country or zone is not affected by the presence of disease or infection in imported animals in a quarantine centre or at a border inspection post.~~

[...]

Article 5.6.3.

General principles applicable to procedures for import official controls for importation

Veterinary Authority or other relevant Competent Authorities should ~~take control of~~ the imported *commodities* to ~~decide~~ determine whether or not the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

Import-Official controls should be ~~performed~~ implemented at an appropriate place which might include a *border inspection post*, a point of entry, *quarantine centre*, the place of destination, or premises of the operator responsible for the consignment. The consignment should remain under the control of the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities until formal clearance.

In case of emergency, ships and aircrafts may be granted access to a port or airport ~~which that~~ are not their intended destination. In those cases, they should be subjected to the animal health and animal welfare measures which the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities may consider necessary based on the potential risk.

1. Official inspection

Where official inspections of *commodities* are ~~performed~~ implemented, they should always include a documentary check and, depending on the risk to human and animal health and *animal welfare*, should also include identity checks and physical inspection checks. When the *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* Services ~~needs to have~~ full access to the consignment for the purpose of identity checks or physical inspection, consignments should be partially or fully unloaded from the means of transport.

a) Documentary check

A documentary check should be ~~implemented~~ performed on all consignments presented for official ~~controls inspection~~ to ensure that they meet the *importing country* requirements.

~~A~~ Documentary check should include examination of the *international veterinary certificate*, and possibly of laboratory reports or other documents, including those of a commercial nature, which are required to accompany the consignment.

When ~~implementing~~ performing a documentary check, the ~~Veterinary Authority or other Competent Authorities/Services~~ should inspect the required documents, in original or their digital equivalents as agreed between the *importing* and *exporting country*, to ensure that:

- i) the *international veterinary certificate* has been issued by the *Official Veterinarian* of the *exporting country*; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds as relevant to the model ~~established~~ established by the importing country or agreed between the exporting and by the importing country where applicable for that commodity and intended use, ~~based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.;~~ and

Japan	<p>Category: addition</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">i) the international veterinary certificate has been issued by the Official Veterinarian of the exporting country; complies with relevant principles set out in Article 5.2.3. and corresponds <u>as relevant</u> to the model established <u>established by the importing country or agreed between the exporting and by the importing country where applicable</u> for that commodity and intended use, based on Chapters 5.10. to 5.13.; and <p>Rationale: As mentioned in the ad hoc Group in April 2024, the international veterinary certificate may not always be based on bilateral negotiation.</p>
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- ii) the information contained in the checked documents complies with the *importing country* requirements.

b) Identity check

~~An~~ Identity check should be ~~implemented~~ performed upon arrival of ~~the~~ consignment at the point of inspection, as a visual inspection to verify that the content and the labelling of a consignment, including the identification of *commodities*, seals and means of transport, correspond to the information declared in the *international veterinary certificate* and accompanying documents.

The frequency of identity checks, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for ~~sampling~~ selection for checking should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on *risk assessment*.

c) Physical inspection

Physical inspection should include, as appropriate:

- i) clinical examination of ~~an animals~~ for evidence of ~~transmissible~~ diseases and *animal welfare* issues
- ii) ~~and~~ physical checks of *animal products* and *germinal products*,
- iii) ~~and, as appropriate,~~ checks on packaging and labelling,
- iv) checks on the means of transport, ~~labelling~~ and temperature records,
- v) ~~the~~ sampling for analysis, testing or diagnosis, and
- vi) any other checks required by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities to verify compliance with the *importing country* requirements.

The frequency of physical inspection, the quantity of *commodities* to be inspected as well as the criteria for sampling selection for physical inspection should be determined by the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of the importing country based on *risk assessment*, and considering the following:-

i) For aAnimals

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* of the *importing country* should determine the number of *animals* to be clinically examined~~ should be determined in accordance with the overall number of *animals* in the consignment and the declared purpose of the *animals*, ~~which it~~ may be increased if the physical checks carried out have not been satisfactory.

~~In some cases, such as *F*for *animals* that are not required to be identified individually and *animals* considered to be dangerous, clinical examination~~ should *could* consist of observation of the state of health and behaviour of the entire group or of a representative number of *animals*.

If the clinical examination reveals an anomaly, a more thorough clinical examination may be carried out, including sampling and testing, where appropriate.

ii) ~~Germinal~~ For germinal products

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* should carry out~~ Physical checks of the consignment *should be carried out* to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including, when relevant, temperature records ~~when relevant~~ and the integrity of the seals, packaging material and cryogenic tanks.

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* of the *importing country* should determine the number of items to be checked, which may be increased if the checks carried out have not been satisfactory.~~

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with *importing country* requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include laboratory testing of the *germinal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

iii) For Aanimal products

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* should carry out~~ physical checks of the consignment *should be carried out* to verify the compliance of labelling and the transport conditions with *importing country* requirements, including temperature records when relevant and the integrity of the packaging material and seals.

~~The *Veterinary Authority* or other *Competent Authorities* may carry out physical checks to verify that the labelling complies with *importing country* requirements.~~

Physical inspection may include sensory examination and laboratory testing of the *animal products*.

If the physical checks reveal an anomaly, a more thorough inspection may be carried out.

2. Sampling and testing

Sampling and testing of imported *commodities* ~~with a view to checking compliance with the *health-importing country* requirements laid down in the *international veterinary certificate*,~~ may be implemented performed following a risk-based sampling plan or upon suspicion of non-compliance resulting from the documentary, identity or physical checks of *commodities*, without creating unjustified barriers to trade. Testing should be implemented performed in an ~~approved~~ laboratory.

The *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant *Competent Authorities* may develop a risk-based sampling plan for imported consignments, that should specify the percentage of consignments to be sampled, taking into account

the animal health status of the importing and exporting country, the species concerned, the nature and declared purpose of the *commodities*, the number of incoming consignments and the results of previous sampling.

Where no immediate danger to animal health or public health is suspected from *commodities* sampled in accordance with a sampling plan, a consignment may be released before the results of laboratory tests are available. A traceability system should be in place to recall commodities if needed.

3. Sanitary measures at import

To meet the *importing country* requirements, in addition to the *sanitary measures* implemented in the *exporting countries*, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing country may require *sanitary measures* to be implemented at importation before release of the *commodities from official controls*. Measures may include *disinfection of* and ~~disinsection~~ elimination of arthropod vectors from ~~vehicles/vessels~~ means of transport and *containers* used in the transportation and *unloading of commodities*, in accordance with Chapter 4.14.

In the case of *animals*, measures may include *vaccination*, treatment or isolation. In the case of other *commodities*, measures may include a holding period or the application of physical or chemical treatment.

4. Release of consignments

Based on the ~~implemented~~ performed import official controls, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities of importing countries should decide whether the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements.

When the decision is made that the consignment complies with the *importing country* requirements and has been cleared for release, the *Veterinary Authority* or other relevant Competent Authorities should notify the ~~operator/importer~~ and the information should be made available to the customs authorities.

[...]
